Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
September 16, 2021
No. 19-10649 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Felicitas Hernandez Castillo,
Defendant—Appellant,
consolidated with
_____________
No. 19-10712
_____________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Nicole Deon Goosby,
Defendant—Appellant,
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
consolidated with
_____________
No. 19-10821
_____________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Nelson Guevara-Bonilla,
Defendant—Appellant,
consolidated with
_____________
No. 19-11220
_____________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
John Russell,
Defendant—Appellant,
2
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
consolidated with
_____________
No. 19-11224
_____________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Alfonso Hoyos, III,
Defendant—Appellant,
consolidated with
_____________
No. 19-11241
_____________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Miguel Lopez-Campos,
Defendant—Appellant,
3
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
consolidated with
_____________
No. 19-11265
_____________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Devon Wright-Nasalski,
Defendant—Appellant,
consolidated with
_____________
No. 19-11290
_____________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Ignacio Tarin-Valerio, Jr.,
Defendant—Appellant,
4
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
consolidated with
_____________
No. 20-10026
_____________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Harold Richard Cantrell, Jr.,
Defendant—Appellant,
consolidated with
_____________
No. 20-10037
_____________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Pedro Ramos-Quezada,
Defendant—Appellant,
5
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
consolidated with
_____________
No. 20-10237
_____________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Jose Luis Zamudio,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC Nos. 4:19-CR-28-1;
4:12-CR-170-1; 4:19-CR-24-1; 4:17-CR-37-1;
4:19-CR-127-1; 4:19-CR-78-1; 4:19-CR-37-1;
4:12-CR-130-1; 4:19-CR-192-1; 4:19-CR-180-1;
4:19-CR-299-1
Before Clement, Haynes, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
These eleven consolidated cases present the following question:
whether the district court’s oral pronouncements at sentencing conflict with
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
6
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
the conditions of supervised release in its judgments of conviction. See
United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 825 (2020). The district court’s conditions of supervised release,
which it incorporated by reference during each defendant’s sentencing
hearing, mirrored standard conditions enumerated in prior versions of the
Sentencing Guidelines. But when the Guidelines’ conditions were modified
in 2016, the district court’s were not, so they diverged. The defendants
assert on appeal that the district court’s oral pronouncements and written
judgments therefore improperly conflict under Diggles, and that the
offending conditions should be struck from their sentences. We dismiss one
appeal that is now moot, 1 and as we explain below, we modify the sentences
to strike one of the challenged conditions and otherwise affirm.
I.
In each of these cases, the district court announced at the defendants’
sentencing hearings that it would impose the “standard conditions” of
supervised release. The subsequent written judgments contained the court’s
“standard” conditions, which reflected those contained in pre-2016 versions
of the Sentencing Guidelines. These differed from the post-2016 Guidelines’
standard conditions of supervised release.
The defendants challenge four conditions of supervised release. First,
the “shall-not-frequent” condition of supervised release: “The defendant
shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used,
1
In one of the appeals, No. 19-10821, defendant Nelson Guevara-Bonilla has
completed his term of supervised release; his claims are thus moot.
7
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
distributed, or administered.” 2 This language was once included in
§ 5D1.3(c) of the Guidelines but was deleted in 2016. See U.S.S.G.
§ 5D1.3(c) (2015).
The second challenged condition in the district court’s written
judgment is the “paraphernalia” condition, which provides that:
[t]he defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and
shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any
narcotic or other controlled substance, or any paraphernalia
related to such substances, except as prescribed by a physician.
(Emphasis added). 3 This condition is not included in the post-2016
Sentencing Guidelines. Instead, pertinent standard conditions in the post-
2016 Guidelines state:
The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local
offense . . . .
The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled
substance . . . . [and]
The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a
controlled substance . . . .
U.S.S.G. §§ 5D1.3(a)(1), (2), (4).
The third challenged condition in the written judgment is the
“reporting” condition:
2
This condition is challenged by Felicitas Castillo, John Russell, Alfonso Hoyos,
Miquel Lopez-Campos, Devon Wright-Nasalki, Ignacio Tarin-Valerio, and Harold
Cantrell.
