This suit was brought in the district court of Galveston county, August 3, 1877, by Alexander H. Ladd, the appellant, against appellee, The Southern Cotton Press and Manufacturing Company, a corporation under the laws of Texas, carrying on the business of receiving, storing and compressing cotton for such parties as might employ its services in that behalf, to recover back moneys alleged to have been paid by appellant at various times for charges which were uniformly and notoriously demanded and collected by appellee on all cotton entrusted to it.
The light to recover back the money thus paid, is claimed in the petition on the ground that upon the facts stated therein the property and services of appellee had been submitted to public use and had become affected with a public interest; that the charges demanded by appellee were unlaw*187ful and without consideration, and that the payments had been made involuntarily and under duress.
The appellee demurred generally and specially, that the facts stated in the petition showed that the business carried on by appellee was a private enterprise and occupation, and not a public employment; that it appeared from the petition that the alleged payments had not been made involuntarily or under duress; that the matters relied on to show duress were insufficient and too vaguely pleaded, and that it appeared from the petition that a large portion of the demand sued for was barred by the statute of limitations.
The demurrer was sustained, and appellant declining to amend, judgment was rendered for appellee. From this judgment an appeal was prosecuted, and appellants assign as error that the court should have overruled, instead of sustaining the demurrer to his petition. In support of this assignment, his counsel make in their brief these propositions, viz.:
First. The petition shows that appellee had submitted its property and services to public use.
1. By becoming incorporated by the legislature for the purpose of carrying on the business designated.
2. By virtue of the nature and extent of the business.
3. Because by combination with others in the same line of business, it became a virtual monopoly, the exercise of which enabled them to exact fictitious charges, and charges without consideration, as a substantial toll on nearly all of the chief commodity of the state, and thereby its services and property became affected with a public interest.
Second. That the charges complained of having been utterly without consideration, and involuntary or enforced payment having been made under protest and without mutuality of assent necessary to a contract, were in fact made under duress of property.
Are these propositions, or any one of them, applicable to the facts averred in appellant’s petition, and if so, should the judg*188ment be reversed? We will consider them in the order in which they are presented.
1. Did appellee, by becoming incorporated by the legislature for the purpose of carrying on a warehouse and compress business, submit its property and services to public use? We are cited to no authority tending to support this proposition, and we are unable to perceive any principle or reason upon which it can be maintained. The petition shows that appellee is a mere private corporation, with no privilege or franchise beyond that of carrying on in a corporate capacity the business in which it is engaged. It is by reason of the nature and character of the business, and not from the fact that it is carried on by an individual or corporation, that the law holds that the property or services of the owner have been submitted to public use.
2. The business of warehousing and compressing cotton, is free to every one who wishes to engage in it. No grant or franchise need be obtained from the state to authorize those desiring to do so to embark in this character of business. It is not one of the employments which the common law declares public. (Coggs v. Barnard, 2 Ld. Raym.; 2 Pars. on Con., 139; Story on Bail., sec. 442.) Nor is it claimed to have been made so by statute. And we know of no authority, and none has been shown us, for saying that a business strictly juris privati will become juris publici, merely by reason of its extent. If the magnitude of a particular business is such, and the persons affected by it so numerous, that the interest of society demands that the rules and principles applicable to public employments should be applied to it, this would have to be done by the legislature (if not restrained from doing so by the constitution) before a demand for such an use could be enforced by the courts.
If the right to regulate property and the character of its employment is, by reason of its extent, and the number of persons interested in or affected by the manner or circumstances *189of its use, as counsel for appellant forcibly declares, “of the very essence of government,” the exercise of this right or power pertains to the legislative and not the judicial department.
