United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 14, 2007
FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-30889
Summary Calendar
SANDRA LEIA BEENE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
LINDA S. MCMAHON, Acting, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(5:05-CV-1057)
_________________________________________________________________
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:*
Sandra Leia Beene appeals the district court's decision
affirming an administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security, denying her application for disability benefits under the
Social Security Act (SSA).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
In June 2003, Beene filed for disability insurance benefits
and supplemental security income, claiming she became disabled due
to the effects of Hepatitis C and related treatment, as well as
other medical problems. The administrative law judge (ALJ) denied
Beene’s claim for benefits. Beene exhausted all administrative
appeals after which the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. Beene then
filed this action, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s
decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court affirmed the
benefits denial.
To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security
Act (SSA), a claimant has “the burden of proving she has a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment lasting at
least twelve months that prevents her from engaging in substantial
gainful activity”. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir.
2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). In evaluating whether a
claimant is disabled under the SSA, the ALJ uses the well-
established five-step sequential inquiry: (1) Is the claimant
engaged in substantial gainful activity?; (2) Does the claimant
have a severe impairment?; (3) Does the impairment meet or equal a
listed impairment?; (4) Does the impairment prevent the claimant
from performing past relevant work?; and (5) Does the impairment
prevent the claimant from doing any other work? See C.F.R. §
404.1520. A determination of disability at any step ends the
inquiry. Id.
2
In its transition from steps three to four, the ALJ determines
the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC), which is a
determination, based on the evidence in the record, “of the most
the claimant can still do despite [her] physical and mental
limitations”. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir.
2005). The claimant’s RFC is used in steps four and five of the
sequential analysis. Id.
In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, we grant it “great
deference” and do not disturb it unless we “cannot find substantial
evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s decision or
find[] that the Commissioner made an error of law”. Leggett v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is
more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance, and is such
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
the decision. Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). “In applying the
substantial evidence standard, the court scrutinizes the record to
determine whether such evidence is present, but may not reweigh the
evidence or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s.”
Perez, 415 F.3d at 461 (internal citations omitted). Beene claims:
(1) the ALJ erred by improperly defining “moderate” mental
limitations in assessing her RFC; and (2) substantial evidence does
not support the ALJ’s RFC assessment.
3
In assessing Beene’s RFC, the ALJ concluded she had a
moderately reduced ability to understand, remember, and carry out
detailed instructions, and a moderate limitation in the abilities
to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods of
time, interact with the general public, and set goals independently
of others. The ALJ explained that moderate meant “there was a
moderate limitation in this area, but the individual is still able
to function satisfactorily”. Beene contends this definition is
inconsistent with SSA regulations or the SSA’s Program Operations
Manual Systems (POMS), the internal operating procedures of the
SSA. (Beene does not, however, point to a contrary definition in
the SSA regulations or the POMS.)
As the district court correctly noted, the critical issue on
appeal is not the precise definition of “moderate” but whether the
ALJ was properly able to assess Beene’s RFC to determine: whether
she was able to perform her past job; or in the alternative,
whether there were other jobs available for her in the national
economy. See C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (steps four and five in the
sequential analysis). To that end, the ALJ had a vocational expert
determine, based on the definition of the RFC found by the ALJ,
whether Beene would be employable. See Vaughan v. Shalala, 58 F.3d
129, 132 (5th Cir. 1995) (“A vocational expert is called to testify
because of his familiarity with the job requirements and working
conditions. The value of a vocational expert is that he is
familiar with the specific requirements of a particular occupation,
4
including working conditions and the attributes and skills needed.”
(internal citations and quotations omitted)). The vocational
expert was able to sufficiently incorporate the disabilities
outlined by the ALJ and determine that Beene would be able to find
employment in the national economy. See, e.g., Morris v. Bowen,
864 F.2d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1988); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d
1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002).
Regarding Beene’s claim that substantial evidence does not
support the ALJ’s RFC findings, the ALJ concluded that, while Beene
had “limitations” on her ability to perform work, they were not
disabling to the extent alleged. Beene contends: her disabilities
are more severe than the ALJ determined; and she is unable to
perform any type of work satisfactorily. Substantial evidence,
however, supports the ALJ’s conclusions. In September 2003, while
still undergoing treatment for Hepatitis C, Dr. Thomas Staats, a
clinical neuropsychologist conducted a consultive mental-status
exam and concluded, inter alia, that Beene’s thinking was logical
and coherent, her memory was intact, and her sustained
concentration was adequate. He did note, however, that she had
problems with social interactions and she likely suffered from
depression and anxiety due to the general medical condition and
adverse effects of certain medications. Beene was also examined by
Dr. Linda Hartwell, a clinical psychologist and state agency
medical consultant, who reported Beene had some moderate
5
limitations in areas of understanding and memory, sustained
concentration and persistence, and social interactions, but had no
significant limitations in these areas. Dr. Hartwell stated Beene
was mentally capable of functioning in the work setting. The ALJ’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence; therefore, the
district court did not err in affirming the denial of benefits.
See Brown, 192 F.3d at 496 (5th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED
6