DLD-221 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 20-3340
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMES E. HOCKER,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 4:18-cr-00313-001)
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann
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Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 15, 2021
Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 10, 2021)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
PER CURIAM
James E. Hocker appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for compassionate release
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Government has filed a motion for summary
affirmance. For the following reasons, we grant the Government’s motion and will
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
In 2018, Hocker pleaded guilty to securities fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348. The
next year, he was sentenced to 204 months of imprisonment. We affirmed. See United
States v. Hocker, No. 19-2379, -- F. App’x –, 2021 WL 2879343 (3d Cir. July 9, 2021).
In August 2020, Hocker filed a pro se motion for compassionate release pursuant
to § 3582(c)(1)(A). (ECF 36.) He argued that various health conditions, including
“coronary artery disease, sleep apnea, and diabetes (borderline),” put him at increased
risk from COVID-19. The Government opposed the motion. (ECF 42.)
The District Court denied relief. (ECF 45.) It agreed with the Government’s
concession that Hocker had shown that extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted
relief. But the District Court concluded that the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) weighed against any reduction in his sentence. Those factors included the
seriousness of Hocker’s offense, his criminal history, the likelihood of recidivism, and
the fact that he had served less than a quarter of his sentence. Hocker appeals. The
constitute binding precedent.
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Government has filed a motion for summary affirmance (Doc. 10), to which Hocker
objects. (Doc. 12).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of discretion
the denial of an eligible defendant’s motion for a sentence modification under § 3582(c).
See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, we “will not
disturb the District Court’s decision unless there is a definite and firm conviction that it
committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the
relevant factors.” Id. (alteration, quotation marks, and citation omitted). We may affirm
on any basis supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir.
2011) (per curiam).
The compassionate release provision states that a district court “may reduce the
term of imprisonment” and “impose a term of probation or supervised release” if it finds
that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting compassionate release, a district court must consider
“the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.”
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include, among other things, “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,”
§ 3553(a)(1), and the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; “to afford
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adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; and “to protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C).
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Hocker’s compassionate release motion because the applicable § 3553(a) factors do not
support relief. Hocker’s crime was serious. For several years, he defrauded numerous,
often elderly, individuals, who lost some or all of their retirement and life savings. See
Hocker, 2021 WL 2879343, at *1 (stating that Hocker “targeted the elderly, those nearing
or entering retirement, and others with limited investment experience”). The losses from
his actions totaled almost $1.5 million. In addition, Hocker had been convicted of
numerous DUI offenses, and committed the underlying offense while on supervision for
two of those convictions. Finally, Hocker had served only 17 months of a 17 year
sentence. See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 331 (stating that “the time remaining in [the]
sentence may—along with the circumstances underlying the motion for compassionate
release and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among similarly situated inmates—
inform whether immediate release would be consistent with” the § 3553(a) factors).
These factors support the District Court’s conclusion that continued incarceration was
needed to afford adequate deterrence, promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment, and protect the public.
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Government’s motion and will summarily
affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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