United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT February 5, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 06-30431 Clerk
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GREGORY L. SPELLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Case No. 2:03-CR-271-ALL
_________________________________________________________________
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and KING and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Gregory L. Spells appeals the denial of a motion to
suppress evidence discovered by federal agents during a search of
his residence and subsequently used to support his convictions for
possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of
a drug-trafficking crime. Because the executing agents’ reliance
on the warrant was objectively reasonable, we apply the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule announced in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1985), and AFFIRM the district
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
court’s ruling.
In July 2003, DEA Task Force Agent Paul Toye was
contacted by a confidential informant who reported that an
individual from St. Bernard Parish made weekly deliveries of crack
cocaine to Spells’s residence located at 1524½ Barrone Street in
New Orleans. The informant stated that Spells maintained a
constant stockpile of crack cocaine and protected it with firearms
that had been used to commit several New Orleans-area homicides by
Spells’s friend, Kevin “Deuce” Ellis.
During Toye’s investigation of the tip, another DEA
agent, Paul Girior, independently corroborated that the multi-unit
address was a well-known distribution point for crack cocaine.
Toye then conducted a criminal history investigation and determined
that Spells had two prior felony arrests for possession of crack
cocaine and that a New Orleans resident named Kevin Ellis had
felony arrests for distribution of crack cocaine and for carrying
an illegal firearm during the commission of a crime. Finally, Toye
was notified by a separate confidential informant, whose past
information regarding narcotics investigations had proven reliable,
that the first confidential informant was trustworthy.
The informant again contacted Toye on August 6, 2003,
stating that Spells had received a fresh delivery of between
fifteen and twenty pre-packaged plastic baggies containing crack
cocaine earlier that morning. In response to this second tip,
surveillance of the residence was established, and Toye obtained a
2
search warrant. When agents confronted Spells outside of the
residence, he admitted that his apartment contained contraband. A
search subsequently revealed 130 grams of crack cocaine in several
plastic baggies, a 9mm semi-automatic pistol with laser sight, two
.40 caliber semi-automatic pistols, and a scoped, lever-action
rifle.
Based on the fruits of the search, Spells was charged
with possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and possession of
a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Spells moved to suppress the narcotics
and firearm evidence, arguing that the warrant affidavit was
deficient because it lacked any “indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S. Ct. at 3421. After a suppression
hearing, the district court denied Spells’s motion. Spells entered
a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial
of the motion to suppress.
We review a district court’s denial of a suppression
motion by first determining whether Leon’s good-faith exception
applies. United States v. Sibley, 448 F.3d 754, 757 (5th Cir.
2006). If so, we typically do not consider whether the warrant was
adequately supported by probable cause and will affirm the district
court’s ruling. United States v. Flanders, 468 F.3d 269, 270 (5th
3
Cir. 2006).1 Under the good-faith exception, “evidence will be
admitted if it is obtained by officers acting in objectively
reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a magistrate
judge.” United States v. Pigrum, 922 F.2d 249, 252 (5th Cir.
1991). The district court’s determination of the reasonableness of
an officer’s good-faith reliance on a warrant is reviewed de novo.
United States v. Cherna, 184 F.3d 403, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1999).
Reliance on a warrant affidavit is reasonable if the
affidavit is not “bare bones.” See United States v. Restrepo,
994 F.2d 173, 188-89 (5th Cir. 1993). “Bare bones” affidavits are
those containing “wholly conclusory statements, which lack the
facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently
determine probable cause.” United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d
317, 321 (5th Cir. 1992).
Here, the degree of detail provided by the informant’s
tip, when considered in conjunction with the corroborating
information obtained by Agent Toye, demonstrates that the instant
warrant affidavit is not “bare bones.” The informant provided
detailed information on two separate occasions that included: the
location of Spells’s supplier; the frequency of the deliveries; the
1
In the presence of an officer’s good-faith reliance on a warrant, we reach the probable
cause issue only if the case involves “a novel question” of Fourth Amendment law. United States
v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d, 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 264,
103 S. Ct. 2317, 2346 (1983) (White, J., concurring)). This case presents no such question. See
id. (whether facts alleged by an affidavit support a finding of probable cause does not raise a novel
question of law).
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address of the residence at which Spells allegedly bagged and sold
crack cocaine; a description of the contraband weapons possessed by
Spells; and a specific description of the amount of crack cocaine
delivered to Spells on the morning of August 6. Toye’s independent
investigation uncovered facts consistent with the informant’s tip.
More than conclusory statements bolstered the affidavit.
The magistrate judge determined that the nature and
quality of the information contained in Toye’s warrant affidavit
bore sufficient indicia of reliability to support a finding of
probable cause.2 Without evaluating the accuracy of that
determination, we agree that Toye’s affidavit was not “bare bones”
and that his reliance on the magistrate judge’s ruling was
objectively reasonable, and thus in good faith.3 When, as here, a
warrant affidavit is not facially invalid, “it is impossible to
argue...that an officer’s reliance on it could be unreasonable.”
United States v. McKnight, 953 F.2d 898, 905 (5th Cir. 1992).
For these reasons, the good faith exception applies, the
district court correctly denied the motion to suppress, and the
2
See, e.g., United States v. Privette, 947 F.2d 1259, 1262 (5th Cir. 1991) (detail of an
informant’s statement or internal consistency of the statement with surrounding facts compensate
for deficiencies in an informant’s veracity); United States v. Jackson, 818 F.2d 345, 349 (5th Cir.
1987) (particularly detailed information can serve as the basis for an informant’s knowledge);
United States v. Farese, 612 F.2d 1376, 1379 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980) (suspect’s criminal record is a
valid consideration in the probable cause assessment) (citation omitted).
3
Because of our determination that Leon’s good-faith exception applies, we do not
reach the question whether the magistrate judge’s probable cause assessment was accurate.
Restrepo, 994 F.2d at 187.
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conviction is therefore AFFIRMED.
6