[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
April 18, 2006
No. 05-14493 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00154-CV-1-MP-AK
DENZOAL E. SANDERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 18, 2006)
Before BLACK, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Denzoal Sanders appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), and supplemental security income, 42 U.S.C. § 1393(c)(3), for the
period before July 1, 1998. Sanders asserts he presented the ALJ with credible
testimony and sufficient medical evidence that he was disabled before July 1998.
We review a social security case to determine whether the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal
standards were applied. See Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir.
1997). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320,
1322 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
We have explained our review of a claim of disability based on pain in this
way:
This Court has established a three part “pain standard” that applies
when a claimant attempts to establish disability through his or her
own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms. The pain
standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and
either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the
alleged pain arising from the condition or (3) that the objectively
determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be
reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.
Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). “[A] claimant’s subjective
testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the standard is itself
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sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Id. Credibility determinations with
respect to the subjective testimony are generally reserved to the ALJ. See Johns v.
Bowen, 821 F.2d 551, 557 (11th Cir. 1987). However, “[i]f the ALJ decides not to
credit such testimony, he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing
so.” Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223.
The ALJ concluded Sanders’ subjective testimony regarding the level and
duration of pain he experienced before July 1, 1998 was not credible, and this
credibility assessment is reserved to the ALJ. See Johns, 821 F.2d at 557. The
ALJ articulated explicit and adequate reasons for making this assessment about
Sanders’ condition before July 1, 1998, and these stated reasons are supported by
the record. In 1995, Sanders’ treating physician concluded Sanders could walk, get
in and out of a chair, and lay down without difficulty. He also concluded Sanders
did not have severe back spasms or root nerve damage. In addition, when another
physician treated Sanders in 1997, he concluded Sanders’ pain was “subjective”
and that it was unlikely he had any severe nerve-root pain. Furthermore, before
July 1, 1998, Sanders worked with a hammer and chisel and with solder and steel,
which contradicted his testimony that he was in too much pain to work during this
period. He also helped his wife selling items at flea markets on Saturdays and
Sundays until 1998. Thus, it is reasonable to infer Sanders’ pain was not as severe
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as he alleged regarding the period before July 1, 1998. Substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s determination that Sanders was not disabled before July 1,
1998.
AFFIRMED.
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