NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2483-19
JUAN CABRERA and PATRICIA
RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
NIA HALL,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
SAMUEL ALPERT,
EAN HOLDINGS, LLC,
ENTERPRISE HOLDINGS, INC.,
ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR,
ALAMO RENT-A-CAR, and
NATIONAL CAR RENTAL,
Defendants.
_____________________________
Argued August 2, 2021 – Decided August 12, 2021
Before Judges Mayer and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-2119-17.
Casandra DeStefano argued the cause for appellant
Juan Cabrera (Law Offices of Jef D. Henninger,
attorneys; Jef D. Henninger, on the brief).
Marc R. Jones argued the cause for respondent Nia Hall
(Cipriani & Werner, PC, attorneys; Matthew K.
Mitchell and Marc R. Jones, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs Juan Cabrera and Patricia Rodgriquez 1 appeal from a January
10, 2020 order denying a motion to file a late demand for a trial de novo from
an April 23, 2019 arbitration award. We affirm.
Plaintiff was injured in a multi-car collision on June 5, 2015. Plaintiff
filed a personal injury action seeking damages for injuries he sustained in the
accident. Defendants filed answers, and the parties exchanged discovery. After
the close of discovery, defendants, with the exception of defendant Nia Hall
(Hall), moved for summary judgment. Defendant Samuel Alpert and the rental
car defendants were granted summary judgment by orders dated May 24, 2019.2
1
Patricia Rodriguez, the wife of Juan Cabrera, asserted a per quod claim as a
result of injuries sustained by her husband in the June 5, 2015 motor vehicle
accident. We use plaintiff to refer to the direct claims assert by Juan Cabrera.
2
The summary judgment orders are not the subject of this appeal.
A-2483-19
2
Because the matter was subject to the verbal threshold limitation of
lawsuit elected by plaintiff in his automobile insurance policy, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
8, mandatory automobile arbitration was scheduled for April 23, 2019. Plaintiff
was self-represented at the arbitration.3 The arbitrators found Hall one hundred
percent responsible for the accident. However, based on the lack of medical
documentation proffered in support of plaintiff's personal injury claim, the
arbitrators had "no choice but to enter a no cause of action." To obtain an award
of damages, plaintiff needed to demonstrate he sustained permanent injuries
sufficient to overcome the verbal threshold limitation on lawsuit option.
At the conclusion of the hearing, plaintiff signed the "report and award of
arbitrator(s)." Above the signature line, plaintiff received written notice
rejection of the arbitration award required the filing of "a trial de novo request
together with a $200 fee within thirty (30) days of today." The arbitrators also
reiterated the thirty-day deadline to file a demand for a trial de novo if plaintiff
was dissatisfied with the arbitration decision.
In seeking to file a late demand for a trial de novo, plaintiff claimed he
was represented by a new attorney at the time of the arbitration. He argued his
3
Plaintiff's attorney withdrew as counsel prior to the arbitration based on
plaintiff's rejection of the recommended settlement offer and decision to proceed
to trial.
A-2483-19
3
new attorney possessed his medical records. However, at no time prior to the
arbitration did plaintiff request an adjournment of the hearing so his new counsel
could appear. Nor was there a substitution of attorney filed reflecting new
counsel prior to the arbitration date.
According to the record on appeal, plaintiff retained new counsel on May
7, 2019, fourteen days after completion of the arbitration hearing. 4 In addition,
the appellate record reflects plaintiff's prior counsel provided the personal injury
file to plaintiff according to a receipt signed on April 5, 2019. Despite having
his litigation file eighteen days before the arbitration hearing, plaintiff failed to
explain why he could not produce medical records in support of his injury
claims.
Plaintiff knew he had thirty days from the April 23, 2019 arbitration
hearing to file a demand for a trial de novo, and the filing deadline expired on
May 23, 2019. Because plaintiff retained new counsel on May 7, 2019, he had
4
For the first time on appeal, plaintiff suggests his new attorney failed to appear
at the arbitration hearing, resulting in eventual disbarment in the State of New
York in March 2020. However, counsel's disbarment was unrelated to plaintiff's
personal injury case and occurred nearly one year after the arbitration. Because
plaintiff failed to raise this argument to the motion judge, we decline to address
it. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds
Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)) (declining
to address arguments not presented to the trial court unless the matters "go to
the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest ").
A-2483-19
4
ample time to discuss the arbitration decision with his new attorney and file a
trial de novo before the thirty-day period lapsed. There is nothing in the record
evidencing an effort by plaintiff or his newly retained attorney to file a timely
demand for a trial de novo.
Based on plaintiff's failure to file a trial de novo, on May 28, 2019, Hall
filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award. During the pendency of the
motion, plaintiff removed the case to federal court, which deprived the New
Jersey Superior Court judge of jurisdiction to decide Hall's motion. In a
December 20, 2019 order, the federal court remanded the case to the New Jersey
Superior Court. In January 2020, after the case returned to the Superior Court,
Hall refiled her motion to confirm the arbitration award. Plaintiff, still self-
represented, moved to permit the late filing of a demand for a trial de novo.
