NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 21 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEONTE VONDELL SPICER, No. 20-55434
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:17-cv-00717-CJC-ADS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
J. BUNSOLD, UA Officer or CO, in
individual and official capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 19, 2021**
Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Federal prisoner Deonte Vondell Spicer appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his
action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging an Eighth Amendment claim. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d
1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted judgment because Spicer failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies, and failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable.
See id. at 1172 (setting forth exhaustion framework under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”)); see also Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858-60 (2016)
(describing limited circumstances in which administrative remedies are
unavailable); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (requiring PLRA
exhaustion for federal prisoners’ Bivens actions).
We do not consider Spicer’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal,
that his due process rights were violated. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052
(9th Cir. 1999) (“As a general rule, we will not consider arguments that are raised
for the first time on appeal.”).
We reject as unsupported by the record Spicer’s contention that he was
prevented from seeking discovery before the district court.
Spicer’s pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
2 20-55434