3
Nicole Goosby challenges the emphasized provision contained in this condition.
8
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
The defendant shall report to the U.S. Probation Officer and
shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the
first five (5) days of each month.
Cf. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(2) (2015). 4 In the post-2016 Guidelines, this
condition reads:
[T]he defendant will receive instructions from the court or the
probation officer about how and when to report to the
probation officer, and the defendant shall report to the
probation officer as instructed.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(2).
The final challenged written condition is the “notify” condition. The
condition states:
As directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify
third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant’s
criminal record or personal history or characteristics, and shall
permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to
confirm the defendant’s compliance with such notification
requirement.
Cf. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(12) (2015). 5 The post-2016 Guidelines altered the
prior phrasing of this condition to read:
If the probation officer determines that the defendant poses a
risk to another person (including an organization), the
probation officer may require the defendant to notify the
person about the risk and the defendant shall comply with that
instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and
4
Goosby is likewise the only defendant to challenge this condition.
5
Jose Zamudio challenges this condition.
9
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
confirm that the defendant has notified the person about the
risk.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(12).
This court held these cases in abeyance pending decision in Diggles.
After the en banc court handed down its opinion in Diggles, the Government
moved for a limited remand in approximately two dozen similar cases to allow
the sentencing district courts either to correct clerical errors in the written
judgments or, alternatively, to clarify the courts’ intent in imposing the
challenged supervised release conditions. This court granted the motions,
and, on remand, the Government filed unopposed motions to correct clerical
errors in the relevant written judgments pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 36. The Government alternatively requested clarification of the
record in each case. Four of the five sentencing courts granted these motions.
However, the district judge assigned the group of cases now before us
denied the motions to correct any clerical errors and instead granted the
alternative motion to clarify. In doing so, the judge determined that the
motions “proceed[ed] on the assumption that [the] court intended to impose
as standard conditions of supervision in each of the cases the conditions that
are prescribed by [U.S.S.G.] § 5D1.3(c), but inadvertently failed to recognize
that those conditions were changed” by the 2016 amendments to the
Guidelines. The court rejected this characterization:
The court is denying each of the motions to correct potential
clerical error in the judgment because the conditions of
supervision were not included in the judgments by clerical
error, but were put and retained in the conditions of
supervision intentionally because, as well as the undersigned
can recall, of the court’s belief that they were appropriate
conditions considering the nature of most of the criminal
litigation, drug-trafficking cases, the court deals with, and that
10
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
most of the grounds of revocation the court faces when
handling a motion to revoke a term of supervised release are
violations of prohibitions against use or possession of illegal
controlled substances. . . .
[B]ut the court is providing the following clarification as to the
court’s reasons for including those conditions in the standard
conditions of supervision that the court routinely has been
using in its criminal cases, for approximately twenty years.
The district court thus affirmed its intention to impose the conditions of
supervised release outlined in the defendants’ written judgments.
Given the sentencing court’s clarification, the defendants in these
cases contend that there is an impermissible conflict between the written
conditions of supervised release and the court’s oral pronouncement of their
sentences. We address each condition in turn.
II.
In the sentencing context, “[w]hen a defendant objects for the first
time on appeal, we usually review only for plain error.” Diggles, 957 F.3d at
559. “But we do not review for plain error when the defendant did not have
an opportunity to object in the trial court.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P.
51(b)). “That principle applies when a defendant appeals a court’s failure to
pronounce a condition that later appears in the judgment.” Id. (citations
omitted). When “the district court had not made any mention of the
condition at sentencing, nor was there any indication that the [Presentence
Investigation Report] proposed the challenged condition[,]” no forfeiture of
the issue occurs. Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court reviews
these challenges for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d
378, 381 (5th Cir. 2006).
11
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
Consistent with Diggles, the parties agree that the standard of review
for all the defendants’ sentences except Goosby’s should be abuse of
discretion. The record bears out that none of the defendants, other than
Goosby, were given notice that the court intended to impose its own set of
“standard” release conditions distinct from the updated conditions in
§ 5D1.3(c). Thus, we review the conditions challenged by those defendants
for abuse of discretion.
