United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 19, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
)))))))))))))))))))))))))) Clerk
No. 06-30695
Summary Calendar
))))))))))))))))))))))))))
MICHAEL J. RILEY, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION AND LOUISIANA ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
No. 2:05-CV-2500
Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Michael J. Riley, Sr. (“Riley”) appeals the
district court’s granting of Defendants-Appellees Louisiana State
Bar Association’s (“Bar Association”) and Louisiana Attorney
Disciplinary Board’s (“Board”) (collectively, “Defendants”) motions
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIRCUIT RULE
47.5.4.
to dismiss.1 Specifically, Riley argues that the district court
erred in holding that: (1) the Eleventh Amendment barred Riley’s
claims for monetary damages against the Bar Association and the
Board,2 and (2) it lacked jurisdiction to hear Riley’s claims under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We decline to reach the Eleventh
Amendment issues. However, we agree with the district court that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives it of jurisdiction to hear any
of Riley’s claims. We therefore AFFIRM.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2003, Riley sought readmission to the Louisiana State Bar
Association for the third time. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied
Riley’s application for readmission on November 19, 2004. In re
Riley, 887 So. 2d 459 (La. 2004), reconsideration denied, 898 So.
2d 1286 (La. 2005). In response, Riley requested reconsideration
of that decision, which the Louisiana Supreme Court denied. Riley
then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
1
The Bar Association and the Board filed separate motions to
dismiss and the district court issued separate orders granting
those motions.
2
In its order granting the Board’s motion to dismiss, the
district court held that the Board had Eleventh Amendment immunity
against “[Riley’s] claims against the Board.” App. at 17. In its
subsequent order granting the Bar Association’s motion to dismiss,
the district court restricted the broad language of its prior
holding. The district court held that the Board had Eleventh
Amendment immunity with respect to claims for monetary damages, but
not for claims for declaratory or injunctive relief. Id. at 27
n.8.
2
certiorari, which was also denied.
Despite these setbacks, Riley remained undeterred. On June 20,
2005, Riley filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the Bar Association
and the Board, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment due
process and equal protection clauses in addition to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988 et seq. Riley alleges that the Board
libeled him by submitting recommendations to the Louisiana Supreme
Court which stated that Riley had not completed all court-ordered
restitution. COMPL. ¶ XXI. Riley contends that the Louisiana
Supreme Court denied his application for readmission because of the
allegedly false claims in the Board’s recommendations. Id. ¶ XXV.
Riley further contends that the Bar Association and the Board treat
black applicants for readmission differently than they treat white
applicants. Id. ¶¶ XXXIX-XXXXIV. The complaint seeks both
injunctive relief and monetary damages.
The Bar Association and the Board filed separate motions to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In separate orders, the district court
granted both motions for substantially the same reasons. Riley now
appeals those orders.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Riley appeals the district court’s orders granting Defendants’
motions to dismiss, so this court has jurisdiction to hear the
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
This court reviews a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo.
United States v. Willard, 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003). We
must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and review the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. We may dismiss
a claim if the plaintiff fails to allege any set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
The district court determined that Riley was not entitled to
relief because the Eleventh Amendment and the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred Riley’s claims against the Defendants. The district
court held that Eleventh Amendment immunity shielded the Defendants
from suit for monetary damages. Further, the district court held
that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it lacked jurisdiction over
all of Riley’s claims, including those for declaratory and
injunctive relief. Because, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we
may legitimately decide this case exclusively on jurisdictional
grounds, we decline to reach any Eleventh Amendment issues.3
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine directs that federal district
courts lack jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state
court judgments. Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th
1994). State courts should resolve constitutional questions arising
3
In declining to resolve any Eleventh Amendment issues, we
follow the well-established canon that courts should avoid
addressing constitutional questions when possible. United States
v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 359 (5th Cir. 2002). This court should
not decide questions of a constitutional nature “unless absolutely
necessary to decide the case.” Id.
4
from state proceedings. Id. “If a state trial court errs[,] the
judgment is not void, it is to be reviewed and corrected by the
appropriate state appellate court. Thereafter, recourse at the
federal level is limited solely to an application for a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.” Id. “A federal
complainant cannot circumvent this jurisdictional limitation by
asserting claims not raised in the state court proceedings or claims
framed as original claims for relief.” United States v. Shepherd,
23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994). Similarly, a federal complainant
cannot re-litigate issues that should have been raised in state
court and defeat the operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by
casting a complaint as a civil rights violation. Liedtke, 18 F.3d
at 317. Finally, Rooker-Feldman bars federal claims which, while
not identical to, are “inextricably intertwined” with state court
judgments. Id. at 318.
Riley argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to his case.
Instead, he contends that his complaint states a separate cause of
action unrelated to his application for readmission to the bar.
Riley cites to our decisions in Davis v. Baylis, 70 F.3d 367 (5th
Cir. 1995), and Guathier v. Continental Dining Services, Inc., 831
F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that Rooker-
Feldman does not bar an action in federal court if the same action
would be allowed in the state court of the rendering state.
Riley’s arguments are unavailing. Riley attempts to frame the
alleged violations of his civil rights as original claims, but they
5
arise from, and exist only because of, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
denial of his application for readmission. Although, in his
briefings, Riley strenuously maintains that he does not wish to
challenge the denial of his application for readmission, his
complaint suggests otherwise. His complaint states “[t]he denial
of Plaintiff’s application for readmission, by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, on November 19, 2004, is a denial of due process and
equal protection afforded to the Plaintiff, as a black person, under
the United States Constitution . . . .” COMPL. ¶ XXVI. Contrary to
Riley’s briefings, these words do not indicate an original cause of
action unrelated to his application for readmission.
Even if Riley’s complaint is not a direct challenge to the
denial of his application for readmission, his complaint falls under
the aegis of Rooker-Feldman because it raises issues “inextricably
intertwined” with a state court judgment, such that the district
court was “in essence being called upon to review the state-court
decision.” Shepard, 23 F.3d at 924. Riley’s case is materially
indistinguishable from Liedtke, in which we applied Rooker-Feldman
because the federal claim was “inextricably intertwined” with a
previous state court judgment. In Liedtke, the appellant filed a
§ 1983 suit challenging the constitutionality of the events that led
to his disbarment. 18 F.3d at 316. In that case, we held that
Rooker-Feldman prevented the appellant from challenging those events
in federal court because they were “inextricably intertwined” with
the state court judgment disbarring him. Id. at 318. Similarly,
6
in this case, Riley argues that the events leading to the denial of
his application for readmission--for example, the Board allegedly
submitting a knowingly libelous recommendation to the Louisiana
Supreme Court--resulted in unconstitutional violations of his civil
rights. These events are “inextricably intertwined” with the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s denial of Riley’s application for
readmission. Cf. Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 316. Therefore, under Rooker-
Feldman, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear any
of Riley’s claims.
If the readmission process did result in violations of Riley’s
civil rights, then he should have raised those issues before the
Louisiana Supreme Court. See Musslewhite v. State Bar of Tex., 32
F.3d 942, 946 n.15 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that federal courts lack
jurisdiction over claims that could have been, but were not raised
in state court). Riley exhausted his recourse at the federal level
when the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ
of certiorari. Under Rooker-Feldman, the district court lacked
jurisdiction over Riley’s claims and properly dismissed his suit.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the orders of the
district court.
AFFIRMED.
7