United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT January 30, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 06-50793 Clerk
Summary Calendar
PATRICIA RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Versus
YSLETA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas, El Paso Division
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Patrica Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) filed this suit against the
Ysleta Independent School District (“YISD”) alleging that YISD’s
Board of Trustees (“Board”) denied her procedural due process in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it
terminated her employment contract.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of YISD,
holding that Rodriguez had received all process that was due. We
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Prior to her termination, Rodriguez was employed by YISD as a
third grade bilingual teacher. Rodriguez was accused of testing
irregularities in the administration of the Texas Assessment of
Knowledge and Skills (“TAKS”) reading test to her third grade class
on March 3, 2004. While the test was in progress, colleagues
observed Rodriguez inappropriately helping her students by calling
them to her desk, returning their tests to them, pointing to the
tests, and directing the students back to their desks with their
tests. The colleagues also observed Rodriguez making erasures on
the students’ tests and making comments to the class that were
outside the test script.
After an investigation, YISD recommended that the Board
terminate Rodriguez’s contract. YISD provided notice of the
proposed termination to Rodriguez on April 15, 2004. Pursuant to
section 21.253(a) of the Texas Education Code, Rodriguez made a
request to the Commissioner of Education (“Commissioner”) for a
hearing concerning the proposed termination. Consistent with the
statute, the hearing was held before a certified hearing examiner
and proposed findings were entered by the examiner on July 14,
2004. On August 2, 2004, the Board adopted the examiner’s
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recommendations and voted to terminate Rodriguez’s employment
contract.
Rodriguez appealed her termination to the Commissioner. The
Commissioner issued a decision denying Rodriguez’s appeal. After
Rodriguez’s request for rehearing by the Commissioner was denied,
Rodriguez was entitled under the statute to appeal the
Commissioner’s decision to a state district court but she elected
not to do so.
Rodriguez brought the present suit alleging that she was
denied procedural due process by YISD because the Board (1) failed
to provide an unbiased and impartial hearing officer; (2) failed to
allow Rodriguez the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against her; and (3) failed to allow Rodriguez to call
and present witnesses on her own behalf.
The district court granted YISD’s motion for summary judgment
on Rodriguez’s procedural due process claims on the ground that,
inter alia, Rodriguez had received all the process that was due.
We agree. YISD followed the Texas statute and gave Rodriguez a
trial like factual hearing and the right to address the Board
before any termination decision was made. In addition, Rodriguez
had two levels of appeals available to her—first to the
Commissioner and then to the state court.
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While Rodriguez claims the hearing examiner was biased and
committed various errors during the administrative hearing, she
does not dispute that the district’s board of trustees, the final
decisionmaker, granted her a pre-termination opportunity to orally
argue her case. During that argument, Rodriguez had the chance to
call the hearing examiner’s errors to the Board’s attention and to
challenge the hearing examiner’s findings. Rodriguez makes no
allegation that this proceeding was procedurally inadequate. In
addition, after the Board voted to terminate her contract,
Rodriguez acknowledges that she was provided with three
opportunities at post-termination process under Texas law to appeal
the Board’s determination and to again correct mistakes caused by
any errors on the part of the hearing examiner.
Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s conclusion
that Rodriguez was afforded all the rights of the due process
framework under Texas law. These procedures meet the
constitutional minimums for procedural due process. See Coogin v.
Longview Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F.3d 465-66 (5th Cir. 2003).
Therefore, we conclude Rodriguez fails to establish a genuine
question of material fact as to whether she has been denied
procedural due process.
We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
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