Blanca Estrada-Contreras v. Merrick Garland

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 21 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BLANCA EDUVINA ESTRADA- No. 19-72754 CONTRERAS; DAYANA ELISA CANIZALEZ-ESTRADA, Agency Nos. A208-984-665 A208-984-669 Petitioners, v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted July 19, 2021** Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges. Blanca Eduvina Estrada-Contreras and her daughter, Dayana Elisa Canizalez-Estrada, natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing their appeal from an * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Id. at 1241. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review. The agency did not err in concluding that petitioners’ proposed particular social group is not cognizable. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))). Petitioners’ contention that the agency erred in its legal analysis or ignored evidence fails. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (the agency adequately considered evidence and sufficiently announced its decision); Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due process claim); see also Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing de novo claims of due process violations 2 19-72754 in immigration proceedings). Thus, petitioners’ claim for asylum and withholding of removal fail. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because Estrada-Contreras failed to show it is more likely than not that she will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835-36 (9th Cir. 2011) (possibility of torture too speculative). We lack jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ contention that the IJ failed to advise Canizalez-Estrada of her potential eligibility for Special Immigrant Juvenile status. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency). The stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate. PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part. 3 19-72754