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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-13321
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:16-cr-60139-BB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARLTON STYLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(September 7, 2021)
Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Carlton Styles appeals his sentence of 151 months’ imprisonment, arguing
that the sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. After careful
review, we affirm.
I.
Styles pled guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery. Based on several
prior convictions and his instant conviction, the district court originally sentenced
Styles as a career offender. See United States v. Eason, 953 F.3d 1184, 1188 (11th
Cir. 2020). Styles (along with several co-defendants) appealed his sentence, and
on appeal we held that the district court erred in sentencing him as a career
offender because Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence under
the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 1195–96. We vacated his sentence and
remanded for further proceedings. Id.
In anticipation of Styles’s resentencing, the probation office prepared a
revised presentence investigation report (“PSR”). The PSR calculated a total
offense level of 22 and a criminal history category of IV, which yielded a
guidelines range of 63 to 78 months’ imprisonment. The PSR stated that an
upward variance may be warranted due to Styles’s criminal history. The statutory
maximum for Styles’s offense was 20 years’ imprisonment.
The PSR also noted the sentences of Styles’s co-defendants. Zavier McGee
and Malcom Anwar Williams were sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment,
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Wayne Burcks was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment, and Marlon Eason
was resentenced after this Court’s 2020 decision to 175 months’ imprisonment.
Neither party objected to the PSR, but Styles filed a sentencing
memorandum in which he argued that no upward variance was warranted. He also
argued that his co-defendants were not similarly situated. McGhee and Williams
“were deemed ‘career offenders’”—a designation that no longer applied to
Styles—and each received sentences “corresponding to the bottom end of their
respective applicable guideline ranges.” Doc. 82 at 4.1 McGhee had his sentence
reduced to 108 months’ imprisonment due to substantial assistance to the
government. Burcks, although not designated a career offender, was sentenced to
180 months’ imprisonment—a significant upward variance from his guidelines
range—because of “23 prior felony convictions and two federal supervised release
violations stemming from [his] most recent federal offense.” Id. at 5 (emphasis
omitted). Eason was resentenced to 175 months’ imprisonment, even without the
career offender designation, because of his “12 prior felony and 17 prior
misdemeanor convictions.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Plus, Styles argued, “without
the benefit of having access” to the PSRs, “it is impossible to know what other
aggravating factors may have influenced [the district court’s] decision to sentence
them.” Id. In response, the government argued in favor of an upward variance,
1
“Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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citing Styles’s criminal history, the nature of the offense, and the need to avoid an
unwarranted sentencing disparity between Styles and his co-defendants.
At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSR, including its calculated
guidelines range. Styles requested a within-guidelines sentence, citing his
rehabilitation while incarcerated. Although he had a significant criminal history, it
was not so significant that the guidelines’ criminal history calculation failed to
account for it. And Styles’s co-defendants “appear[ed] to be very, very differently
situated,” although Styles’s counsel explained that he lacked access to their PSRs.
Doc. 95 at 16.
The district court, citing the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), 2 engaged in a lengthy and thorough analysis of Style’s case. In
mitigation, the court explained that Styles had “many positive role models,”
including a sister, mother, and the mother of one of his sons; plus, he had two sons
to care for. Id. at 19. The court noted that Styles had been in custody for several
years between his original sentencing and resentencing and had “the benefit of
being able to reflect on what’s important.” Id. at 20. Styles had completed a
commercial driver’s license course and a construction course. He also had served
as a groundskeeper. The court acknowledged that Styles’s youngest son is autistic
and that Styles was and should continue to play a role in the child’s life. It also
2
See infra Part II.
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acknowledged that Styles lost his father at an early age. The court opined that
rehabilitation “still is” a goal for Styles. Id.
In aggravation, the court stated that Styles’s criminal history reflected
“someone who is a dangerous person, who’s violent and puts people in fear, and
continues to steal from others.” Id. at 20–21. The court noted a pattern of
“escalation” in Styles’s criminal conduct, beginning at age 18 and continuing until
the instant offense conduct. Id. at 21. The court explained that Styles had
committed a previous armed robbery (one that was “eerily similar” to the instant
offense), received a 10-year prison term for it, but then committed this crime
instead of turning his life around. Id. at 22, 29. The court explained that a
sentence any less than 10 years would not “serve as an adequate deterrent to
[Styles] and to others that are contemplating similar behavior.” Id. at 29.
The district court also reviewed the sentences and criminal histories of
Styles’s co-defendants, explaining that “one of the goals of sentencing is to ensure
that there are no unwarranted disparities.” Id.
Based on these factors, the court concluded that a within-guidelines sentence
would not “serve the goals of sentencing.” Id. at 30. The court specifically noted
that co-defendant Williams “had nine criminal history points, and was on
supervised release, and there were two additional points,” and he was sentenced to
151 months’ imprisonment. Id. at 29. The court indicated that Williams’s
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circumstances were roughly similar to Styles’s. Thus, the court imposed a
sentence of 151 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised
release. Styles objected that the sentence was procedurally and substantively
unreasonable, and the district court overruled the objection but noted that it was
preserved for the record.
This is Styles’s appeal.
II.
“To be upheld on appeal, a sentence must be both procedurally and
substantively reasonable.” United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th
Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct.
1648 (2021). We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).
The district court must impose a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the
need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
sufficiently punish the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from
the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing
a particular sentence, the court must also consider the offense’s nature and
circumstances, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the kinds of sentences
available, the applicable guideline range, any pertinent policy statements from the
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Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities
between similarly situated defendants, and the need to provide restitution to
victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).
