OPINION OF THE COURT
This cause is before the Court pursuant to notice and evidentiary hearing upon defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of a quantity of cocaine seized as a result of a warrantless search of a rental automobile driven and occupied by defendant. The historical facts relevant to disposition of defendant’s motion may be chronicled as follows:
Defendant was observed at 2:55 p.m. on February 9, 1985, travelling at an unlawful speed west-bound on Interstate 10, by Trooper Stall-worth. Defendant was followed a short distance and eventually stopped by Trooper Stallworth. Upon stopping defendant and citing him for unlawful speed, Trooper Stallworth’s suspicions were aroused for the reasons: When queried by Trooper Stallworth, defendant had explained he was from California and had been to Miami, Florida, from where he had departed the afternoon before. The defendant further explained
Based on these circumstances, Trooper Stallworth requested permission to search the interior of defendant’s automobile. Defendant acquiesced to this search of the automobile’s interior even though the testimony is in conflict whether defendant affirmatively stated to the officer in specific terms that he had approval to search. The warrantless search of the vehicle’s interior yielded no contraband or other incriminating evidence. Trooper Stallworth next requested permission to search the trunk of the automobile and defendant stated he knew nothing about the trunk’s contents without saying more. Given that response, Trooper Stallworth removed the keys from the ignition, opened the trunk and discovered a valise with defendant’s initials on its exterior. A search of the valise disclosed a wrapped, opaque package containing approximately one pound of cocaine. Defendant was placed under arrest for trafficking in cocaine.
These facts as recited above are detailed in light of facts and inferences most favorable to the State and in light of credibility choices the Court has been required to make and has resolved in favor of the State. Wilson v. State, 470 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
STANDING TO CONTEST SEARCH
Based on recent pronouncements contained in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) and Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the State asserts defendant lacks standing to contest the search of the trunk’s contents in light of the apparent disavowal he made to Trooper Stallworth preceding the search of the trunk. See e.g. United States v. Hawkins, 681 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1982).
In this proceeding defendant denied he made any disclaimer to Trooper Stallworth. The authority of Hawkins, supra and United States v. Canady, 615 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1980) offered as supporting author
CONSENT TO SEARCH
The Court has resolved the credibility choices to be made and conflicts in the testimony in the State’s favor. The Court concludes that defendant consented to a search of his vehicle. Alzate v. State, 446 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985). The Court finds persuasive, under the totality of the circumstances present, the disclaimer by defendant of any knowledge of the trunk’s contents which the searching officer rightly understood as permission to continue his search to the trunk’s interior. Alvarado v. State, 466 So.2d 335, 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). See also State v. Funksman, 468 So.2d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984). Under either “a greater weight of the evidence” standard or a “clear and convincing evidence” standard, this Court finds the State has carried its burden of showing a free and voluntary consent to search of the automobile. Likewise, the Court follows the rationale of State v. Wargin, 418 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) in sustaining the warrantless search of defendant’s luggage in the trunk based on the threshold conclusion that a voluntary consent was given to search the trunk.
This Court further finds that there is no evidence to support defendant’s contentions that his stop and detention by Trooper Stall-worth was done as a “pretext” to conduct or induce a search of defendant’s automobile. Compare, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In this regard, Trooper Stallworth acted properly. State v. Walden, 464 So.2d 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH
Finally, the Court has considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant’s detention and subsequent arrest and finds that Trooper Stallworth possessed probable cause for the warrantless search of defendant’s automobile. Certainly, the nervousness exhibited by
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that defendant’s motion to suppress be and the same is hereby denied.