Case: 20-50699 Document: 00515991840 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/24/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 20-50699 August 24, 2021
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Damidrick Deshone Fearce,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:07-CR-41-1
Before Wiener, Dennis, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
In 2007, Defendant-Appellant Damidrick Deshone Fearce, federal
prisoner # 79206-180, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base within 1,000 feet
of a school and playground, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-50699 Document: 00515991840 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/24/2021
No. 20-50699
841(b)(1)(A), 860, and 846. The Government sought an enhanced sentence
based on Fearce’s prior felony drug conviction, raising the statutory
minimum term of imprisonment from 10 to 20 years and the statutory
minimum term of supervised release from 5 to 10 years. See id.
§ 841(b)(1)(A) (2007). Fearce’s statutory minimum term of supervised
release was further increased to 20 years pursuant to § 860(a). See id.
§ 860(a). He was sentenced from below the advisory guidelines range of 360
months to life imprisonment to the statutory mandatory minimum term of
240 months of imprisonment to be followed by a 20-year term of supervised
release. In May 2015, the district court reduced Fearce’s sentence from 240
months to 217 months of imprisonment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
and Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines.
In January 2020, Fearce submitted a motion under § 404 of the First
Step Act of 2018 (First Step Act), requesting a reduction in his terms of
imprisonment and supervised release. He now appeals the district court’s
order denying his § 404 motion.
We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence
pursuant to the First Step Act for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2699 (2020);
see also United States v. Stewart, 964 F.3d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 2020). A
resentencing court has broad discretion because the First Step Act does not
require a sentence reduction even if the defendant is eligible for one. Jackson,
945 F.3d at 321.
Fearce contends that the district court’s explanation for its denial of
his motion was inadequate because it did not provide specific factual reasons.
The relevant arguments for reducing Fearce’s term of imprisonment,
including the history of his original sentencing and the sentence reduction
previously granted, were comprehensively briefed by the parties. In its
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No. 20-50699
amended order, the district court stated that it had considered the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, the facts of the case, the severity of the offense, and the
departures previously granted. The record thus shows that the parties were
afforded an opportunity to present their cases and that the district court
exercised its discretion in denying Fearce’s § 404 motion. See United States
v. Batiste, 980 F.3d 466, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Jackson, 945 F.3d at
322.
Fearce nevertheless contends that the district court erred by not
expressly addressing or acknowledging his request for a reduction in his term
of supervised release. His contention is unpersuasive. His § 404 motion
requests a reduction of his term of supervised release to 16 years, asserting
that he “has strong motivation to succeed on supervised release,” and
providing examples of how he has prepared himself for release while in
prison. The Government’s response also acknowledges that, under the First
Step Act, Fearce is eligible for a reduction in his term of supervised release.
Both parties thus raised his eligibility for a reduction in his term of supervised
release in their § 404 submissions, so “the relevant arguments were before
the court when it made its resentencing determination.” Batiste, 980 F.3d at
479. The record here confirms that the district court considered Fearce’s
request and implicitly denied it.
Finally, Fearce has not shown any abuse of discretion in connection
with either of his assertions that the district court’s denial was based on an
erroneous assessment of the evidence. See Batiste, 980 F.3d at 479; Jackson,
945 F.3d at 319.
AFFIRMED.
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