NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 20-1736
__________
SHAWN DANIELS,
Appellant
v.
NORTHWESTERN HUMAN SERVICESS; MICHAEL WENCROWIC;
MARLENE GREENE; JOVANA LEWIS; STACEY BORDON; PAUL SACHS;
JOHN DOE 1; JOHN DOE 2
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-03128)
District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 23, 2021
Before: AMBRO, PORTER and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 14, 2021)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Shawn Daniels appeals pro se from an order granting the defendants’ motion to
dismiss his second amended complaint. We will affirm the District Court’s order.
In 2018, Daniels initiated a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Northwestern
Human Services, a private non-profit organization that operated “Douglas House,” a
residential rehabilitation center in Philadelphia.1 Daniels also named in his complaint
several Douglas House staff members, including Marlene Greene, Stacey Bordon, and
Jovana Lewis. He amended his complaint. The defendants moved to dismiss the
amended complaint, arguing, among other things, that Daniels had failed to plead that the
defendants were state actors for § 1983 purposes. See Motion, ECF No. 26-1 at 6–8.
Thereafter, Daniels amended his complaint again. He stated that he had resided at
Douglas House for almost 14 months. He made numerous allegations about the
defendants’ behavior, including that Lewis harassed him with profane language and
confiscated his belongings. Daniels also asserted that Greene called the police on him
and made false accusations about him, which endangered him and resulted in his having
to appear in mental health court. Daniels also alleged that Lewis and Bordon withheld
documents pertaining to a court order, which resulted in Daniels’ being sentenced to a
term of incarceration for non-compliance with the order. Daniels claimed that the
defendants violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
1
The parties agree that Douglas House is now operated by Merakey Philadelphia, whose
counsel represents the appellees. See Doc., 3d Cir. ECF No. 10 at 1.
2
The defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint. The District
Court granted the defendants’ motion, concluding that Daniels had failed to plead that the
defendants are state actors for § 1983 purposes, and declined to grant Daniels leave to
further amend his complaint. Daniels appealed.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo the District Court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d
146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018).
We agree with the District Court that Daniels’ second amended complaint failed to
plead that the defendants were state actors for § 1983 purposes. To survive the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, Daniels was required to allege that the defendants, while
acting under color of state law, deprived him of a federal right. See Leshko v. Servis,
423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005). The “color of state law element is a threshold issue,”
and thus there is no liability under § 1983 if the defendants were not acting under color of
state law. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995).
Private actors, such as the non-governmental defendants named here, can be said
to act under color of state law only if their conduct is “fairly attributable” to the state.
See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982). To determine whether state
action exists in such a circumstance, we consider “(1) whether the private entity has
exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether
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the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials; and (3)
whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the
acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Daniels’ second amended complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations from
which a reasonable person could infer that the defendants were state actors or engaged in
state action. Regarding the defendants’ relationship to the state, Daniels alleged only that
“Douglas House is a community residential rehabilitation residence under operation of
[Northwestern Human Services] who is from my knowledge integrated working with the
City of Philadelphia and its prison institutions and the state as well. People from the state
jails are often sent to these [residential centers] for programs.” Am. Complaint, ECF No.
60-1 at 11.2 Even under the liberal pleading standards afforded to pro se litigants, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), these allegations do not suffice,
see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
2
Daniels’ second amended complaint was filed at ECF No. 54, but that version is
missing pages. The defendants filed a complete copy of the complaint as an attachment
to their motion to dismiss at ECF No. 60-1, which we cite here.
4
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that a plaintiff’s complaint must contain more than
“labels and conclusions”).3
Daniels argues on appeal that the defendants are private actors who were engaged
in “joint activity” with the state. Appellant’s Br. at 7. However, this argument is bare
and unsupported. See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d
136, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have consistently refused to consider ill-developed
arguments or those not properly raised and discussed in the appellate briefing.”).
Daniels’ allegations—including that the defendants’ actions resulted in Daniels being
made to appear in court and being placed into state custody—are insufficient to state that
the defendants were “willful participant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents.”
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (quotation marks and citation
omitted); see generally Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (holding that a
nursing home was not a “joint participant” with the state despite extensive state funding
and licensing); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840–41 (same regarding a public school); see
also, e.g., Carey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 823 F.2d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1987)
3
To the extent that Daniels’ second amended complaint can be interpreted to include an
allegation that he was court-ordered to live at Douglas House, see, e.g., Am. Complaint,
ECF No. 60-1 at 6 (stating that the mental health court “sent [him] back to Douglas
House”), such an allegation, without more, is insufficient to allege that the defendants
were state actors. See, e.g., Leshko, 423 F.3d at 347 (holding that court-ordered foster
parents were not state actors for § 1983 purposes); see also generally Kach, 589 F.3d at
646 (emphasizing that the state-action test is “fact-specific”).
5
(concluding that a private actor did not engage in state action when he called the police
on a trespassing individual, even though the call resulted in the individual’s arrest).
In addition, Daniels does not argue on appeal that the District Court should have
granted him leave to further amend his complaint, see In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115
(3d Cir. 2016) (holding that arguments not raised in an appellant’s opening brief are
forfeited), and he presents nothing on appeal to suggest that further amendment would
enable him to cure the defect in his second amended complaint, see Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that allowing leave to amend is
unnecessary if amendment would be futile).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting the defendants’
motion to dismiss.
6