FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 22, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
TATIANA GROTENDORST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 09-2132
v. (D.C. No. 1:08-CV-00628-CG)
(D. N.M.)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before GORSUCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant Tatiana Grotendorst appeals from an order of the district
court affirming the Commissioner’s decision denying her application for Social
Security disability benefits. She claims the ALJ failed to properly analyze her
mental impairments, to properly consider the credibility of her claim of disabling
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
back pain, and to properly develop the record with regard to that claim. We agree
the ALJ failed to properly apply the law when considering Ms. Grotendorst’s
mental impairments. Therefore, exercising our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we reverse and remand to the district court with
directions to remand to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this order
and judgment.
Appellant filed for disability benefits on June 1, 2005, claiming a
combination of impairments, the main one being loss of function in her left hand
from a laceration to her left wrist on November 11, 2003. She also claimed
reduced function due to heel spurs, scoliosis, degenerative spine disease, asthma,
and the mental impairments of anxiety, depression, and a pain disorder. The
agency denied her applications initially and on reconsideration.
On March 6, 2007, appellant received a de novo hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ). The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential
evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See Williams v.
Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988).
Step one requires the agency to determine whether a claimant
is presently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If not, the agency
proceeds to consider, at step two, whether a claimant has a medically
severe impairment or impairments. An impairment is severe under
the applicable regulations if it significantly limits a claimant’s
physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. At step
three, the ALJ considers whether a claimant’s medically severe
impairments are equivalent to a condition listed in the appendix of
the relevant disability regulation. If a claimant’s impairments are not
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equivalent to a listed impairment, the ALJ must consider, at step
four, whether a claimant’s impairments prevent her from performing
her past relevant work. Even if a claimant is so impaired, the agency
considers, at step five, whether she possesses the sufficient residual
functional capability to perform other work in the national economy.
Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations
omitted). The claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
disability at steps one through four. See Williams, 844 F.2d at 751 n.2. If the
claimant successfully meets this burden, the burden of proof then shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. See id. at 751.
The ALJ concluded that Ms. Grotendorst had the following severe
impairments at step two of the sequential evaluation: “right hip pain secondary to
broken pelvis in 1986 and left wrist pain.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 15. Because, at
step three, the ALJ concluded that these impairments did not meet or equal one of
the listed impairments, and she then considered Ms. Grotendorst’s residual
functional capacity (RFC), determining she retained the RFC
to lift and or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently
with no lifting more than 5 pounds with the left upper extremity,
stand and or walk about 4 hours in an 8-hour workday, sit about 4 to
6 hours in an 8-hour workday, occasionally crouch, crawl, and climb
ladders or scaffolds, no repetitive fine manipulations with the left
upper extremity, and no grasping forcefully or pushing and or pulling
with the left upper extremity.
Aplt. App., Vol. I at 17. She found at step four that Ms. Grotendorst could not
return to her past relevant work, but, at step five, that Ms. Grotendorst was not
disabled because there were a significant number of other jobs which she could
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perform in the national or regional economy. The Appeals Council denied review,
making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Following
affirmation by the district court, Ms. Grotendorst appealed to this court.
Our review of the district court’s ruling in a social security
case is de novo. Thus, we independently determine whether the
ALJ’s decision is free from legal error and supported by substantial
evidence. Although we will not reweigh the evidence or retry the
case, we meticulously examine the record as a whole, including
anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ’s findings in
order to determine if the substantiality test has been met.
Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (quotations and citations omitted). Substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Fowler v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 1451, 1453 (10th Cir. 1989)
(quotations omitted).
Ms. Grotendorst’s first two points concern her mental impairment claims.
She asserts that the evidence showed the severe mental impairments of
depression, anxiety, and a pain disorder. The ALJ explicitly concluded at step
two of the sequential evaluation that Ms. Grotendorst’s anxiety and depression
were non-severe impairments; did not address the pain disorder diagnosis; and did
not provide for any limitations from mental impairments in the RFC.
Ms. Grotendorst argues that this non-severity determination was error and that the
ALJ further erred by failing to include in the RFC and, specifically, in the
hypothetical questions presented to the vocational expert (VE), a limitation on her
ability to concentrate.
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We have reviewed the record in detail. It is clear that Ms. Grotendorst was
diagnosed with mental impairments. Doctors from the Lovelace Sandia Health
System (Lovelace) diagnosed her with anxiety and an alcohol abuse disorder. An
agency examining psychiatrist later diagnosed her with major depression and a
somatic pain disorder. Further, Ms. Grotendorst subjectively claimed both at the
hearing before the ALJ and to other medical professionals that she had mental
impairments. She asserted that she had a history of being treated for anxiety,
depression, and alcoholism. She asserted that she abused alcohol when she
became anxious or lonely. She also testified at the hearing that she was being
treated at that time with an anti-depressant and her representative submitted the
name of the anti-depressant in his post-hearing brief to the ALJ.
