United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 20, 2007
_______________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-51572
_______________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DIONICIO SANCHEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
No. 5:04-CR-403-1
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and CLEMENT, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Dionicio Sanchez pled guilty to possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A). Sanchez’s conditional guilty plea reserved the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Finding no
constitutional violation, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
At around 3:30 p.m. on July 31, 2004, Sanchez was driving
through Gonzales County, Texas, when State Trooper Michael Turk
clocked Sanchez’s Ford pickup at 88 mph in a 70-mph zone. Turk
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
stopped the vehicle and requested Sanchez’s driver’s license and
insurance certificate. Sanchez informed Turk that he did not speak
English, although he had responded to Turk’s loud-speaker command
to pull the vehicle further onto the shoulder. Sanchez spoke in
broken English during the stop and appeared to comprehend Turk’s
questions.
Before Sanchez provided the documentation, Turk noticed
that the air conditioner was making a “roaring noise” but that the
interior of the vehicle remained warm. As Sanchez moved to
retrieve his insurance documents, Turk noticed that Sanchez’s hands
were shaking and that he showed signs of nervousness. Turk
immediately ordered Sanchez out of the vehicle.
Turk noticed that Sanchez’s insurance certificate had
been issued only four days before in Laredo, Texas, the area from
which Sanchez indicated he had come. Sanchez’s driver’s license
indicated a Houston address; however, a dispatcher informed Turk
that the vehicle had been registered in El Cenizo, Texas. The
vehicle had not been reported stolen.
When asked his destination, Sanchez responded that he was
headed to Houston to visit his uncle. Based on his experience,
Turk knew that Laredo was a source city and Houston a destination
city for narcotics. Turk then asked Sanchez how many days he had
been in Laredo, to which Sanchez responded that it was very hot.
Turk believed Sanchez was evading questions about his trip.
Turk advised Sanchez that he would receive a speeding
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ticket and began to fill out the citation. After walking around
the vehicle to view the registration and inspection certificate,
Turk informed Sanchez that the road he was traveling was a known
pipeline for illegal drugs. Before he completed the citation, Turk
asked Sanchez if he was carrying anything illegal in his truck like
marijuana or cocaine. Sanchez averted his eyes and said no. Less
than twelve minutes after the stop had begun, Turk asked Sanchez in
Spanish for permission to search the vehicle, and Sanchez gave his
verbal consent.
Turk’s search of the vehicle revealed over sixty-seven
pounds of cocaine secreted within the dashboard. After the
district court denied Sanchez’s motion to suppress, Sanchez entered
a conditional guilty plea. He now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
Sanchez argues that Turk unconstitutionally extended the
traffic stop when, after learning that the vehicle was not stolen,
he continued questioning him about matters unrelated to the initial
stop.1 He also contends that his consent was involuntary. We
review the district court’s factual determinations for clear error
1
Sanchez relies upon United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336 (5th Cir.
2002), United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2001), United States v.
Jones, 234 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2000), and United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193
(5th Cir. 1999). We distinguished those cases in Brigham because reasonable
suspicion was lacking after computer checks came back “clean”; without
articulable facts, further questioning rendered the detentions unconstitutional.
In this case, like Brigham, Turk had additional reasonable suspicion based on
articulable facts that Sanchez was involved in drug trafficking.
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and its Fourth Amendment conclusions de novo. See United States v.
Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 n.2 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Sanchez does not contest the initial stop; thus, the
issue is whether Turk’s actions “were reasonably related to the
circumstances that justified the stop, or to dispelling his
reasonable suspicion developed during the stop.” Id. at 507; see
also United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 2003).
Sanchez’s arguments resemble those made in Brigham.
There we rejected the notion that an officer’s questioning “on a
subject unrelated to the purpose of a routine traffic stop” was
itself a Fourth Amendment violation, and held that the officer did
not act unreasonably in extending the stop. 382 F.3d at 508
(emphasis omitted); see also id. (“[D]etention, not questioning, is
the evil at which Terry’s second prong is aimed.” (quoting United
States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993))). The
occupants of the vehicle in Brigham had aroused the officer’s
suspicion because the lessee was not present and they had appeared
nervous, avoided eye contact, and answered questions indirectly.
Id.
Assuming Turk extended the detention,2 he had reasonable
suspicion based on articulable facts that Sanchez was involved in
2
Turk asked for Sanchez’s consent before he completed the citation;
therefore,“the detention continued to be justified by the facts that gave rise
to its inception.” United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 408 (5th Cir. 2006)
(noting that the detention in Brigham was justified by the facts giving rise to
the initial stop because “the police obtained consent to search defendant’s
vehicle while the background check was pending”). Moreover, nothing about Turk’s
questioning of Sanchez was improper. See Brigham, 382 F.3d at 508.
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drug trafficking. Turk’s suspicions were aroused by the “roaring
noise” emanating from the dashboard; Sanchez’s shaking hand and
nervousness; the recently issued insurance certificate; the
discrepancy between the addresses on Sanchez’s license and the
insurance certificate; Sanchez’s averting his eyes when asked if he
carried contraband; and the fact that Sanchez was driving a known
drug-courier route. See id. at 509 (“The Supreme Court has
emphasized the importance of allowing officers to draw on their own
experience and specialized training . . . .” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also United States v. Fishel, 467 F.3d 855,
857 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 632
(5th Cir. 2006); Gonzalez, 328 F.3d at 758. Because Turk had not
completed the citation when he asked for consent, his actions did
not extend the length of Sanchez’s detention. See Brigham,
382 F.3d at 511 (“There is, however, no constitutional stopwatch on
traffic stops.”); see also Jenson, 462 F.3d at 408. Turk’s actions
under the circumstances were reasonable, and Sanchez’s continued
detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Because Turk’s actions were reasonable, Sanchez’s consent
was not unconstitutionally tainted. See Brigham, 382 F.3d at 512;
Gonzalez, 328 F.3d at 759. Nothing in the record indicates that
the district court clearly erred in determining that Sanchez’s
consent was not an independent act of free will.
AFFIRMED.
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