United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT January 31, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-10117
G. MARK JENKINS, MD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
METHODIST HOSPITALS OF DALLAS, INC.; HOWARD CHASE; JOHN HAUPERT;
JACK BARNETT; KELLY WOLFE; TIM MEEKS; KIM HOLLON,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 05-10118
G. MARK JENKINS, MD,
Plaintiff,
versus
METHODIST HOSPITALS OF DALLAS, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants,
DONALD H. FLANARY, JR.,
Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:02-CV-1823)
1
Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:
In the first of these two related appeals, Dr. G. Mark Jenkins
contests the summary judgment awarded Methodist Hospitals of
Dallas, Inc. and affiliated individuals (collectively, Hospital)
against his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (providing equal contract
rights for all persons under the law). Among other things, at
issue is whether Dr. Jenkins, who is black, failed to establish,
sufficient to defeat summary judgment, that intentional
discrimination on the basis of race interfered with his ability to
make or enforce contracts. At issue in the other appeal is whether
the district court abused its discretion in imposing, sua sponte,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, public-reprimand
sanctions against Dr. Jenkins’ attorney for a misrepresentation in
his brief. JUDGMENT AND SANCTIONS AFFIRMED.
I.
Dr. Jenkins, a cardiologist, joined North Texas Cardiovascular
Associates (NTCA) in 1998, after completing a cardiology
fellowship. NTCA in turn had a contractual relationship with the
Methodist Hospitals of Dallas to provide cardiac services to
patients. Accordingly, shortly after joining NTCA, Dr. Jenkins
applied for medical-staff privileges at the Hospital.
Dr. Jack Barnett, then chief of the Hospital’s department of
medicine, initially opposed the application, purportedly due to Dr.
2
Jenkins’ omission of an unsatisfactory item in his medical-training
history. When Dr. Barnett’s opposition failed to persuade his
approval-process colleagues, however, he gave Dr. Jenkins’
application his support. Upon being granted staff privileges at
the Hospital in late 1998, Dr. Jenkins began working in the cardiac
catheterization laboratory (cath lab), where he performed, inter
alia, primary angioplasty.
The administrative director of the cardiology department
testified by deposition that, starting approximately six months
after Dr. Jenkins arrived, cath-lab employees communicated to her
they felt they were working in a hostile environment. As a result,
in mid-2000, she requested a meeting with the cath-lab staff, a
human-resources vice president, and the newly-assigned
administrator for cardiology. Following that meeting on 12 July,
the cardiology administrator: met with Dr. Robert Edmonson, then
director of cardiology, and Dr. Barnett, among others; and formed
an ad hoc committee to determine whether he should be subject to
corrective action.
That committee interviewed a number of cath-lab staff members,
cardiology-section members, hospital administrators, and Dr.
Jenkins. As stated in a committee document, the committee:
concluded “there [was] a hostile environment in the Cath Lab, which
is potentially injurious to patient care”, due in “large part” to
3
Dr. Jenkins; and, on 21 July, recommended termination of his
medical-staff membership and privileges.
The committee’s recommendation was forwarded to the corporate
medical board (Board). On 25 July, after meeting that day with Dr.
Jenkins, the Board summarily suspended Dr. Jenkins’ cath-lab
privileges, pending further review.
On 27 July, after further review of the evidence related to
Dr. Jenkins’ cath-lab conduct, however, the Board recommended that
Dr. Jenkins retain his staff membership and privileges under
certain conditions, such as his acknowledging he created a hostile
environment in the cath lab and apologizing both in writing and in
person to the cath-lab employees, agreeing to undergo psychiatric
evaluation and ongoing counseling from a psychiatrist selected by
the Board, and agreeing to the monitoring of his cath-lab behavior
for an indefinite period of time by a committee recommended by the
Board. Dr. Jenkins agreed to all of the conditions, except
evaluation by a Board-chosen psychiatrist; he requested choosing
his own.
Accordingly, on 23 August, Dr. Jenkins requested further
review by a fair-hearing committee of the medical staff. And, on
7 September, the above-described summary suspension was reported to
the national practitioner data bank (NPDB).
Following a hearing in December 2000 and January 2001, the
fair-hearing committee unanimously disagreed with Dr. Jenkins’
4
summary suspension and, on 5 February 2001, recommended petitioning
the NPDB to void the adverse recommendation. Upon receipt of the
fair-hearing committee’s report, the Board made a final
recommendation on 20 February to reinstate Dr. Jenkins’ cath-lab
privileges, to establish a monitoring committee, and to petition
the NPDB to void the adverse recommendation. In sum, Dr. Jenkins’
suspension lasted approximately seven months.