To determine whether a sentence is procedurally reasonable, we ask whether
“the district court: (1) properly calculated the Guidelines range; (2) treated the
Guidelines as advisory; (3) considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; (4) did not
select a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts; and (5) adequately explained the
chosen sentence.” United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir.
2010). Where, as here, a district court imposes a variance, it must “explain why
that variance is appropriate in a particular case,” and its “justifications must be
compelling enough to support the degree of the variance and complete enough to
allow meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238
(11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).
“A district court abuses its considerable discretion and imposes a
substantively unreasonable sentence only when it (1) fails to afford consideration
to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to
an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in
considering the proper factors.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249,
1256 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Though we “commit[] to the
sound discretion of the district court the weight to be accorded to each § 3553(a)
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factor,” United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2015), the
“district court’s unjustified reliance on any one Section 3553(a) factor may be a
symptom of an unreasonable sentence,” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179,
1191 (11th Cir. 2008). To that end, the district court may not focus
“singlemindedly” on one factor “to the detriment of all the other sentencing
factors.” United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006).
We will vacate a district court’s “sentence only if we are left with the
‘definite and firm’ conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that is outside
the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States
v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). We do “not presume that a
sentence outside the guideline range is unreasonable and must give due deference
to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, as a whole, justify the
extent of the variance.” Id.
Finally, challenges not raised before the district court are reviewed only for
plain error. See United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir.
2003). “It is the law of this circuit that, at least where the explicit language of a
statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error
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where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly
resolving it.” Id. at 1291.
III.
Styles argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the district court (1)
relied improperly on information in the PSRs of his co-defendants; (2) relied on a
factor to vary upward that already was accounted for in his guidelines range; (3)
unreasonably weighed one of the § 3553(a) factors, the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities; and (4) failed sufficiently to account for mitigating factors.
He also appears to argue that the district court failed to provide an adequate
explanation for the variance. Only the last of these sounds in procedural
reasonableness, so we address it first.
A. Procedural Reasonableness
Styles appears to argue that the district court failed to provide adequate
explanation for the variance.3 Not so. As detailed above in Part I, the district court
extensively discussed the factors that weighed in favor of an upward variance,
including that Styles had committed the instant offense after a 10-year prison term
3
Although Styles objected to the sentence on procedural reasonableness grounds, he did
not specifically argue in the district court that the court gave insufficient reasons for the upward
varianceWhen there is no objection in the district court, we review procedural sentencing issues
for plain error. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). We need not
decide whether Styles’s objection was sufficient to preserve the argument he makes here because
he cannot show any error, plain or otherwise.
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for an “eerily similar” robbery. Doc. 95 at 29. Styles argues that the district court
was not entitled to consider his criminal history in imposing a variance because his
guidelines criminal history category adequately accounted for it. This challenge is
more appropriately viewed through the lens of substantive reasonableness.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Styles’s remaining arguments sound in substantive reasonableness. Again,
these arguments are that the district court (1) relied improperly on information in
his co-defendants’ PSRs, (2) relied on his recidivism to vary upward even though
the guidelines already accounted for this factor, (3) unreasonably weighed the need
to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and (4) failed sufficiently to account
for mitigating factors. We can discern no abuse of discretion.
Styles contends that the district court erred in relying on information in his
co-defendants’ sealed PSRs to arrive at an appropriate sentence. He argues that the
use of nonpublic information turned “an otherwise permissible factor (the need to
avoid disparate sentences)” into an “impermissible factor.” Appellant Br. at 16
(emphasis omitted); see Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256. 4 Importantly, however,
Styles never expressly asked for access to those PSRs. He noted to the district
court that he lacked the PSRs, but never filed a motion for their disclosure or
4
To the extent Styles argues that the district court violated his constitutional right to due
process by consulting his co-defendants’ PSRs, he has abandoned that claim by raising it for the
first time in his reply brief. See United States v. Whitesell, 314 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002).
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expressly objected to the use of information contained only in them. Essentially,
he argues that the district court should have sua sponte ordered the PSRs unsealed.
No rule or binding precedent supports his argument, so we must reject it. See
Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d at 1290–91. Our rejection of his assertion that the district
court was required to unseal the PSRs of his codefendants neutralizes his
challenge, because otherwise Styles acknowledges that it was permissible for the
court to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.
Next, Styles argues that the district court erred in considering his previous
robbery offense because that offense was already accounted for in his criminal
history score. Styles acknowledges that a district court may rely on a factor
“already included in the calculation of the guidelines sentencing range” so long as
it “articulate[s] specifically the reasons that this particular defendant’s situation is
different from the ordinary situation covered by the guidelines calculation.”
United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2006). But, he argues,
“the district court failed to provide such an adequate explanation.” Appellant Br.
at 19. We disagree. The court discussed Styles’s prior robbery conviction at
length and explained its uncanny similarity to the instant offense. In so doing, the
court articulated the reasons why Styles’s situation was different from any ordinary
conviction that scored criminal history points.
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As to Styles’s other challenges to the substantive reasonableness—that the
district court placed too much weight on the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities and not enough weight on mitigating factors—they boil down to one
argument: the district court weighed the § 3553(a) factors incorrectly. On this
record, considering the careful analysis the district court undertook, we cannot say
that the district court committed any clear error in judgment. We are not at liberty
to simply reweigh the sentencing factors. Thus, we reject Styles’s arguments.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Styles’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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United States v. Carlton Styles
Combined Opinion