The parties disagree whether Goosby’s challenges should be reviewed
for abuse of discretion or plain error. Because, for the reasons stated below,
we believe Goosby had notice of the conditions of supervised release at issue
and had an opportunity to object, we review her challenges for plain error.
III.
“The district court must orally pronounce a sentence to respect the
defendant’s right to be present for sentencing.” Diggles, 957 F.3d at 556
(citing United States v. Martinez, 250 F.3d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001)). The
district court may impose supervised release conditions by orally adopting
“courtwide or judge-specific standing orders that list conditions” by
reference, but this must be done when the defendant is present and the
defendant must be provided a document containing the adopted conditions
in order to have an opportunity to object. Id. at 561, 561 n.5; see United States
v. Garcia, 983 F.3d 820, 824 (5th Cir. 2020).
If a term or condition of a sentence in the court’s written judgment
conflicts with the oral sentence, the oral sentence controls. Id. at 557. Such
a conflict exists when the written judgment “broadens the pronounced
requirements of supervised release.” United States v. Rivas-Estrada, 906
F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2018). “If, however, there is ‘merely an ambiguity’
between oral and written sentences, ‘then “[this court] must look to the
12
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No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
intent of the sentencing court, as evidenced in the record,” to determine the
defendant’s sentence.’” United States v. Vasquez-Puente, 922 F.3d 700, 703
(5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 935
(5th Cir. 2003)). If an ambiguity—rather than a conflict—between a
defendant’s written and oral sentences can be reconciled, then the district
court did not abuse its discretion by including an unpronounced condition in
the written sentence. See id. at 704–05.
The basic question in each of the cases before us is whether there is a
conflict, or a mere ambiguity, between the defendants’ oral and written
sentences regarding the challenged conditions. That question in mind, we
address each condition in turn.
A. “Shall-not-frequent” condition
The defendants assert that the shall-not-frequent condition in their
written judgments conflicts with the oral pronouncement of their sentences.
They argue that though the oral pronouncement implied a prohibition of
interactions with certain individuals, the district court did not mention a
prohibition regarding frequenting certain places. Conversely, the
Government contends that no conflict exists because the shall-not-frequent
condition is merely redundant with a separate condition that also states the
defendants may not associate with individuals known to be engaged in
criminal activity. Indeed, the Sentencing Commission indicated that it
deleted the challenged provision in 2016 amendments to the Guidelines
because the shall-not-frequent provision was “redundant with other
conditions” and “is encompassed by the ‘standard’ condition that
defendants not associate with those they know to be criminals or who are
engaged in criminal activity.” 2016 U.S.S.G. Manual – Supplement to
Appendix C (November 1, 2016) 169.
13
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
The defendants have the better argument. Comparing the text of the
shall-not-frequent condition imposed by the district court with the “do-not-
associate” condition carried forward in the post-2016 Guidelines reveals that
the shall-not-frequent condition “broadens the pronounced requirements of
supervised release” beyond those stated in the do-not-associate condition.
Rivas-Estrada, 906 F.3d at 350. There is some redundancy between the two
conditions; the shall-not-frequent condition imposed by the district court
would also proscribe association with individuals found in the places
rendered off-limits. But the district court’s condition goes further, barring
defendants from frequenting “places where controlled substances are
illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered.” Cf. United States v. Huor,
852 F.3d 392, 404 (5th Cir. 2017) (concluding that special condition
prohibiting a sex offender from “residing or going places” frequented by
minors was not orally pronounced, such that there was a conflict between the
oral and written sentences). Even given some redundancy, practically
speaking, avoiding certain people is distinct from, and perhaps more
straightforward than, avoiding certain places.
As a ready example, if a grocery store parking lot was a place where
drug activity occurred, the defendants would violate the shall-not-frequent
condition by simply going to the grocery store for food—even if they
interacted with no one while walking through the parking lot to the store. It
is true that the Sentencing Commission determined that the thrust of the
condition—“that defendants not associate with those they know to be
criminals or who are engaged in criminal activity”—was redundant with
other, more tailored conditions, including the do-not-associate condition.