In this action, Dr. Jenkins presented numerous federal and
state-law claims against the Hospital. Only one is on appeal:
under § 1981, for racial discrimination impairing his ability to
make or enforce contracts.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Hospital. For the § 1981 claim at issue, the court held: there
was no contract in the record to form the basis of a § 1981 claim;
and, even if there were, Dr. Jenkins failed to create a genuine
issue of material fact on whether the Hospital had the intent to
discriminate against him on the basis of race. Jenkins v.
Methodist Hosps. of Dallas, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-1823-M, 2004 WL
3393380 (N.D. Tex. 14 Aug. 2004).
Dr. Jenkins’ brief in opposition to summary judgment contained
a misstatement in quoting a comment, according to Dr. Jenkins, made
to him by Dr. Barnett. Accordingly, pursuant to the show-cause
procedure for sua sponte sanctions under Rule 11, the court imposed
public-reprimand sanctions against Dr. Jenkins’ attorney in an
5
opinion. Jenkins v. Methodist Hosps. of Dallas, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-
1823-M, 2004 WL 2871006 (N.D. Tex. 14 Dec. 2004).
II.
The § 1981 and sanctions issues are addressed in turn. For
the former, Dr. Jenkins failed to show a material fact issue
concerning claimed racial discrimination. For the latter, the
district court did not abuse its considerable discretion.
A.
A summary judgment is reviewed de novo, applying the same
standard as the district court. E.g., Wheeler v. BL Dev. Corp.,
415 F.3d 399, 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005).
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). “We resolve doubts in favor of the
nonmoving party and make all reasonable inferences in favor of that
party.” Dean v. City of Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir.
2006). No genuine issue of material fact exists if the summary-
judgment evidence is such that no reasonable juror could find in
favor of the nonmovant. E.g., Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55
F.3d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1995).
Section 1981 provides: “All persons ... shall have the same
right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white
citizens”. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 claims are analyzed
6
under the same framework as Title VII claims. Roberson v. Alltel
Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 651 (5th Cir. 2004).
To defeat summary judgment, Dr. Jenkins was required, inter
alia, to show a genuine issue of material fact. The following sub-
issues concern the underlying process for determining whether he
made that material-fact-issue showing.
First, Dr. Jenkins had to establish a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination. Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 118 F.3d
268, 274 (5th Cir. 1997). He had to show: (1) he is a member of
a racial minority; (2) the Hospital had the intent to discriminate
against him on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination
concerned the making or enforcement of a contract. Id. Upon Dr.
Jenkins’ making this showing, the Hospital was required to
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the summary
suspension. E.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305,
312 (5th Cir. 2004). The burden then shifted to Dr. Jenkins to
show: either the proffered reason was not true, but rather a
pretext for discrimination; or the reason, although true, was only
one reason for the suspension, and Dr. Jenkins’ race was another
motivating factor. Id. To meet the motivating-factor prong, Dr.
Jenkins had to show his race “‘actually played a role in [the
Hospital’s decision-making] process and had a determinative
influence on the outcome’”. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
7
507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). Throughout the burden shifting, Dr.
Jenkins had the ultimate burden of showing a genuine issue of
material fact on whether the Hospital intentionally discriminated
against him on the basis of race. See id. at 143.
Dr. Jenkins claims: by summarily suspending his cath-lab
privileges for seven months and reporting this action to the NPDB,
the Hospital intentionally discriminated against him and thereby
interfered with the making or enforcement of his contracts with the
NTCA, patients needing angioplasty, and a different hospital at
which he wanted to acquire staff privileges. (Because Dr. Jenkins
contends the suspension of his cath-lab privileges and report to
the NPDB interfered with his ability to make and enforce contracts,
we first examine whether those actions were racially
discriminatory. If they were not, we need not determine whether
each defendant separately engaged in racially discriminatory
conduct.) The Hospital responds that the alleged contracts cannot
form the basis for a § 1981 claim. In the alternative, it
contends: the suspension was due, not to racial animus, but to
concern that Dr. Jenkins was creating a hostile environment in the
cath lab which could potentially result in a lower standard of
patient care; and it was legally required to report the action to
the NPDB.
Essentially for the reasons stated in the district court’s
extremely detailed and well-reasoned opinion, and assuming Dr.
8
Jenkins made a prima facie case of discrimination, he failed to
show the requisite material fact issue on whether the Hospital’s
proffered reason for suspending his staff privileges pending
investigation of the alleged hostile-working environment was not
legitimate and non-discriminatory. Accordingly, we need not reach
the question of whether the Hospital’s actions interfered with his
making or enforcement of a contract.
