United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 13, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-10570
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MANUEL GARCIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:05-CR-177
--------------------
Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Manuel Garcia appeals his conviction and the sentence
imposed following his guilty plea conviction to possession with
intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and to
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime. Garcia was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 267
months on the drug count and to a term of imprisonment of 60
months on the firearm count, the terms to run consecutively.
Garcia argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 06-10570
-2-
authorizing a search of his residence. He argues that the
affidavit supporting the issuance of the warrant was insufficient
and that it was so lacking in probable cause, a reasonable
officer could not have relied upon it in good faith.
“Where a search warrant is involved, this [c]ourt employs a
two-step process for reviewing a district court’s denial of a
motion to suppress.” United States v. Froman, 355 F.3d 882, 888
(5th Cir. 2004). The court first determines “whether the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.” Id.
“The good-faith exception . . . provides that evidence obtained
by law enforcement officials acting in objectively reasonable
good-faith reliance upon a search warrant is admissible . . .,
even though the affidavit on which the warrant was based was
insufficient to establish probable cause.” United States v.
Shugart, 117 F.3d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If the exception does not apply, however, this
court “proceed[s] to the second step in the analysis and
determine[s] whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for
finding probable cause.” Froman, 355 F.2d at 88.
The good faith exception does not apply “where the warrant
is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable.” United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 399-400
(5th Cir. 2003). Thus, it does not apply when a search warrant
No. 06-10570
-3-
is supported by no more than a “bare bones” affidavit. United
States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1311 (5th Cir. 1993).
The affidavit supporting the warrant in the instant case was
not a bare bones affidavit. It contained detailed information
from two unrelated confidential informants who both admitted that
they had bought drugs and weapons from Garcia at his home on Judy
Avenue in Fort Worth, Texas. The detailed and incriminating
statements remedied any questions about the reliability of the
informants. See United States v. Privette, 947 F.2d 1259, 1262
(5th Cir. 1991); Shugart, 117 F.3d at 844. Further, the police
investigation corroborated much of the evidence provided by the
confidential informants. Shugart, 117 F.3d at 844.
The affidavit was sufficient “to allow the conclusion that a
fair probability existed that seizable evidence would be found”
at Garcia’s residence. United States v. Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272,
1279 (5th Cir. 1997)(internal quotation and citation omitted).
Therefore, the officers’ reliance on the warrant was objectively
reasonable, and the good faith exception was applicable. The
district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
Garcia argues that the sentence imposed at the top of the
guideline range is unreasonable because he was categorized as a
career offender as the result of a 1996 conviction for possession
of .2 grams of cocaine, which resulted in the revocation of his
deferred adjudication probation for a murder offense. Garcia
objects to this court’s use of the presumptively reasonable
No. 06-10570
-4-
standard when the sentence imposed is within the appropriate
guidelines range, and he points out that the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to determine the validity of such standard in
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 551 (2006).
We review the sentence for reasonableness. United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-62 (2005). Garcia identifies no error
in the guidelines computation, and the district court
appropriately considered “the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). We therefore give great deference to
the sentence imposed. United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005).
Given Garcia’s extensive criminal history, the seriousness
of his instant offenses, and the great deference due to the
sentencing judge’s discretion, the sentence imposed is not
unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.