United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 9, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-60616
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARK MONROE GEESLIN, also known as Mark Sharp Geeslin,
also known as Arvin Sharp Geeslin,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi
1:04cr110LG
Before REAVLEY, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In May of 2001, Mark Monroe Geeslin used another man’s last
name, driver’s license, social security number and date of birth to
amass $112,660.94 of debt under various aliases. On March 1, 2005,
Geeslin pled guilty to one count of identity theft in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(7) and (b)(1)(D). Specifically, he used
another person’s identity to open accounts with a wireless
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
telephone company, a cable television company, a power company, a
medical center, and two doctors’ offices. In calculating Geeslin’s
sentence, the district judge applied a two-level enhancement
pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(i) on the grounds that the offense
involved “the unauthorized . . . use of another’s means of
identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of
identification.” The court found that when Geeslin used the stolen
social security number to open lines of credit at various
businesses, the account numbers generated in the process became
“means of identification” as contemplated by § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(i).
Geeslin objected to this enhancement and argued that he used the
documentation to obtain services—medical services, telephone
services, cable services, etc.—not to produce new forms of
identification. The court overruled the objection and, after
tabulating all relevant sentencing factors, calculated a range of
33–41 months. The judge then sentenced Geeslin at the top of that
range.
On appeal, Geeslin raises only a single issue. He asserts
that services, such as medical, cable, telephone and power
services, are not “means of identification” as that term is used in
§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(i). Unfortunately for Geeslin, the definition of
“means of identification” says otherwise.1 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7)
1
The application notes to § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(i) instruct us to
give “means of identification” the meaning given to it in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028(d)(7).
2
defines “means of identification” as “any name or number that may
be used alone or in conjunction with any other information, to
identify a specific individual.” Surely this includes a personal
telephone number, which is among the many things that Geeslin
fraudulently acquired. Indeed, § 1028(d)(7) specifically includes
“telecommunication identifying information or access device” as a
“means of identification.”2
We do agree with Geeslin that a telephone number is not the
first thing that comes to mind when one uses the term “means of
identification.” In fact, we have found no cases from any other
circuit that have considered the application of §
2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(i) to a phone number or utility bill like those at
issue here. In the typical § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(i) case, a court will
impose the enhancement because a defendant used false
identification to secure a bank loan. E.g., United States v.
Radziszewski, 474 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2007). This scenario is
expressly included in the Application Notes as an example of
conduct to which subsection (b)(10)(C)(i) applies. See U.S.S.G. §
2B1.1., cmt. n.9(C)(ii)(I). In such a case, “the account number of
the bank loan is the other means of identification that has been
2
When we pursue this definition even further, we find that 18
U.S.C. § 1029(e), which is specifically cross-referenced in §
1028(d)(7)(D), defines an “access device” to include a “mobile
identification number, personal identification number, or other
telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument identifier .
. . .” We believe this includes a functional cell phone and phone
number.
3
obtained unlawfully.” Id. This example assuages any lingering
concerns we may have about classifying a phone number as a “means
of identification.” If the account number on a bank loan
explicitly qualifies, then so does a phone a number. We might be
more reluctant to reach the same conclusion about the account
number on a cable or power bill alone,3 but we are readily
persuaded that use of false identification in the acquisition of a
phone and phone number is deserving of a sentencing enhancement
pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(i).
The defendant’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
3
We also agree with the district court’s observation that, had
Geeslin used the identification only to get medical services, this
would be a very different case, and probably not deserving of an
enhancement. However, we find the phone number dispositive, and we
may affirm on any basis fairly supported by the record. Berry v.
Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999).
4