The primary evidence relied upon by Dr. Jenkins for the
asserted reason for the suspension’s being pretextual and racial
bias’ being another motivating factor for the Hospital’s actions is
11 alleged remarks by individuals affiliated with the Hospital.
[I]n order for comments in the workplace to
provide sufficient evidence of discrimination,
they must be “(1) related [to the protected
class of persons of which the plaintiff is a
member]; (2) proximate in time to the
[complained-of adverse employment decision];
(3) made by an individual with authority over
the employment decision at issue; and (4)
related to the employment decision at issue”.
Patel v. Midland Mem’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 298 F.3d 333, 343-44 (5th
Cir. 2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Rubinstein v. Adm’rs
of Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400-01 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Dr. Jenkins attributes several of the alleged remarks to Dr.
Barnett. As a participant both on the ad hoc committee that
initially recommended suspension of Dr. Jenkins’ cath-lab
privileges and in the Board’s review of this recommendation, Dr.
Barnett was obviously in a position to influence the decision to
9
suspend Dr. Jenkins. Although Dr. Barnett’s alleged remarks about
Dr. Jenkins reflect a mistrust of him and his professional
capabilities, none shows the requisite racial animus towards him.
Dr. Barnett’s other alleged remarks were either not made in
reference to blacks and/or occurred many years prior to Dr.
Jenkins’ suspension.
The remaining five alleged remarks attributed to persons other
than Dr. Barnett likewise do not meet Dr. Jenkins’ summary-judgment
burden. One involved the “probable” use of a racial epithet in
reference to Dr. Jenkins off hospital grounds by two individuals,
one of whom was a witness before the ad hoc committee. This
singular alleged remark is insufficient to show the committee’s
actions were motivated by racial bias. Dr. Jenkins has provided no
evidence that witness either wielded power over the committee
members or provided inaccurate information the committee relied
upon without conducting an independent investigation. See Long v.
Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996). Another alleged
remark did not involve blacks, while another involved a black
speaker, neither of which suggests the Hospital’s reason was
pretextual or motivated by racial bias against blacks. The final
two comments were simply opinions, with no supporting evidence,
that Dr. Jenkins was resented in the cath lab and suspended because
he was black.
10
Dr. Jenkins also asserts that a number of other actions by the
Hospital indicate its racial motivation, including: the Hospital’s
failure to call his attention to the cath-lab problem prior to
beginning the peer-review process; the claimed bad faith with which
the ad hoc committee conducted that review; affidavits showing the
claims about his behavior were false; the “gratuitous severity” of
his summary suspension; the Board’s refusal to negotiate with him
regarding the conditions for reinstatement of his privileges; and
the unanimous rejection of the charges against him.
The underlying evidence for these assertions, however, does
not show a genuine issue of material fact on whether the Hospital’s
summary suspension of Dr. Jenkins was racially motivated. That
evidence shows the ad hoc committee was formed only after the
administrative director of the cardiology department received
numerous complaints about Dr. Jenkins’ professionalism in the cath
lab and called meetings to try to resolve the discord. The
rejection of the committee’s suspension recommendation does not
create a material fact issue whether its actions were racially
motivated. Bryant v. Compass Group USA Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 478
(5th Cir. 2005) (“[E]vidence that the employer’s investigation
merely came to an incorrect conclusion does not establish a racial
motivation behind an adverse employment decision”.), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 1027 (2006). Under § 1981, courts are charged only with
determining whether such actions were racially discriminatory;
11
where they are not shown to be, courts cannot second-guess the
bases for them. Id.
B.
For the companion appeal, Donald H. Flanary, Jr. (Jenkins’
attorney) challenges the district court’s sua sponte sanctioning
his conduct under Rule 11. In opposition to the Hospital’s
summary-judgment motion, Jenkins’ attorney filed both a response
and a supporting brief on 4 November 2003. In presenting the
racial discrimination claims, the brief quoted from Dr. Jenkins’
affidavit (which was filed with that brief after being signed and
notarized at Jenkins’ attorney’s law firm on the very day the brief
was signed).
Dr. Jenkins stated in his affidavit: Dr. Barnett said to him
“he [Dr. Barnett] would not let me [Dr. Jenkins] treat his dog”.
The brief, however, quoted the statement as “Boy, I would not let
you treat my dog”, wrongly inserting the racially-charged word
“Boy” at the beginning of the statement.
