Case: 21-20066 Document: 00515977903 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/13/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 13, 2021
No. 21-20066
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Michel Thomas,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Stafflink, Inc., doing business as, Link Staffing Services;
Bill Pitts; Karen Pitts; Mario Tamez; Matt Trimble;
Christine O’Brien; Link Staffing Management, L.L.C.,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:17-CV-3902
Before Southwick, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-20066 Document: 00515977903 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/13/2021
No. 21-20066
Michel Thomas, acting pro se, filed an employment discrimination
lawsuit against the Defendants. The district court dismissed some of his
claims and granted summary judgment on others. We AFFIRM.
We first examine our jurisdiction. On August 4, 2020, the district
court entered final judgment against Thomas. On August 31, 2020, Thomas
filed a “motion to dismiss” under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3),
60(b)(4), and 60(b)(6), arguing that the final judgment was void because it
was inconsistent with due process.
On November 9, 2020, the district court denied the motion to dismiss
and re-entered final judgment. On December 4, 2020, Thomas filed another
“motion to dismiss” under Rules 60(b)(3), 60(b)(4), and 60(b)(6). Like his
first motion, the second post-judgment motion argued that the final judgment
was void because it was inconsistent with due process. The district court
denied Thomas’s second post-judgment motion on January 4, 2021. Thomas
filed his notice of appeal on February 2, 2021.
Generally, a party must file a notice of appeal “within 30 days after
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(A). Certain timely filed post-judgment motions, including a motion
under Rule 60(b), interrupt the time for filing the notice of appeal. See Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). An appellant generally can take advantage of this
interruption only once. We have explained that successive post-judgment
motions are “condemned by well-established authority in this and other
circuits.” Charles L.M. v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 884 F.2d 869, 870 (5th Cir.
1989). As a result, “where an appellant files a second motion to reconsider
‘based upon substantially the same grounds as urged in the earlier motion,’
the filing of the second motion does not interrupt the running of the time for
appeal.” Id. (quoting Ellis v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 720, 721 (5th Cir. 1973)).
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Case: 21-20066 Document: 00515977903 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/13/2021
No. 21-20066
Here, Thomas’s first Rule 60(b) motion was timely filed and
interrupted the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4)(A). Thomas’s second Rule 60(b) motion was based on substantially
similar grounds and therefore did not interrupt the time for filing a notice of
appeal. The 30-day time for appeal ran from the district court’s denial of his
first Rule 60(b) motion. Since Thomas did not file his notice of appeal within
30 days of that denial, we have no jurisdiction to review the final judgment
entered in this case.
Because Thomas’s notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the
court’s denial of his second Rule 60(b) motion, we may review the court’s
decision on that motion. We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for
abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869, 871
(5th Cir. 1989).
After a review of the record and briefs, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Thomas’s second Rule 60(b)
motion. Thomas’s motion principally makes arguments that he made or
could have made earlier in the proceedings. He argues that the district court
colluded with the defendants but provides no evidence in support of his
claim. He otherwise offers no “extraordinary circumstances” to justify
relief. See Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED.
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