[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
January 20, 2006
No. 05-13590 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
BIA Nos.
A97-185-604
A97-185-605
MAURICIO ADOLFO ECHEVERRI CARDONA,
MONICA PATRICIA TABARES RAMIREZ,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(January 20, 2006)
Before DUBINA, CARNES and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Mauricio Adolfo Echeverri Cardona (“Echeverri”), a native and citizen of
Colombia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order
adopting and affirming the immigration judge’s decision denying him asylum and
withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).1 We
dismiss the petition in part and deny the petition in part.
I.
Echeverri entered the United States as a non-immigrant visitor on March 28,
2000. He did not file his application for asylum until February 2003, after nearly
three years had passed.2
An alien is not entitled to asylum unless he demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that the application has been filed within one year after
arriving in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). An untimely asylum
application may still be considered if the alien demonstrates extraordinary
circumstances relating to the delay. Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
1
Echeverri also sought relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture;
however, he makes no arguments concerning CAT relief on appeal. He has therefore waived
that issue. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“Sepulveda does not raise any challenge in her brief to the denial of relief under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT). When an appellant fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is
abandoned.”); Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1308
n.43 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Claims not presented to the court of appeals are considered waived.”).
Accordingly, we deny the petition as it relates to CAT relief.
2
Echeverri is the primary applicant. His wife, Monica Patricia Tabares Ramirez, is a
derivative applicant, and therefore relies on Echeverri’s asylum application.
2
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Echeverri’s application for asylum
because his application was not filed within one year of his arrival in this country
and he failed to prove extraordinary circumstances which would excuse the
untimely filing. This Court is without jurisdiction to review that determination. 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3); Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir.
2003) (“section 1158(a)(3) divests our Court of jurisdiction to review a decision
regarding whether an alien complied with the one-year time limit or established
extraordinary circumstances that would excuse his untimely filing”); see also
Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 427 F.3d 954, 957 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding
that changes to the INA’s judicial review provisions by the Real ID Act, Pub.L.
No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), did not affect the jurisdictional bar of §
1158(a)(3)). Accordingly, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Echeverri’s petition
as to his asylum claim.
II.
Although we do not have jurisdiction to review the denial of Echeverri’s
asylum application, we do have jurisdiction to entertain his petition for review of
the denial of his application for withholding of removal. To qualify for
withholding of removal, an alien must show that, if returned to his native country,
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C.
3
§ 1231(b)(3)(A). The burden of proof is on the alien to show either that he has
suffered past persecution or that it is more likely than not that he will suffer future
persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b). The applicant’s testimony, “if credible,
may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.” Id.
The IJ did not separately address whether Echeverri was eligible for
withholding of removal. Instead, the IJ determined that, even if Echeverri’s
application for asylum had not been time-barred, he failed to establish either past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution necessary for the granting
of asylum.3 Because the more-likely-than-not standard for withholding of removal
is more stringent than the well-founded-fear standard for asylum, see Al Najjar v.
Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 2001), the IJ denied Echeverri’s
claim for withholding of removal.
The BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision; therefore, we review that
3
To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must first demonstrate that he is a refugee. 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). The INA defines “refugee” as follows:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .
Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). To establish refugee status, an applicant for asylum must present specific
and credible evidence that he has experienced past persecution or that he has a well-founded fear
of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)–(2); Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262,
1287 (11th Cir. 2001).
4
decision as well as the BIA’s decision. Id. at 1284. We review legal
determinations made by the BIA and the IJ de novo. D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 817 (11th Cir. 2004). We review the IJ’s and BIA’s findings
of fact under the substantial evidence test and must affirm the decision below “if it
is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.” Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1284 (quotation and citation
omitted). Under this highly deferential standard of review, a denial of relief may
be reversed only if the evidence “compels” it. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
481 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815 n.1 (1992).
We also review the IJ’s credibility determinations under the substantial
evidence test and “may not substitute [our] judgment for that of the [IJ] with
respect to credibility findings.” D-Muhumed, 388 F.3d at 818. “[A]n adverse
credibility determination alone may be sufficient to support the denial of an asylum
application,” but the IJ must still “consider other evidence produced by an asylum
applicant.” Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005).
When the IJ has made an adverse credibility determination, the applicant has the
burden of showing that “the IJ’s credibility decision was not supported by
‘specific, cogent reasons’ or was not based on substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting
D-Muhumed, 388 F.3d at 819).
The IJ found that, despite the fact that Echeverri worked for two Colombian
5
coffee growers’ associations in a “red zone” where he encountered Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”) guerillas, he had never been harmed by
them. The IJ found that there was no evidence that Echeverri had ever tried to
relocate within Colombia or that FARC guerillas had ever threatened him and his
wife at their home. The IJ also found that although Echeverri engaged in
community activity on behalf of the Liberal Party in Colombia, he had merely been
a collaborator and had never been a party member.
Echeverri claimed that FARC murdered his brother-in-law in May 1998 as
the two of them were leaving a political meeting and that FARC called his office
one year later and threatened him. The IJ found that the affidavits by three
individuals offered by Echeverri to support his claim for asylum were completed
five years after the fact and did not identify who killed Echeverri’s brother-in-law.
The IJ also found that Echeverri was not credible because, when he came to the
United States in May 1999 after the threatening phone call from FARC, he did not
then seek asylum but instead returned to Colombia sixty-one days later.
Based on our review of the record, we hold that substantial evidence
supports the IJ’s determination, as adopted by the BIA, that Echeverri is not
entitled to withholding of removal. Echeverri failed to prove that he had
previously been persecuted. The evidence shows that Echeverri encountered
FARC guerillas on three occasions between February and April 1998 while
6
working for the coffee growers’ association. During these encounters, Echeverri
was detained and interrogated but, as the IJ found, he was never harmed. These
instances, while frightening, are not sufficient to rise to the level of persecution.
See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“[P]ersecution is an extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents
of verbal harassment or intimidation. . . . [M]ere harassment does not amount to
persecution.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Nor did Echeverri prove that it is more likely than not that he will be
persecuted when he returns to Colombia. The only evidence that Echeverri’s life is
at risk in Colombia is his testimony that his brother-in-law was killed in May 1998
after a political meeting at which Echeverri was also present and that, one year
later, FARC guerillas called his office to take credit for the murder and to tell
Echeverri that “they were not going to fail,” apparently in reference to Echeverri
himself. After that phone call, Echeverri fled to the United States—without his
wife—but stayed only two months before returning to Colombia. He remained in
Colombia for several months, without incident,4 before returning to the United
States in March 2000. In total, between May 1998, when his brother-in-law was
killed, and his March 2000 arrival in this country, Echeverri received only one
4
Echeverri stated in his asylum application that his parents received a threatening phone
call after he returned from the United States; however, Echeverri did not testify to this fact
before the IJ.
7
equivocal threat and was never harmed. Based on this evidence, the IJ correctly
found that Echeverri did not have a well-founded fear of persecution (necessary for
asylum) and was therefore ineligible for withholding of removal.
Lastly, we note that the IJ provided specific, cogent reasons for his adverse
credibility determination. Substantial evidence supports these findings. Echeverri
never provided a clear answer as to why he did not file for asylum within one year
of coming to this country in March 2000. Echeverri also provided conflicting
answers about whether he was a Liberal Party member.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Echeverri’s petition for review of the
denial of withholding of removal.
DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
8