Opposing counsel immediately discovered the glaring
misstatement and pointed it out in their 19 November 2003 reply
brief. Jenkins’ attorney, however, did not correct this
misrepresentation until almost two months later, upon being
questioned about it by the district court at a 13 January 2004
summary-judgment hearing. Jenkins’ attorney apologized for the
12
misrepresentation and offered to resubmit the brief with the
quotation corrected.
The district court rejected the request and found the conduct
“unacceptable” because it changed a comment from one which “on its
face has absolutely nothing to do with race” to one that, “was, in
fact, racially related”. The district court admonished Jenkins’
attorney for “put[ting] before the Court a false piece of evidence”
and directed him to submit affidavits explaining his and his firm’s
actions in that regard.
Subsequently, in its 18 August 2004 opinion granting summary
judgment, the district court issued a show-cause order to Jenkins’
attorney, specifying the conduct at issue. After reviewing the
response to that order, the court in a December 2004 opinion held
Jenkins’ attorney in violation of Rule 11(b)(3) (allegations and
factual contentions must have evidentiary support) “for his
unprofessional conduct in not verifying the accuracy of the alleged
quotation and in not promptly withdrawing it when the error was
pointed out in Defendants’ Reply Brief”. Jenkins, 2004 WL 2871006,
at *2. The court sanctioned him through a public reprimand in the
opinion. Id.
In claiming the sanctions were unwarranted, Jenkins’ attorney
maintains the statement at issue was an inadvertent mistake and not
the result of serious misconduct. Rule 11 sanctions are reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc.,
13
332 F.3d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). As noted in
Whitehead, this standard is “necessarily very deferential” for two
reasons:
First, based on its familiarity with the
issues and litigants, the district court is
better situated than the court of appeals to
marshal the pertinent facts and apply the
fact-dependent legal standard mandated by Rule
11. Second, the district judge is
independently responsible for maintaining the
integrity of judicial proceedings in his court
and, concomitantly, must be accorded the
necessary authority.
Id at 802-03. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Rule 11 is designed to “reduce the reluctance of courts to
impose sanctions by emphasizing the responsibilities of attorneys
and reinforcing those obligations through the imposition of
sanctions”. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 870
(5th Cir. 1988) (en banc). Along that line, attorneys certify to
the best of their knowledge that “allegations and other factual
contentions [submitted to the court] have evidentiary support”.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
For obvious reasons, the procedure for sanctions imposed sua
sponte differs from when requested by counsel. Compare FED. R. CIV.
P. 11(c)(1)(A) with 11(c)(1)(B). If, after notice and a reasonable
opportunity to respond, the court determines Rule 11 sanctions may
be warranted, it may sua sponte issue a show-cause order specifying
the offending conduct and, following a response, may impose
sanctions. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(B), (c)(3).
14
As hereinafter discussed, “the standard under which the
attorney is measured [under Rule 11] is an objective, not
subjective, standard of reasonableness under the circumstances”.
Whitehead, 332 F.3d at 802 (quoting Childs v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 29 F.3d 1018, 1024 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added)).
Accordingly, an attorney’s good faith will not, by itself, protect
against the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Childs, 29 F.3d at
1024.
Concerning this objective standard, Jenkins’ attorney claims:
where, as here, sanctions are imposed sua sponte, the standard
should instead be whether he acted in subjective bad faith, akin to
being in contempt of court. He bases this on his not having the
21-day safe-harbor provision he would have had to correct the error
under Rule 11(c)(1)(A) for sanctions requested by counsel. E.g.,
In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003).
In this regard, the sanctions imposed in Whitehead and Childs
were pursuant to counsel’s motion. The sanctions imposed in Childs
were under the Rule as amended in 1983, which permitted sua sponte
sanctions. The amendment in 1993 concerning such sanctions simply
added the above-described show-cause procedure. See Advisory
Committee Notes on FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1993 Amendments). The rule
as amended in 1993 was at issue in Whitehead. That opinion makes
15
no distinction between the initiating basis by which sanctions are
being considered.
Admittedly, this distinction was not at issue in Whitehead;
but, obviously, the reasons for our abuse-of-discretion standard of
review being “necessarily very deferential” are as applicable to
sua sponte sanctions as to those imposed on motions by counsel.
Nor is there any basis for making a distinction based on who
initiates the sanctions inquiry. Ultimately, unless the safe-
harbor provision is utilized for sanctions requested by counsel,
the district court must decide whether to impose them. In each
instance, the party subject to sanctions is given the opportunity
to show why they should not be imposed.
Accordingly, Whitehead and Childs are controlling; they
require an objective standard. See also Young v. City of
Providence ex rel. Napolitano, 404 F.3d 33, 38-40 (1st Cir. 2005);
Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir.
