NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 9 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE GUSTAVO LARA-MORALES; No. 20-71733
KATHERINE MIHCELLE LARA-
HENRIQUEZ; SARA CAROLINA Agency Nos. A208-284-408
HENRIQUEZ DE LARA, A208-282-190
A208-282-191
Petitioners,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 6, 2021**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: NGUYEN, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Jose Gustavo Lara-Morales, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order upholding the denial
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal,
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Lara-Morales claims
his wife, Sara Carolina Henriquez de Lara, and his child, Katherine Michelle Lara-
Henriquez, as derivative beneficiaries of his application for asylum.1 We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the agency’s factual findings
for substantial evidence, Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir.
2006), and we deny the petition for review.
Lara-Morales claims past persecution and fear of future harm based on
membership in two particular social groups: “people who had business or
companies” in El Salvador and “his family that is targeted for extortion because
[Lara-Morales] appears to be a wealthy business owner.” During a merits hearing,
Lara-Morales testified that he previously owned a successful tailoring business in
El Salvador. According to Lara-Morales, in 2012, he and Henriquez de Lara were
robbed by three armed men during a visit to Henriquez de Lara’s mother’s house.
Three years later, in March 2015, gang members called Lara-Morales and visited
his business to extort him for $1,000. When Lara-Morales did not pay the men,
three gang members dressed in police uniforms attacked him on the street,
demanded $1,000 in monthly payments, and threatened to kill his family if he did
1
Henriquez de Lara and Lara-Henriquez filed separate applications for
withholding of removal and CAT relief.
2
not comply. After those incidents, Lara-Morales transferred ownership of his
business to a relative and fled El Salvador for the United States.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that, even if Lara-
Morales’ proposed particular social groups were cognizable, he failed to establish
that he would be persecuted “on account of” his membership in those groups.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.
2010). To prove the requisite nexus, Lara-Morales needed to introduce some
evidence of his persecutors’ motives. Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 739
(9th Cir. 2009); see also Zetino, 622 F.3d at 1016 (explaining that a “desire to be
free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang
members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). Although the IJ found Lara-
Morales’s testimony credible, she concluded that there was “no evidence, whether
direct or circumstantial, of [his] assailants’ motive[s].” The BIA determined that
this finding was not clearly erroneous. Because the record does not compel a
contrary conclusion, Petitioners’ claims for asylum and withholding of removal
fail.2
2
Our conclusion is not affected by the differing nexus standards that apply
to asylum and withholding of removal claims. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846
F.3d 351, 358-60 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing the “one central reason” standard for
asylum and the “a reason” standard for withholding of removal).
3
We do not reach Lara-Morales’s argument that substantial evidence does not
support the IJ’s determination that the Salvadoran government was unable or
unwilling to protect him from private persecutors. The BIA did not address that
issue. In reviewing the BIA’s decision, we “consider only the grounds relied upon
by that agency.” Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Petitioners failed to show it is more likely than not that they will be tortured if
returned to El Salvador. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033
(9th Cir. 2014).
PETITION DENIED.
4