USCA11 Case: 20-11906 Date Filed: 08/19/2021 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-11906
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-00287-CLM
ROBERT LEWIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ROBERT E. FULMER,
Field Supervisor,
CHRISTIE BRINKLEY,
Manager,
JOHN GILLNEY,
Field Supervisor/Retired,
JIMMY JOHNS,
Plant Director/I.E.I.,
MICHAEL WEISER,
President/CEO,
Defendants - Appellees.
USCA11 Case: 20-11906 Date Filed: 08/19/2021 Page: 2 of 6
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(August 19, 2021)
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Lewis, proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte dismissal without
prejudice of his amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure
to state a plausible claim to relief. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
Lewis filed a pro se lawsuit alleging employment discrimination based on age,
disability, and race following his termination as a security guard by Weiser Security
Services, Inc. Lewis’s complaint, however, did not give details about the
circumstances of his termination. Instead, Lewis alleged that individuals affiliated
with Weiser Security had rear-ended his car, broken into his home, and tried to
poison him, and that Weiser Security had refused to pay him his share of a
settlement—$3.6 million, according to Lewis—in a lawsuit brought by several of
his coworkers. A document attached to the complaint reflects that Weiser Security
terminated Lewis for repeatedly harassing and threatening his supervisor about the
alleged settlement payout.
2
USCA11 Case: 20-11906 Date Filed: 08/19/2021 Page: 3 of 6
Because Lewis sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court
screened his complaint sua sponte and ordered him to replead his complaint or face
dismissal of the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Stating that the complaint
failed to provide basic facts about Lewis’s employment and termination or “any facts
that indicate discrimination,” the court ordered him to replead his complaint to
correct the pleading defects it noted.
Lewis filed an amended complaint, reiterating allegations from his complaint
and adding that he had not received any promotions or decent pay raises because of
a conspiracy against him, that he was owed incentive pay, that Weiser Security
preferred to hire older security guards because they were less likely to leave, and
that someone had stolen money from his 401(k) retirement account. The district
court found that the same pleading defects remained, so it dismissed the action
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim
on which relief may be granted. Lewis now appeals.
II.
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), viewing the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
applying the standards of Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d
1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 2019). To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter which, accepted as true, plausibly establishes
3
USCA11 Case: 20-11906 Date Filed: 08/19/2021 Page: 4 of 6
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009).
For the employment-discrimination claims at issue here, that standard means
that the plaintiff must plead facts that plausibly suggest that an adverse employment
action resulted from intentional discrimination on a prohibited basis, such as age,
disability, or race. Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th
Cir. 2015); see Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1);
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112; and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1). An adverse employment action is “a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
We liberally construe the filings of pro se parties. Timson v. Sampson, 518
F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Yet we cannot “rewrite an otherwise deficient
pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d
1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014). Even with liberal construction, “issues not briefed
on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.
Liberally construing Lewis’s brief, we can’t tell that he makes any argument
about the district court’s judgment. The brief restates many of the same factual
claims as his amended complaint about mistreatment by Weiser Security employees
4
USCA11 Case: 20-11906 Date Filed: 08/19/2021 Page: 5 of 6
and unpaid wages and settlement proceeds. It also alleges a conspiracy between
Weiser Security and Honeywell Aerospace, the nature of which is not clear. But it
does not reference the district court’s decision or its reasons for dismissing the
lawsuit. Because Lewis “fails to challenge properly on appeal . . . the grounds on
which the district court based its judgment,” he has abandoned any challenge to the
judgment. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir.
2014); see Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.
In any case, the district court correctly dismissed the amended complaint for
failure to state a claim because it fails to plausibly suggest that any mistreatment
Lewis suffered was motivated by his age, disability, or race.1 See Nix v. WLCY
Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.3d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that Title
VII—like other federal employment-discrimination statutes—prohibits
discrimination based on only specific, protected grounds and “is not a shield against
harsh treatment at the workplace”).
Lewis appears to claim that Weiser Security preferred older workers because
they were less likely to leave the company in the face of poor treatment, but he does
not offer any factual allegations to support that suspicion or to connect it to an
1
Though it found otherwise, the district court had federal-question jurisdiction because
Lewis’s claims—though not sufficient to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)—arose under
federal employment-discrimination statutes. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804, 807–08 (1986).
5
USCA11 Case: 20-11906 Date Filed: 08/19/2021 Page: 6 of 6
employment decision that harmed him. See Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246; Oxford Asset
Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[C]onclusory
allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as
facts will not prevent dismissal.”). And the allegations concerning his low wages,
lack of promotions, missing settlement payout, and October 2019 termination are
too sparse, disjointed, and vague to suggest that these events were based on his
disability or race, which are unknown, or his age.2 Accordingly, the amended
complaint did not state a plausible claim of unlawful discrimination.
For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Lewis’s amended complaint.
AFFIRMED.
2
The same is true of Lewis’s allegations of a criminal conspiracy to assault and poison
him, but it is unclear how these events relate to his employment with, or could be attributed to,
Weiser Security. See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 (“A tangible employment decision requires an
official act of the enterprise, a company act.”). Nevertheless, our decision here does not foreclose
Lewis from seeking relief under state law for the alleged unlawful conduct.
6