United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT February 6, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-61077
Summary Calendar
SYED FEROZ MEHDI,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
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Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A77 528 147
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Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Syed Feroz Mehdi, a native of Pakistan, petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ summary affirmance of the
decision of the immigration judge to deny his applications for
withholding of removal and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT). In his applications, Mehdi asserted that
he would be targeted by Sunni violence if returned to Pakistan
because he is a famous cricket player who is a Shia and because
the Sunnis are targeting Shias who are professionals. He argues
(1) that the Immigration Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-61077
-2-
due to a statutorily non-compliant Notice to Appear (NTA) and (2)
that the IJ improperly disregarded Department of State evidence
verifying the human rights violations and persecution of Shias in
Pakistan.
Regarding the NTA, Mehdi argues that it was insufficient
because it did not specify a time and place at which the
proceedings would be held, as required by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Instead, the NTA ordered him to appear
before an IJ “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” However,
the day after the NTA issued, Mehdi received a written Notice of
Hearing (NOH), which indicated the date and time of the hearing;
he appeared and testified at the hearing. Therefore, Mehdi had
actual notice, and he was not prejudiced by the omission of a
time and date on the NTA. The NTA and the NOH combined to
satisfy the statutory requirements of written notice. See Haider
v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Our reading of
the INA and the regulations compels the conclusion that the NTA
and the NOH, which were properly served on [the alien], combined
to provide the requisite notice.”). Mehdi’s argument that the
NTA deprived the Immigration Court of jurisdiction lacks merit.
Regarding Department of State evidence on Pakistan, Mehdi
complains that the IJ ignored most of it and considered only that
the violence against Shias in Pakistan has been ongoing for
decades. However, the IJ specifically noted that he considered
the Pakistan Country Report and accorded it limited weight. The
No. 05-61077
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IJ noted that the religious violence in Pakistan was occurring
during the time Mehdi was in Pakistan and that Mehdi was not
harmed. The IJ concluded that Mehdi would not be “in any more
danger today than he would have been when he lived in Pakistan
and was not harmed.” Moreover, the IJ found that Mehdi was not
truthful when he said that he intended to remain in the United
States only for the six-month duration of his visa.
We accord “great deference” to an IJ’s decisions concerning
an alien’s credibility. Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 903 (5th
Cir. 2002). The only way for an alien to overcome an adverse
credibility determination is through evidence that compels a
finding in his favor. Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir.
1994). Mehdi does not point to any evidence that contradicts the
IJ’s finding that he intended to live and work in the United
States and did not intend to leave when his six-month visa
expired. There is no evidence in the record that compels a
contrary finding. Nor has Mehdi shown a “clear probability” of
persecution upon his return. See Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185,
188 (5th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s
denial of Mehdi’s application for withholding of removal. See
Majd v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 590, 594 (5th Cir. 2006).
Because Mehdi offered no evidence that he will be tortured
upon his return to Pakistan, he has not met the higher bar of
torture. See Roy v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 139 (5th Cir. 2004).
PETITION DENIED.