UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-7736
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO LAMONT LIGHTFOOT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Peter J. Messitte, Senior District Judge. (8:99-cr-00409-PJM-1)
Submitted: July 2, 2021 Decided: July 13, 2021
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David Benowitz, PRICE BENOWITZ LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jonathan F.
Lenzner, Acting United States Attorney, Ellen E. Nazmy, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Antonio Lamont Lightfoot appeals from the district court’s order denying his
motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by
the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (“First
Step Act”). On appeal, Lightfoot argues that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to sufficiently explain its reasons for denying his motion, failing to provide evidence
that it considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and failing to consider his
post-sentencing rehabilitation. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the district court’s
order and remand for further consideration of Lightfoot’s motion.
We review a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for compassionate
release for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir.
2021). “In doing so, we ensure that the district court has not acted arbitrarily or irrationally,
has followed the statutory requirements, and has conducted the necessary analysis for
exercising its discretion.” United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 185 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing
United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018)).
Under § 603 of the First Step Act, district courts may reduce a term of imprisonment
if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” upon a motion of the
Bureau of Prisons or upon motion of the defendant after he has exhausted his administrative
remedies with the Bureau of Prisons. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). If a district court finds
that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, it must then consider the § 3553(a) factors
“to the extent that they are applicable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Finally, a district court
may grant a reduction only if it is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
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the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). “As of now, there is no
Sentencing Commission policy statement ‘applicable’ to [a defendant’s] compassionate-
release motion[],” as opposed to such a motion brought by the Bureau of Prisons. United
States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 283 (4th Cir. 2020). Rather, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 1B1.13, p.s., which is applicable to motions filed by the Bureau of Prisons, does
not bind a district court when it considers a compassionate release motion brought by a
defendant. McCoy, 981 F.3d at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court denied Lightfoot’s motion for compassionate release,
reasoning that Lightfoot’s release posed a danger to the community and citing a factor
required to be considered under USSG § 1B1.13, p.s. Because the district court did not
have the benefit of our decision in McCoy, it relied upon the policy statement and did not
expressly address Lightfoot’s motion with reference to the § 3553(a) factors. We therefore
vacate the district court’s order and remand for further consideration of Lightfoot’s
motion. * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
*
We express no opinion on the merits of Lightfoot’s motion for compassionate
release.
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