United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT January 11, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-40263
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARLOS VICENTE RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:05-CR-1527-2
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Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Carlos Vicente Rodriguez appeals his bench-trial conviction
for conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to
distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He contends that the district
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized
at an immigration checkpoint because the extended detention and
subsequent search of the vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment
rights.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 06-40263
-2-
The Fourth Amendment does not protect people from all
searches and seizures, but it does protect them from unreasonable
searches and seizures. See United States v. Jones, 133 F.3d 358,
361 (5th Cir. 1998). At an immigration checkpoint, any vehicle
may be stopped even in the absence of any individualized
suspicion of illegal activity so that the Border Patrol Agent may
determine the citizenship status of the people passing through
the checkpoint. United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726,
729 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d
425, 431, 433 (5th Cir. 2001). “The permissible duration of an
immigration checkpoint stop is therefore the time reasonably
necessary to determine the citizenship status of the persons
stopped.” Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at 433. Questions outside
the scope of the stop are permissible, but only insofar as they
do not extend the duration of the stop. Id. at 432. Any
detention beyond the time it takes to determine citizenship and,
logically, any subsequent search of a vehicle must be based on
consent or probable cause. See United States v. Portillo-
Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 652-53 (5th Cir. 2002).
U.S. Border Patrol Agent Wilbert Flores testified that
although he was satisfied with the driver’s citizenship status,
he was not satisfied as to Rodriguez’s citizenship status or that
of the three minor children. Thus, the extended detention was
permissible to determine their citizenship status and complete
the immigration inspection. See Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at
No. 06-40263
-3-
433. Further, Agent Flores sought and obtained consent to search
the vehicle’s trunk approximately one minute after the vehicle’s
arrival at the immigration checkpoint, and, thus, consent was
obtained within the lawful duration of the immigration stop. See
id. at 435. There is no indication that the driver’s consent was
limited to a cursory inspection of the trunk or that the search
was completed at the primary inspection area. Thus, the driver’s
consent to search the trunk also justified the continued
detention. See id. At the secondary inspection area, the
service canine alerted to the vehicle’s trunk and its contents.
These alerts provided the agents with probable cause to further
extend the detention and search the trunk. See United States v.
Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 444 (5th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the
district court did not err when it denied Rodriguez’s motion to
suppress, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.