NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 19 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-50113
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos.
3:15-cr-02821-BAS-3
v. 3:15-cr-02821-BAS
ALEXANDER MARTINEZ,
MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 4, 2021
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: WARDLAW, MILLER, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Alexander Martinez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
compassionate release for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review sentence reduction decisions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) for abuse of
discretion, United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam),
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
and we affirm.
Contrary to Martinez’s contention, we find no indication that the district
court impermissibly treated U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as a binding policy statement or
misapplied Aruda. See Aruda, 993 F.3d at 802 (“[T]he current version of U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13 is not an ‘applicable policy statement[ ]’ for 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
motions filed by a defendant. . . . The Sentencing Commission’s statements in
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 may inform a district court’s discretion for § 3582(c)(1)(A)
motions filed by a defendant, but they are not binding.”). The district court did not
cite § 1B1.13, and the record does not support Martinez’s argument that the court
improperly limited its review to the statements provided in that provision. See
United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(stating that “absent some indication that the district court had in mind a different
definition,” we “will not assume that the court applied the wrong legal standard”).
Rather, the district court applied the correct law when determining whether
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant[ed]” a reduction in Martinez’s term
of imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and appropriately considered the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in concluding that Martinez’s sentence
accurately reflected his involvement in the offense, “even after COVID-19 and
appellate guidance.” The district court explained that compassionate release was
not warranted because—unlike his co-defendant who chose to go to trial—
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Martinez “solicited kickbacks for referrals,” stipulated to the amount of loss behind
the alleged miscalculation in his plea agreement, and waived his right to appeal
and to collaterally attack his conviction and/or sentence. The record supports the
district court’s conclusions, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Martinez’s motion for compassionate release. See Aruda, 993 F.3d at 799
(“A district court may abuse its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if it
rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact.” (citation
omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
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