[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
March 22, 2006
No. 05-14557
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00234-CR-1-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DONDRELL CAPERS,
a.k.a. Tony Goss,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(March 22, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dondrell Capers appeals his 80-month sentence for possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Capers argues that the
sentence should be vacated because the court erred in its consideration of the
mitigating factors he raised under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and, relatedly, because 80
months is unreasonably long. Upon review of the record and consideration of the
parties’ briefs, we discern no reversible error.
After hearing Capers’s § 3553(a) arguments regarding mitigating
circumstances, the district court clearly stated that it “considered the factors as
outlined in 18 U.S.C. 3553” in “determining what would be an appropriate
sentence . . . .” Capers calls this acknowledgment inadequate, arguing that a court
must “address and either accept or reject factors raised and submitted for
consideration at sentencing.” A district court must consider the mitigating factors
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), but it need not explain each factor’s applicability and
relation to the sentence actually imposed. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784,
786 (11th Cir. 2005). A simple “acknowledgment by the district court that it has
considered the defendant’s arguments and the factors in section 3553(a) is
sufficient . . . .” Id. We find that this requirement was adequately met in the
present case. Absent evidence to the contrary, we have no cause to conclude that
the court’s avowed consideration of § 3553(a)’s effect on Caper’s sentence failed
to encompass the arguments it had just solicited on that score. Under such
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circumstances, a court’s “failure” to specifically address the content of defendant’s
arguments is analytically equivalent to a court’s “failure,” upheld in Talley, to
enumerate and explain each of the mitigating factors it purports to have considered.
Capers’s challenge to the length of his sentence also fails. A sentencing
court must correctly calculate the sentencing range advised under the Sentencing
Guidelines. United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178-79 (11th Cir. 2005).
It “may [then] impose a more severe or more lenient sentence,” so long as the
sentence is reasonable. Id. at 1179. The burden on appeal rests with the party
alleging unreasonableness, and this Court ordinarily expects to uphold as
reasonable an otherwise sound sentence that falls within the advisory Guidelines
range. Talley, 431 F.3d at 788 (11th Cir. 2005). Capers is unable to overcome
these premises. Despite his extensive criminal history, and his second conviction
on this very offense, Capers was sentenced at the lower end of the advisory
Guideline range and 40 months below the 120-month statutory maximum sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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