The ALJ made two brief assessments regarding Ms. Grotendorst’s claimed
mental impairments. First, at step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ
concluded:
The claimant has further alleged that she has anxiety and
depression. However, there is no objective medical evidence of
record that the claimant has been treated for anxiety or depression at
any time during the relevant period under consideration. The
claimant reported in March 2005 that her first contact with a mental
health professional was for alcohol abuse. There is evidence that the
claimant has received some treatment from Lovelace Sandia Health
System; however, this treatment was for alcohol abuse. Thus the
undersigned concludes that the claimants anxiety and depression are
non-severe impairments.
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Aplt. App., Vol. I at 16 (citations omitted). The ALJ also concluded, in
determining Ms. Grotendorst’s RFC:
As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned rejects the
opinion of the State agency medical consultant wherein it was opined
that the claimant has severe mental impairments. There is no
objective medical evidence of record that the claimant has a severe
mental impairment for the reasons previously mentioned in the body
of this decision.
Id. at 19. This analysis was legally insufficient.
When confronted with a claim of mental impairment, the ALJ is required
by regulation to apply a “special technique.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. The
first step in that technique is to “evaluate [the claimant’s] pertinent symptoms,
signs, and laboratory findings to determine whether [the claimant has] a medically
determinable mental impairment(s).” Id. § 404.1520a(b)(1). “A physical or
mental impairment must be established by medical evidence consisting of signs,
symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by [a claimant’s] statement of
symptoms.” Id. § 404.1508.
Here, it appears the ALJ determined that Ms. Grotendorst had the medically
determinable mental impairments of anxiety and depression, simply because the
ALJ proceeded to make severity findings as to those two impairments. 1 Under
§ 404.1520a(b)(2), once medically determinable mental impairments are found,
1
If this is an incorrect reading of the decision and the ALJ’s holding was
that Ms. Grotendorst had no medically determinable mental impairments other
than her alcohol addiction, that holding was erroneous considering the evidence in
the record.
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the ALJ must “rate the degree of functional limitation resulting from the
impairment(s).” The ALJ does this by rating the claimant’s limitations in
“four broad functional areas,” which are: “Activities of daily living; social
functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of
decompensation.” Id. § 404.1520a(c)(3). These ratings are then used to
determine the severity of the mental impairment(s). Under the regulations,
the [ALJ’s] written decision must incorporate the pertinent findings
and conclusions based on the technique. The decision must show the
significant history, including examination and laboratory findings,
and the functional limitations that were considered in reaching a
conclusion about the severity of the mental impairment(s). The
decision must include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation
in each of the [four broad] functional areas . . . .
Id. § 404.1520a(e)(2).
Here, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Grotendorst’s anxiety and depression
were not severe without first making the required findings regarding how limited
she was in each of the four broad functional areas. Instead, the ALJ held that
Ms. Grotendorst’s anxiety and depression were not severe because there was “no
objective medical evidence . . . that [she] ha[d] been treated for anxiety or
depression at any time during the relevant period under consideration.”
Aplt. App., Vol. I at 16.
First, this is a misstatement of the record. Dr. Levis from Lovelace
diagnosed Ms. Grotendorst with alcohol abuse disorder and anxiety disorder (not
otherwise specified) and the progress notes from two follow-up therapy sessions
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reiterate that assessment. See id. at 282-83, 293. 2 Those therapy sessions were
“treatment.” In the “PLANS” section of those progress notes, one of the goals set
forth was to “Continue 1:1,” see id. at 282-83, which we take to mean that
Ms. Grotendorst was to continue one-on-one therapy sessions as part of her
treatment plan.
Second, the regulations set out exactly how an ALJ is to determine severity,
and consideration of the amount of treatment received by a claimant does not play
a role in that determination. This is because the lack of treatment for an
impairment does not necessarily mean that the impairment does not exist or
impose functional limitations. Further, attempting to require treatment as a
precondition for disability would clearly undermine the use of consultative
examinations. Thus, the ALJ failed to follow the regulations in reaching her
determination that Ms. Grotendorst’s mental limitations were not severe at step
two of the sequential evaluation.