2003). In the alternative, Jenkins’ counsel maintains sanctions
were improper under an objective standard.
In response to the show-cause order, Jenkins’ attorney
provided the following: An associate in his law firm assumed
primary responsibility for drafting the section of the brief
containing the misstatement. (On two instances earlier, in the
response and supporting brief, the statement was quoted correctly.)
The brief was then reviewed by two partners in the firm who
16
checked, among other things, all quotations for accuracy and added
supporting record citations. Jenkins’ attorney then proofread the
brief. Despite these internal-review procedures, the error
remained. As noted, approximately two weeks after the brief was
filed, the error was brought to Jenkins’ attorney’s attention by
opposing counsel’s reply brief.
Of course, Jenkins’ attorney does not contest either the
district court’s finding the statement at issue false or that he
was responsible because he signed the brief. Instead, he claims an
isolated factual error should not be the basis of Rule 11
sanctions. Under certain circumstances, however, an isolated
factual misrepresentation may serve as the basis for them. See,
e.g., Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d
1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming a sanction for miscitation
and mischaracterization of authority “because, in quoting from and
citing published opinions, [counsel] distorted what the opinions
stated by leaving out significant portions of the citations or
cropping one of them, and failed to show that she and not the court
had supplied the emphasis in one of them”).
As stated by the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11, a lawyer
is required to “‘stop-and-think’ before ... making legal or factual
contentions”. Advisory Committee Notes on FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1993
Amendments). Needless to say, this duty is an extremely important
one, especially for the situation at issue. As the district court
17
stated, the “erroneous inclusion of the word ‘boy’ in the statement
... if relied upon by the Court, could have altered the outcome of
th[e] ... case”. Jenkins, 2004 WL 2871006, at *2. See also Aman
v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding racially-charged “code words” may provide the basis of
discriminatory intent by “send[ing] a clear message and carry[ing]
the distinct tone of racial motivations and implications”).
“Whatever the ultimate sanction imposed, the district court
should utilize the sanction that furthers the purposes of Rule 11
and is the least severe sanction adequate to such purpose.”
Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878. For example, an admonition by the court
may be an appropriate sanction, in instances where the attorney’s
sanctionable conduct was not intentional or malicious, where it
constituted a first offense, and where the attorney had already
recognized and apologized for his actions. E.g., In re Kelly, 808
F.2d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 1986) (issuing a formal warning because
“the [offending paper] was clumsily rather than dishonestly
drafted, and ... counsel ha[d] ... acknowledged [the deficiency]
... and has assured us that [he] will not in the future make
inadequately substantiated statements in court filings”); see also
Traina, 911 F.2d at 1158. On the other hand, sanctions should be
“sufficient to deter repetition of [similar] conduct”. FED. R. CIV.
P. 11(c)(2).
18
As the district court noted, the erroneous, racially-charged
quotation should have been discovered through simple proofreading.
Morever, as the court noted, even though the error was pointed out
by opposing counsel in November 2003, Jenkins’ attorney did not
correct it until January 2004, roughly two months later, at the
summary-judgment hearing.
Jenkins’ attorney contends the court’s delayed-correction
statement in its opinion was one of the two bases for sanctions and
that such a basis violated our court’s “snapshot” rule, which
“ensures that Rule 11 liability is assessed only for a violation
existing at the moment of filing”. Skidmore Energy, Inc., v. KPMG,
455 F.3d 564, 570 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 524 (2006).
It is not clear whether it was a basis, or simply a factor that
resulted in not mitigating against sanctions. In any event, such
reliance on this “snapshot” rule is inapposite; the district court
had already concluded the filing never satisfied Rule 11 to begin
with, a fact never contested by Jenkins’ attorney. See generally
id. (sanctions upheld on similar grounds). Moreover, at most,
this was but one of two bases relied upon in imposing sanctions,
the other, as quoted above, being the attorney’s “unprofessional
conduct in not verifying the accuracy of the alleged quotation”.
Jenkins, 2004 WL 2871006, at * 2. Therefore, although Jenkins’
attorney did not have a continuing duty to correct the
misrepresentation, see Edwards v. Gen. Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 242,
19
245 (5th Cir. 1998), his promptly doing so might have been
considered by the district court as a mitigating factor. Jenkins’
attorney did not take that obvious, and most appropriate,
opportunity.
Pursuant to our quite deferential standard of review for
sanctions, we are extremely mindful that district courts are “on
the front lines of litigation”. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990). As the district court noted, the error
was glaring and could have had a serious impact on its summary-
judgment decision. The court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing the public-reprimand sanctions.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and sanctions are
AFFIRMED.
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