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112 09/14/2021
DA 18-0668 Case Number: DA 18-0668
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2021 MT 236N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v. FILED
SKYLER TRISTAN SCHNEIDER, SEP 14 2021
Bowen Greenwpod
Clerk of Supreme Court
Defendant and Appellant. State of Montana
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. BDC 2017-287
Honorable Michael F. McMahon, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Lisa S. Korchinski, Assistant Appellate
Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Leo Gallagher, Lewis and Clark County Attorney, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 25, 2021
Decided: September 14, 2021
Filed:
Clerk
Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
111 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve
as precedent. Its case title, cause nurnber, and disposition shall be included in this Court's
quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
Skyler Schneider (Schneider) appeals the September 26, 2018 Judgment and
Commitment Order of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, convicting
him of deliberate homicide and tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. Schneider
asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because there was "no plausible justification"
for his counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress the murder weapon after conflicting
testimony about its evidentiary integrity. We affirm.
¶3 In May 2018, a jury convicted Schneider for fatally shooting his live-in girlfriend,
23-year-old Katie Spencer, through the front window of her parked car. Schneider, who
had called 911 to report Spencer's condition, was arrested on site as he exited a nearby
alley, still on the phone with dispatch. Police spotted a single bullet hole through the
vehicle's front windshield, a spent 9rnm shell casing four feet frorn Spencer's car, and a
9mm Taurus semi-automatic handgun, which belonged to Spencer, in the bushes along the
same alleyway frorn which Schneider had emerged. Officers on scene discussed that the
gun appeared to have a reddish-brown spot on the end of the barrel, which they speculated
could be blood; however, they did not make note of it in their report, the State crirne lab
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did not test it, nor did the lab's forensic report rnention any substance on the barrel of the
gun.
¶4 During the final pre-trial conference on April 18, 2018, the parties discussed the
unknown status of the blood evidence on the weapon. The State agreed to seek clarification
and Schneider's counsel suggested that she may also inquire with the crime lab, though the
record is unclear as to whether either inquiry occurred.
¶5 At trial, the State admitted a photograph of the weapon into evidence. Schneider's
trial counsel introduced the question of the unknown and untested substance to the jury in
her opening statement. Counsel also cross-examined both officers who thought there may
have been blood on the gun and the technician who testified that there was no blood on the
weapon at the time of forensic testing.
¶6 The jury returned a guilty verdict. The District Court sentenced Schneider to life
for deliberate homicide and a concurrent sentence of ten years for tampering with or
fabricating physical evidence.
¶7 Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) clairns are mixed questions of fact and law
that are reviewed de novo. State v. Ward, 2020 MT 36, ¶ 15, 399 Mont. 16, 457 P.3d 955;
State v. Hinshaw, 2018 MT 49, ¶ 8, 390 Mont. 372, 414 P.3d 271; State v. Larsen,
2018 MT 211, ¶ 6, 392 Mont. 401, 425 P.3d 694. We review IAC claims on direct appeal
if the claims are based solely on the record. Ward, ¶ 15; Hinshaw, ¶ 21; State v. Main,
2011 MT 123, ¶ 48, 360 Mont. 470, 255 P.3d 1240.
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¶8 A record-based claim is a claim in which counsel's course of action—or failure to
act—is fully explained by the record. State v. White, 2001 MT 149, in 15, 20,
306 Mont. 58, 30 P.3d 340. If the record on appeal explains "why," this Court will address
the issue on direct appeal. State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243, ¶ 14, 323 Mont. 6, 97 P.3d 1095.
Alternatively, and as Schneider asserts here, a claim can be record-based if there is
"no plausible justification" for defense counsel's action or inaction. Kogul, ¶ 15; see
State v. Jefferson, 2003 MT 90, ¶¶ 46-50, 315 Mont. 146, 69 P.3d 641 (finding defense
counsel's admission that the defendant was guilty of felony assault undermined his attempt
to obtain a complete acquittal on all charges); State v. Rose, 1998 MT 342, ¶ 18,
292 Mont. 350, 972 P.2d 321 (holding defense counsel's failure to ask for a jury instruction
to view accomplice's testimony with suspicion constituted IAC).
¶9 When reviewing IAC claims, we apply the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140,
¶ 10, 343 Mont. 90, 183 P.3d 861; State v. Colburn, 2018 MT 141, ¶ 21, 391 Mont. 449,
419 P.3d 1196. The rule under Strickland requires the defendant to show (1) that his
counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defense.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
¶10 The first prong of the Strickland test begins with a strong presumption that trial
counsel's perforrnance was based on sound trial strategy and falls within the broad range
of reasonable professional conduct. State v. Hamilton, 2007 MT 223, ¶ 16, 339 Mont. 92,
167 P.3d 906. The defendant must establish that his counsel's performance fell below an
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objective standard of reasonableness. Whitlow, ¶ 14; Bishop v. State, 254 Mont. 100, 103,
835 P.2d 732, 734 (1992). To show prejudice, the defendant alleging IAC must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Stock v. State, 2014 MT 46, ¶ 19, 374 Mont. 80,
318 P.3d 1053 (internal citations omitted). "Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a
Fourth Amendment claim cornpetently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the
defendant must also prove . . . that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would
have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual
prejudice." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 2583 (1986).
¶11 Schneider argues his counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to file a motion
to suppress the gun based on the unresolved issue of whether there was blood on the barrel.
Schneider maintains that there was no plausible justification for his counsel's conduct,
constituting deficient performance. The State contends that Schneider's counsel used the
apparent evidentiary inconsistencies to argue against the weight of the evidence at trial but
had little more than conjecture to form the basis of an argument for inadmissibility.
¶12 The State classifies Schneider's challenge as suggesting a "chain of custody"
violation that finds no support in the record. Schneider casts his attorneys' alleged
ineffectiveness as a failure to "follow through with challenging the stain (or lack thereof)
depicted on the barrel of the alleged rnurder weapon." What Schneider fails to do, however,
is provide a cogent argument as to how the possible reddish-brown spot on the murder
weapon provided any basis to suppress the murder weapon. Schneider's claim does not
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overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's strategy fell within the broad range of
reasonable professional conduct.
¶13 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for rnemorandum opinions. This appeal presents
no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent
or modify existing precedent. Schneider has failed to establish that his counsel was
ineffective. His conviction is affirmed.
We Concur:
Chief Jus ice
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Justices ? 44"'"°"'
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