Nevertheless, an error at step two of the sequential evaluation concerning
one impairment is usually harmless when the ALJ, as occurred here, finds another
impairment is severe and proceeds to the remaining steps of the evaluation. See
Carpenter v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A]ny error here
2
The Axis I diagnosis was numbers 305 and 300, which represent alcohol
abuse disorder and anxiety disorder (not otherwise specified), respectively. See
Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
DSM-IV-TR 214, 484 (4th ed. 2000).
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became harmless when the ALJ reached the proper conclusion that [claimant]
could not be denied benefits conclusively at step two and proceeded to the next
step of the evaluation sequence.”); Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1256-57
(10th Cir. 2007) (“We can easily dispose of . . . arguments[] which relate to the
severity of [claimant’s] impairments. The ALJ . . . made an explicit finding that
[claimant] suffered from severe impairments. That was all the ALJ was required
to do in that regard. [Claimant’s] real complaint is with how the ALJ ruled at
step five.”). This is because all medically determinable impairments, severe or
not, must be taken into account at those later steps. 3
Determining whether the ALJ’s error is harmless in this case brings us to
Ms. Grotendorst’s second point, which is that the ALJ failed to include a
moderate limitation to her ability to concentrate and maintain attention in her
RFC finding and in the hypothetical questions to the VE. Here, Dr. Mellon and
Dr. Chiang, both agency physicians, rated Ms. Grotendorst’s ability to maintain
3
Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523:
In determining whether your physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of a sufficient medical severity that such impairment
or impairments could be the basis of eligibility under the law, we
will consider the combined effect of all of your impairments without
regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately,
would be of sufficient severity. If we do find a medically severe
combination of impairments, the combined impact of the impairments
will be considered throughout the disability determination process.
See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2) (requiring that all medically determinable
impairments be considered when assessing RFC).
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attention and concentration for extended periods as moderately limited by her
mental impairments. 4
An ALJ’s RFC determination–which the ALJ then uses at steps four and
five of the sequential evaluation–must consider both severe and non-severe
medically determinable impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(e). Further, the
hypothetical questions posed to the VE to assist with the step-five determination
must reflect with precision all–and only–the impairments and limitations borne
out by the evidentiary record. Decker v. Chater, 86 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir.
1996). Nevertheless, despite record evidence of limitations due to mental
impairments, the ALJ failed to either include those limitations in her RFC
determination and her hypothetical questions, or explain that failure. She failed
to even mention Dr. Mellon’s examination in her decision, and she rejected what
she termed Dr. Chiang’s “opinion . . . that the claimant has severe mental
impairments,” because there had been no prior treatment of depression or anxiety.
Aplt. App., Vol. I at 19. Instead, once the ALJ decided, without properly
applying the special technique, that Ms. Grotendorst’s mental impairments were
not severe, she gave those impairments no further consideration. This was
reversible error. We must therefore remand this matter so that the ALJ may
4
Dr. Mellon conducted a fifty-minute consultative examination on
Ms. Grotendorst. Aplt. App., Vol. I at 209-13. Dr. Chiang, a non-examining
consulting physician, filled out a Psychiatric Review Technique (PRT) form and
a mental RFC assessment that essentially tracked Dr. Mellon’s findings.
Id. at 214-31.
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properly apply the special technique to determine Ms. Grotendorst’s medically
determinable mental impairments, their severity, and any functional limitations
they cause.
Although we are remanding the case for proper analysis of
Ms. Grotendorst’s mental impairments, we shall also briefly address
Ms. Grotendorst’s other issues. Her next two arguments claim the ALJ failed to
properly consider her lower back pain. She argues the ALJ failed to properly
analyze her pain complaints under Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir.
1987). “A claimant’s subjective allegation of pain is not sufficient in itself to
establish disability.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir.
1993). Instead, “[b]efore the ALJ need even consider any subjective evidence of
pain, the claimant must first prove by objective medical evidence the existence of
a pain-producing impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the
alleged disabling pain.” Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, under Luna we must
consider (1) whether Ms. Grotendorst established a pain-producing impairment by
objective medical evidence; (2) if so, whether there is a “loose nexus” between
that impairment and her subjective allegations of pain; and (3) if so, whether,
considering all the evidence, both objective and subjective, Ms. Grotendorst’s
pain is in fact disabling. 834 F.2d at 163-64.
