[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
February 23, 2006
No. 05-13692 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00669-CR-2-WBH-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LEONARD MASON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(February 23, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Leonard Mason appeals his 21-month sentence for conspiracy to “knowingly
cause false representations to be made with respect to information required to be
kept in the records of a federal firearms licensee,” 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 924(s)(1)(A),
and conspiracy to “knowingly and willfully engage in the business of dealing in
firearms without a license,” 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 922(a)(1)(A). Mason argues that
the district court erred when it enhanced his offense level at sentencing for
obstruction of justice. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Mason and James Pray were indicted together in a superseding indictment
on January 20, 2004, for multiple federal firearms offenses. Mason pleaded not
guilty and proceeded to trial. At the close of the trial, the jury found Mason guilty.
On June 23, 2004, the district court conducted a sentencing hearing. At the
hearing, the district court heard argument on the application of an enhancement for
obstruction of justice under section 3C1.1 of the federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The government argued that the obstruction enhancement was appropriate for two
reasons. First, the government argued that the enhancement was warranted
because, after learning that federal agents had interviewed Pray, Mason called
Rashaud Wayns, a convicted felon who purchased firearms from Mason and Pray,
and instructed him to “clean his house.” Wayns, who testified at trial, interpreted
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the comment as a direction to discard the firearms he possessed. Second, the
government argued that the enhancement was warranted because, after federal
agents came to Mason’s house to talk with him, Mason filed a false police report
with the Cobb County, Georgia, Police Department and claimed that nine pistols
were stolen from his unlocked vehicle. Two months later, when the agents
interviewed Mason at his home, Mason told the agents that weapons were stolen
from him and presented a copy of the police report to the agents.
Mason argued that the enhancement was not appropriate because there was
no evidence that Mason’s false report had impeded significantly the investigation
or prosecution. The district court overruled the objected and enhanced the
sentence based on the false police report that Mason had filed. The district court
found that the report had caused a delay of several months. Immediately before
stating the calculation of the sentencing range under the Guidelines, the district
court also found that Mason had “warn[ed] his co-defendant in Washington or co-
conspirator in Washington.”
With a two level enhancement, the district court calculated the appropriate
offense level to be 18, the criminal history category to be I, and the guideline
imprisonment range to be 27 to 33 months. After considering several factors,
including the serious nature of the crime, Mason’s limited criminal history, and the
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fact that Mason had been a good father and had a good work record, the district
court concluded that a sentence below the guideline range would be sufficient to
punish and deter Mason and entered a sentence of 21 months of imprisonment and
3 years of supervised release. Mason appeals the obstruction of justice
enhancement.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review findings of fact by the district court for clear error. United States
v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1177 (11th Cir. 2005). Whether the facts trigger an
enhancement for obstruction of justice is a question of law we review de novo. See
United States v. Banks, 347 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2003).
III. DISCUSSION
Under section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s offense
level is enhanced by two levels if he willfully obstructed or attempted to obstruct
“the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the instant offense of conviction,” and the obstructive conduct relates
to the defendant’s offense of conviction or a closely related offense. U.S.S.G. §
3C1.1. The application notes to section 3C1.1 provide a non-exhaustive list of
examples of obstructive conduct for which the enhancement would be appropriate.
See id. cmts. Application note 4(d) lists the act of “destroying or concealing or
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directing or procuring another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is
material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding . . . or attempting to do
so.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. 4(d). Application note 4(g) lists the act of “providing
a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly
obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant
offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. 4(g). We require clear factual findings to
determine if the application of section 3C1.1 is supported. See United States v.
Alpert, 28 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). When the district court
applies the obstruction of justice enhancement, “it should note specifically what
each defendant did, why that conduct warrants the enhancement, and, if applicable,
how that conduct actually hindered the investigation or prosecution of the offense.”
Id. at 1108.
The district court applied the enhancement because it concluded that Mason
had provided a false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly
obstructed the investigation of the offense. The district court stated that Mason’s
false police report delayed the investigation and prosecution by several months.
The district court provided no further explanation.
The district court failed to follow our admonition in Alpert that a court must
provide a specific explanation for the enhancement of a sentence based on a false
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statement to a law enforcement officer. The district court did not explain how
Mason’s conduct actually caused a delay in either the prosecution or investigation.
See id. The record also does not reveal how, if it all, Mason’s action delayed the
investigation.
Mason’s appeal nevertheless fails for another reason. We may affirm the
application of the enhancement on any ground supported by the record. United
States v. Amedeo, 370 F.3d 1305, 1319 n.12 (11th Cir. 2004). The record reveals
an alternate basis for the enhancement.
Mason’s attempt to direct Wayns to destroy or conceal material evidence is
sufficient to support the enhancement for obstruction under comment 4(d) to
section 3C1.1. At trial, Wayns testified that Mason called Wayns and warned him
to “clean his house,” which Wayns understood to mean he should get rid of his
guns. At sentencing, the district court found that Mason had warned his
coconspirator, and this finding by the district court was not clearly erroneous. In
contrast with application note 4(g), note 4(d) does not require the government to
show that the order to destroy or conceal evidence significantly impeded the
investigation. The finding of the district court supports the enhancement on this
alternative basis.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Mason’s sentence is
AFFIRMED.
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