3. Evidently appellant does not intend to assert that appellee, by combination with others engaged in like business, acquired a monopoly or “virtual monopoly” of the character declared by the constitution of the state to be “ contrary to the genius of a free government,” and never to be allowed. (Art. 1, sec. 26.) But the import of his proposition, as we understand it, is that appellee and others engaged in the same business, though this business was a legitimate and lawful one, had, without any exclusive right to conduct it, by combination virtually acquired the exclusive control of the business in the city and port of Galveston, which enabled them “to exact fictitious charges and charges without consideration,” and thereby to collect “toll on nearly all the chief commodity of the state.” And that by reason of this fact the property and service employed in such business became affected with a public interest. But conceding the premises, the conclusion sought to be deduced seems to us to be a non sequiter.
It will readily be admitted that in many instances combinations may be made by parties engaged in a particular trade, or by those who, at the time, have the control of the market for some article of prime necessity, to make most unconceivable exactions for their services or demand a most extortionate price for their commodities. But certainly this does not change the nature of the employment in which they are engaged, or authorize the court to say, when the business of the parties is strictly private, that it has become public. If the combination is illegal, the parties to it will subject themselves to such penalties as the law imposes; and if the injury to society to be apprehended from such combinations is of a character demanding it, the legislature may, by adequate provision, regulate or prohibit persons from engaging in them. ISTor do we say that there may not be instances where, by combination, or even *190without it, some particular business, by reason of its extent and magnitude and the great number of persons affected by it, though strictly privati juris under the common law and previous statutes, which may be declared publici juris by the legislature. This seems in effect what was held by the supreme court of the United States to have been done by the legislature of Illinois (4 Otto, 125). But as this is not the character of this case, we are not called upon to express an authoritative opinion on the point. It is sufficient for us to say that in the absence of legislation to that effect, a party who has not subjected his property and services to public use by the character of the business in which he is engaged, does not do so by reason of combination with others in a like business, though he is enabled thereby to exact from those who may employ him unreasonable and extortionate charges for the services rendered. Whether payments made under such circumstances may not be held to have been paid under duress, is another question to be considered hereafter. Nor can it justly be held that the mere extent and magnitude of the business changes a private charge for services into a toll to be regulated by law. Nor if so, that the court may, in the absence of legislation upon the subject, substitute its judgment as to the proper amount of such toll for the contract of the parties.
But although none of the grounds urged by appellant in support of his proposition, “that appellees had submitted its property and services to .public use,” taken severally and of themselves warrant his'conclusion, a fair consideration of the argument of his counsel requires us to consider the effect, not only of each of the positions, standing alone, upon the business of appellee, but also, their effect in the aggregate, in connection with all the facts and circumstances connected with or relating to the business in which appellee was engaged and the manner in which it was conducted and carried on.
In doing this it must be conceded, as alleged in appellant’s petition, that appellee and those engaged in the same business at the port of Galveston, with the exception of one small es*191tablishment capable of doing but a limited business, had combined and fixed the charges complained of; that the business in which appellee and his confederates were engaged was necessary to the public, in reference to the transit of cotton from the producer to the manufacturer and consumer; that the charges complained of were a common charge against all comers and upon every bale of cotton, and was also a charge demanded and enforced without consideration, a compliance with which was, under the circumstances, essential to the business life of, and the only escape from business ruin by all who follow the business of brokerage in cotton in the city of Galveston.