Here, the ALJ concluded: “After considering the evidence of record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could
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reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, but that the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely credible.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 19. Thus, the ALJ did
not believe Ms. Grotendorst’s allegations of disabling pain at step three of the
Luna analysis. See Thompson, 987 F.2d at 1489 (holding that at the third step of
the Luna analysis, “the ALJ was required to consider [the claimant’s] assertions
of severe pain and to decide whether he believed them” (quotation and brackets
omitted)). To determine the credibility of a claimant’s complaints of disabling
pain, the ALJ should consider such factors as:
the levels of medication and their effectiveness, the extensiveness of
the attempts (medical or nonmedical) to obtain relief, the frequency
of medical contacts, the nature of daily activities, subjective
measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the
ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant and
other witnesses, and the consistency or compatibility of nonmedical
testimony with objective medical evidence.
Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted).
Ms. Grotendorst argues that the ALJ improperly focused solely on the nature of
her daily activities and that she mischaracterized those activities.
We disagree that the ALJ erred, for the simple reason that Ms. Grotendorst
did not testify to a disabling level of back pain at the hearing. Ms. Grotendorst
has limped due to a curvature of the spine for her entire life. She testified that
she also had arthritis in her hip due to suffering a broken pelvis in 1986 and that
she periodically has injections in her spine because she cannot sit for long. But
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she testified that she had worked with these conditions, she just “[had] to be able
to move around.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 313. 5 She testified that she could sit for
an hour-and-a-half to two hours before her lower back started hurting, stand for
the same amount of time, and walk a mile at a time. 6 Id. at 317-18. She was
asked “when you go to pick up something, what is the problem with lifting,” and
she answered, “[t]he clumsiness in my left hand.” Id. at 327. She testified that
she could carry groceries, except for the heavy ones from Costco. Id. The ALJ’s
treatment of Ms. Grotendorst’s claims of disabling back pain was brief because
those claims were insubstantial.
In her last point, Ms. Grotendorst argues that the ALJ erred by failing to
properly develop the record by obtaining the medical records of Dr. Pamela
Black, who treated her for her back pain.
In a social security disability case, the claimant bears the burden to
prove her disability. To be sure, administrative disability hearings
are nonadversarial and the ALJ has a duty to ensure that an adequate
record is developed during the disability hearing consistent with the
issues raised. Further, this duty pertains even if the claimant is
represented by counsel.
Wall, 561 F.3d at 1062-63 (citations, quotations, and ellipsis omitted).
5
Ms. Grotendorst later explained that having to be able to “move around”
when sitting meant that she had to be able to shift positions in her chair.
Aplt. App., Vol. I at 327.
6
Ms. Grotendorst specifically testified that she could walk the mile-long
round-trip to her mailbox, and could probably walk farther if it were not for the
altitude where she lived. Id. at 326.
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As pointed out by respondent, Ms. Grotendorst was represented by a
non-attorney representative from Action Disability Representatives. Aplt. App.,
Vol. I at 299. While Ms. Grotendorst identified Dr. Black as one of her
physicians in her filings seeking a hearing before the ALJ, neither she nor her
representative made any objection at the hearing to the lack of records from
Dr. Black. Moreover, Ms. Grotendorst’s representative assured the ALJ at the
hearing that there were no further medical records outstanding. But there is a
more important reason why the ALJ did not err by not more fully developing the
record regarding Ms. Grotendorst’s back problems. Because Ms. Grotendorst did
not testify to any disabling symptoms from her back problems, there was no need
to develop the record more fully regarding those back problems.
Ms. Grotendorst also briefly argues that the district court erred in failing to
remand her case to the ALJ pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), so that
Dr. Black’s records could be considered. 7 She presented the records in question
to the district court and they show that she received injections for her back pain in
August and October of 2005 and, again, in August 2007. Dr. Black’s October 20,
2005, notes stated: “[Ms. Grotendorst] is here today as a follow up for her right
SI joint injection of 10/6/05. The patient has had an excellent response to the
7
Sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) reads, in pertinent part: “The court
may . . . at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the
Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new
evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to
incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding . . . .”
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injection. She is pain free not only in her SI joint, but in her back as well. She is
still not having any pain in her coccyx as well.” Id., Vol. II at 63. In her
assessment, Dr. Black stated: “[t]he patient is now pain free.” Id. The notes
from August 2007–five months after the ALJ’s hearing–stated that
Ms. Grotendorst “reported 80% pain reduction following the [injection].”
Thus, the district court committed no error because the records do not support a
claim of disabling pain and were, therefore, not material. See Cagle v. Califano,
638 F.2d 219, 221 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that evidence is material if “the
Secretary’s decision might reasonably have been different had the [new]
evidence been before him when his decision was rendered.” (further quotation
omitted)).
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and REMANDED to the
district court with direction that the case be remanded to the ALJ for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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