After hearing the parties' arguments, in separate January 10, 2020 orders,
the motion judge denied plaintiff's motion and granted Hall's motion. The
motion judge allowed plaintiff considerable leeway in raising arguments without
any evidentiary support. Specifically, plaintiff claimed his lawyers "lied to him"
and defense counsel paid his attorneys to forego legal action on his behalf.
A-2483-19
5
The judge noted plaintiff "had multiple attorneys throughout this matter,
each attorney at some point either withdrawing from representation or otherwise
being terminated." The judge also stated:
The [c]ourt has little discretion with respect to
enforcing the requirement that any rejection of an
arbitration award be filed within 30 days of the
arbitration. Plaintiff's unhappiness with counsel he
sought to retain . . . doesn't legally excuse the failure to
file the trial de novo request within the 30 day period.
....
Accepting everything that the plaintiff says as true, the
plaintiff here still cannot satisfy the extraordinary
circumstances standard set forth by the New Jersey
Supreme Court. Plaintiff was aware of the arbitration
result but failed to take any action to reject that decision
within the 30 day period permitted under the court
rules.
Represented by counsel on appeal, plaintiff argues the arbitration should
be vacated because his "previous attorney's failure to file an appearance . . .
constitute[d] an 'extraordinary circumstance' warranting relief pursuant to Rule
4:21A." We disagree.
Because this appeal involves the interpretation of the court rules
governing arbitration, our review is de novo. Vanderslice v. Stewart, 220 N.J.
385, 389 (2015). We note N.J.S.A. 39:6A-25(a) mandates arbitration in certain
A-2483-19
6
automobile personal injury cases. Our court rules address the procedural
requirements associated with mandatory arbitration. Rule 4:21A-6 provides:
An order shall be entered dismissing the action
following the filing of the arbitrator's award unless:
(1) within 30 days after filing of the arbitration award,
a party thereto files with the civil division manager and
serves on all other parties a notice of rejection of the
award and demand for a trial de novo and pays a trial
de novo fee as set forth in paragraph (c) of this rule; or
....
(3) within 50 days after the filing of the arbitration
award, any party moves for confirmation of the
arbitration award and entry of judgment thereon.
The timing for challenges to an arbitration award is mandated by statute
as well as court rule. See N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-26; N.J.S.A. 39:6A-31. "The
Legislature intended [N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-26] to be strictly enforced." Hartsfield
v. Fantini, 149 N.J. 611, 616 (1997) (quoting Hart v. Prop. Mgmt. Sys., 280 N.J.
Super. 145, 147 (App. Div. 1995)). See also Jones v. First Nat'l Supermarkets,
Inc., 329 N.J. Super. 125, 127 (App. Div. 2000) (citing Stegmeier v. St.
Elizabeth Hosp., 239 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 1990)) ("The express language
of R. 4:21A-6(b)(1) provides that both filing and service of the demand must be
accomplished within thirty days of the entry of an arbitration award.").
A-2483-19
7
Although courts "possess the power to enlarge" the thirty-day period to
file a demand for a trial de novo, "such power should be exercised only in
extraordinary circumstances." Mazakas v. Wray, 205 N.J. Super. 367, 371 (App.
Div. 1985). A "trial court's express and inherent power to relax rules and grant
equitable relief must be sparingly exercised with a view to implementing both
the letter and the spirit of the compulsory arbitration statute and the rules
promulgated pursuant thereto, to the end that the arbitration proceedings achieve
finality." Id. at 372.
Here, plaintiff attended the arbitration. The arbitrators explained a
demand for a trial de novo must be filed within thirty days of issuance of the
arbitration award. In addition, plaintiff signed the arbitration award, which
expressly stated the thirty-day filing period for a trial de novo. Plaintiff failed
to take any action regarding the arbitration award within the required thirty -day
period. Further, he articulated no extraordinary circumstances justifying the late
filing of a demand for a trial de novo. Even on appeal, plaintiff failed to set
forth extraordinary circumstances preventing his timely filing of a trial de novo.
Plaintiff argues the statutory laws and court rules should be relaxed to
protect self-represented litigants and allow them their day in court. However,
self-represented litigants are bound by the same laws and rules of court as parties
A-2483-19
8
represented by counsel. See Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J.
Super. 90, 99 (App. Div. 2014). Likewise, self-represented litigants are held to
the same standard for compliance with our court rules as attorneys. See Rubin
v. Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. 155, 159 (App. Div. 1982).
Plaintiff had his day in court at the arbitration hearing. He chose to
represent himself at arbitration rather than seek an adjournment of the
proceeding. Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the "no cause" arbitration award was
not a basis for the late filing of a request for a trial de novo. Plaintiff has only
himself to blame for the dismissal of his claim.
Applying the unequivocal thirty-day period to file a trial de novo under
Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1), coupled with the legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-26
strictly enforcing that time period, we affirm the motion judge's order denying
plaintiff's motion to file an untimely trial de novo.
Affirmed.
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9