Now, giving the fullest scope and import to these and other allegations made in the petition, how is it shown that appellee’s business is of a character with which the courts of the country have the right to interfere; or from what source, we ask, do they derive their authority to regulate the conditions and terms upon which it shall be conducted? It is not contended by appellant, that, as ordinarily conducted, the business of receiving, storing, compressing and delivering cotton is privati juris, which those engaged in it have not the right to fix the rates and conditions upon which it will be conducted. But the argument seems to be, that, in view of the necessities of trade, its magnitude and effect upon the interest of the people throughout the state, as well as of those engaged in the business of appellant, it has become of like public interest as other occupations and trades which the law pronounces and holds to be juris publici. The conclusion sought to be maintained rests upon the hypothesis that whenever it is made to appear that any particular business is of so general public interest as that which the law holds to be juris publici, the courts have the power to so declare and hold it. The case of Munn v. Illinois, 4 Otto, 125, seems to be the authority mainly relied on to support this position. We cannot regard this case as authority for such a doctrine. It was brought to enforce the statute law of the state. The conclusion to be *192drawn from it is, as we think, that the legislature may declare a particular business publici juris, if the facts and circumstances under which it is conducted justifies and the good of society requires it; but not that the court may so treat it in advance of legislative recognition or declaration. Whether this may be done, even by the legislature, without infringing upon the constitution, need not now be considered. Neither is it necessary for ns at present to determine whether the submission of property and service to public use (as there is high authority for holding) is solely dependent upon the fact that those engaged in such business enjoy some franchise, privilege or immunity from the state, or did so in the early days of the common law wdien this character was impressed upon their property or service. (Dissenting opinion of Fields, J., in Munn v. Illinois, supra, and authorities cited.)
But if it is admitted that appellee’s property and services were affected with a public interest, and the amount demanded of, and paid by appellant, was greater than what was reasonable, as it appears from the petition that the payments were made with full knowledge of all the facts and without fraud or deception, unless made under duress, the amount thus paid cannot be recovered back, although so much as exceeds the reasonable value of the services rendered was paid without consideration. (34 Ala., 405; 7 Cush., 125; 59 N. Y., 603; 50 Ga., 304.)
A mere protest against a charge does not entitle the party who voluntarily and without duress or compulsion pays it, to sue for and recover it back. (5 Cush., 115; 29 Md., 415; 25 Ind., 261; 46 Cal., 589; 5 Kan., 412.)
Second. It remains to inquire whether the money sued for was paid without consideration, involuntarily and under duress. There is no pretense of duress except by reason of the alleged combination of appellee and its confederates, to charge a larger amount than the services rendered were reasonably worth; and for the delivery of cotton which appellant says was not in fact actually delivered, and the agreement between appellee and its *193confederates that they would not do business with any parties who should fail or refuse to pay any of their charges, or who should resort to the courts to controvert or dispute them. As the business in which appellee is engaged is open to all who wished to engage in it, and was not, as we have seen, affected with a public interest, any one engaging in it may prescribe the terms upon which he will transact it. All parties employing his services, knowing his terms, would be bound by them. If it is lawful for a single individual engaged in other business to prescribe the terms upon which he will conduct it, we do not see how it can become unlawful by others in the same employment agreeing with him that they will also transact their business upon the same terms and conditions. (Kirkman v. Walker, 6 Term, 14.)
If appellee may lawfully decline doing business for or with those who refuse to comply with the terms which it prescribes, the fact that a failure to conform to these terms would result in its declining in future to transact business with the party thus failing, cannot be held to be duress. On the other hand, if the terms and conditions are illegal and such as a party has no right to prescribe for himself or in combination with all parties engaged in like business, thereby securing a virtual monopoly, we can see no better reason for saying in this than in the other case that contracts entered into and business conducted for a series of years with one of the parties to such agreement with knowledge of it, can be held to have been under duress. If the combination is illegal and the terms prescribed by it are such as the parties have no right to demand, certainly the courts are not impotent to restrain the parties to such illegal combinations and give redress to those improperly affected by it. To entitle a party voluntarily paying money to recover it back on the ground of duress, he must, at the time of such payment, be under the necessity of either then making the payment, or of resorting to the courts to get possession of property wrongfully detained, or to recover his liberty, or at least show that there is an apparent necessity *194for resorting to the courts for one or the other of these purposes.
The petition shows that the transactions between the parties to this suit do not come within either of these categories. Appellant certainly had ample time and opportunity to have had his day in court, before the business between him and appellee was closed by the last voluntary payment made by him. Hot having complained until the late date at which this suit was brought, he cannot now be heard to complain. (5 Otto, 112-13; 4 Gill (Md.), 425; 1 Ohio St., 268; 34 Md., 436; 115 Mass., 367.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
[Opinion delivered March 26, 1880.]