[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-16294 MARCH 20, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 01-03084-CV-GET-1
CASCADE CROSSING II, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RADIOSHACK CORPORATION,
f.k.a. Tandy Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(March 20, 2006)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is the second time we have considered an appeal of this case. In the
first appeal, Cascade Crossing II, LLC (“Cascade Crossing”) appealed the district
court’s ruling on waiver only. A panel of our court reversed the district court’s
ruling on waiver, and declared that Cascade Crossing was the only prevailing
party and was therefore entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees. The case was
remanded to the district court for a determination of the amount of past due rent
and attorneys’ fees to be paid by Radioshack Corporation (“Radioshack”).
On remand, the parties agreed on the amount of past due rent and interest
but could not agree on the amount of attorneys’ fees. Cascade Crossing argued
that the full amount of attorneys’ fees it sought should be awarded, but
Radioshack argued that the fee award should be capped by the percentages set
forth in O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11. The district court ruled that O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 did
not apply, and Cascade Crossing was awarded the full amount of attorneys’ fees
($282,924.53) incurred in this litigation. Radioshack then perfected this appeal.
We review a district court’s interpretation and application of a statute de
novo. United States v. Ortega-Torres, 174 F.3d 1199, 2000 (11th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted).
Although Radioshack does not dispute that an award of attorneys’ fees to
Cascade Crossing under Section 31 of the Radioshack lease was proper, it argues
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that the district court erred in awarding Cascade Crossing the full amount of its
attorneys’ fees accrued during the litigation. More specifically, Cascade Crossing
argues that the award of attorneys’ fees should have been calculated pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11(a)(2), which caps such attorney fee awards at 15% of the first
$500.00 of past due rent and interest owed, and 10% of the remaining past due
rent and interest.
From the district court’s brief mention of this issue, it is impossible for us to
discern the correctness of the court’s ruling. In its order of August 12, 2005, the
district court found that “the limits contained in O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 are
inapplicable to plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees.” (R. Vol. 5 Doc. 105 at 2.)
The court gave no reason for this finding. Moreover, in open court proceedings,
which occurred on August 10, 2005, the court stated in a conclusory manner:
“[i]nsofar as the defendant relies on Georgia Code 13-1-11, I have concluded that
that code section is not applicable to the plaintiff’s claim and that the defendant
cannot assert that by way of limitation of what the plaintiff has claimed.” (R. Vol.
7 Tr. At 2.)
Because the court did not state the basis of its ruling that O.C.G.A. § 13-1-
11 does not apply, we are unable to grant meaningful review to the parties in this
appeal. We can only speculate as to why the district court made such a ruling.
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Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and remand this case to the
district court with directions that the court state with specificity why O.C.G.A. §
13-1-11 should not apply to this case and support its ruling with appropriate legal
authority, if any.
VACATED and REMANDED.
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