On August 10, 1884, the defendant cut John Davis with a knife. He was indicted for an assault with intent to murder said Davis by said act of cutting, and under said indictment was, on the 16th of October, 1884, convicted of an aggravated assault and battery, and fined $25, which fine he paid. On November 12, 1884, John Davis died from the effect of said cutting, and thereafter the defendant was indicted for the murder of said John Davis by the same act of cutting, and was convicted of manslaughter; from which conviction this appeal is prosecuted.
Defendant pleaded in bar of this prosecution his former conviction of an aggravated assault and battery, and the evidence fully sustained this plea, and showed that said assault and battery was *461the same transaction charged in the present indictment, except that at the time of said former conviction the death of Davis had not occurred. This special plea was properly submitted to the jury, and they found against it; and in this we think there was no error. Mr. Wharton says: “Where, after a conviction of assault, the assaulted person dies, the conviction of assault is no bar to a conviction for murder. The reason is that as at the time of the conviction of assault there could have been no conviction of the murder, the prosecution for the murder is not barred by the conviction of the assault.” (Whart. Cr. PL & Prac., § 476.) Mr. Bishop says: “If, after a battery and a conviction for it, the assailed person dies of his wounds, an indictment may be maintained for the homicide; not, it appears, because the battery is the less offense, but because the blow which had not produced death is, when viewed in the light of its results, a thing different from the blow which had produced death.” (1 Bishop, Or. Law, § 1059.)
There never can be the crime of murder or manslaughter until the party assaulted dies; these crimes have no existence in fact or law till such death. It cannot, therefore, be said that one is tried for the same crime when he is tried for assault during the life, and tried for murder or manslaughter after the death, of the injured party. The death of the assaulted party creates a new crime. At the time the defendant was convicted of the assault and battery upon Davis, the court in which such conviction was had did not have jurisdiction of the offense here prosecuted, because said offense had not then been completed, and could not then have been prosecuted. Hence there is no conflict between the rule announced above and our statute, and the decisions under that statute. (Code Grim. Proc., art. 553.) It is true that the greater offense always includes the lesser. And it is also true that where an offense consists of different degrees, and the defendant, upon indictment or information, is convicted or acquitted of any grade of such offense, such conviction or acquittal is a bar to any further prosecution of the offense. (Code Crim. Proc., art. 553; Givens v. The State, 6 Texas, 344; Thomas v. The State, 40 Texas, 36; Vestal v. The State, 3 Texas Ct. App., 648; White v. The State, 9 Texas Ct. App., 390.) But these rules do not apply where the higher grade of the offense has not been completed at the time of the conviction or acquittal of a lesser grade included within it, because such higher grade did not then exist. We think the court correctly instructed the jury upon this subject, and the jury correctly found against the special plea of former conviction.
*462There are no exceptions in the record to the charge of the court, and no additional charges were requested by the defendant. We discover no material error in the charge given to the jury, and the evidence sustains the verdict. The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
[Opinion delivered November 28, 1885.]