United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT March 5, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-60706
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BJORN JAMAL GREEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 4:05-CR-59
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Before REAVLEY, GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:*
Bjorn Jamal Green pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm
by a prior convicted felon and was sentenced to 70 months of
imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100
special assessment.
Green argues on appeal that his counsel was ineffective for
informing him before he pleaded guilty that he could be sentenced
to up to 15 years of imprisonment, when in fact his maximum
sentence was only 10 years of imprisonment. He contends that he
would not have pleaded guilty if he had known that the maximum
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 06-60706
-2-
sentence that he faced was 10 years of imprisonment and that, as
a result, his guilty plea was involuntary.
Because Green raised these issues in the district court,
they are reviewed de novo. See United States v. Bass, 310 F.3d
321 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Amaya, 111 F.3d 386, 388
(5th Cir. 1997).
The record has not been developed as to whether Green’s
counsel in fact incorrectly told him that his maximum sentence
was 15 years of imprisonment. However, even if Green’s counsel
did incorrectly inform him about his maximum term of
imprisonment, Green was correctly informed about his maximum term
of imprisonment both in his written plea agreement and at his
plea hearing. Accordingly, Green has not shown that his guilty
plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily. See United States
v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1990). For the same
reason, Green has not shown that he was prejudiced by his
counsel’s actions, and thus he has not shown that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel concerning this issue. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
Green also argues that the Government violated Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when it withheld certain
fingerprint analysis evidence. However, Green waived this issue
with his valid guilty plea. See United States v. Lampazianie,
251 F.3d 519, 526 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Diaz, 733
F.2d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 1984).
No. 06-60706
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Green asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing
to obtain a fingerprint analysis from the Government. Green also
wishes reserve for further appellate review the issue whether the
crime of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling constituted a “crime
of violence” for purposes of determining his base offense level.
However, because he has not adequately briefed these issues, he
has abandoned them. See Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 612-13
(5th Cir. 1999).
Green asserts that he wishes to reserve the right to raise
on habeas review any ineffective assistance of counsel claims not
raised on direct appeal. Because the record was not developed as
to any other ineffective assistance of counsel issues, Green
should not be precluded from raising those issues on habeas
review. See United States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 313-14 (5th
Cir. 1987).
Green’s request to preserve for direct appellate or habeas
review the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress in
the event that this court “orders the case to trial” is denied as
unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.