But it is also apparent that the shall-not-frequent condition is broader, and
distinct, in the conduct it prohibits. As a result, the district court was
required to pronounce the shall-not-frequent condition during the
14
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 15 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
defendants’ sentencing hearings yet failed to do so. The resulting conflict
between the defendants’ orally pronounced and written sentences cannot be
reconciled, and the district court’s “clarification” on remand did not address
the Diggles issue. Therefore, the condition must be excised from the
defendants’ written judgments.
Generally, we have remanded cases like these for the district court
either to conform the judgment to the oral pronouncement by striking
unpronounced conditions, e.g., United States v. Omigie, 977 F.3d 397, 407 (5th
Cir. 2020), or to resentence the defendants, e.g., United States v. Brown, 855
F. App’x 176, 179–80 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). Here, however, given the
time that has passed and the fact that these cases have been remanded once
before, we instead exercise our discretion to modify the defendants’
judgments by striking the shall-not-frequent condition imposed by the
district court and otherwise affirming the judgments. See United States v.
Elkins, 335 F. App’x 457, 459 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
B. “Reporting” and “paraphernalia” conditions
Nicole Goosby challenges the reporting and paraphernalia conditions
that the district court reimposed when it revoked her supervised release in
2019. Goosby was originally sentenced on January 25, 2013, and her original
sentence included the two conditions. In 2013, these conditions were also
included among the standard Guidelines conditions. As with the other
challenged conditions, the 2016 Guidelines amendments modified the
conditions, so the standard Guidelines conditions now diverge from the
district court’s “standard” conditions. Goosby contends that, as a result,
there is a conflict between the district court’s oral incorporation of
“standard” reporting and paraphernalia conditions during her revocation
hearing and the conditions that were included in her written judgment.
15
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 16 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
As noted, the parties disagree on the appropriate standard of review
for Goosby’s challenges. “When a defendant fails to raise a pronouncement
objection in the district court, review is for plain error if the defendant had
notice of the conditions and an opportunity to object.” Diggles, 957 F.3d at
563. Goosby did not object during her revocation hearing; the question is
whether she had notice of the conditions and an opportunity to object. She
contends she had no notice, while the Government asserts she did. The
record supports the Government’s assertion.
As in the other cases before us, the district court stated its intention
during Goosby’s revocation hearing to impose “the standard conditions that
will be set forth in the judgment.” Though Goosby points to the differences
between the post-2016 Guidelines and the district court’s “standard”
conditions to contend that she had no notice or opportunity to object, the
transcript of Goosby’s revocation hearing reveals she did. During the
hearing, Goosby’s counsel challenged another of her 2013 conditions of
supervised release, and the district judge assuaged that concern.
Specifically, Goosby’s counsel referenced two conditions from Goosby’s
2013 sentence: that she was not to consume alcohol, and that she was
prohibited from excessively drinking alcohol. Counsel asked for clarification
of which condition controlled, and the district judge said that the court would
remove the word “excessive” to conform the conditions. Goosby’s counsel
did not object to any other condition. But the exchange demonstrates that
Goosby had notice that her prior supervised release conditions were at issue
during her revocation hearing and that she availed herself of the opportunity
to object to other prior conditions. Because she did not object to the two
conditions she now challenges on appeal, we review her claims for plain error.
16
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 17 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
For us to disturb the district court’s judgment, Goosby must show
that “(1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, (3) the error affected [her]
substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Rodriguez-
Parra, 581 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Redd, 562
F.3d 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2009)). Even assuming that the district court plainly
erred by failing properly to pronounce the challenged conditions, we are
hard-pressed to conclude that any error affected Goosby’s substantial rights
or the fairness, integrity, or reputation of judicial proceedings. Goosby had
notice of the reporting and paraphernalia conditions because they were part
of her original sentence imposed in 2013. And the revocation hearing
transcript shows that she was aware that the district court intended simply to
reimpose the conditions, yet she lodged no objection. She was subject to
these conditions before revocation of her supervised release, and is subject to
the same conditions going forward. Against this backdrop, Goosby cannot
demonstrate reversible error in the district court’s reimposition of these
conditions of supervised release.
C. “Notification” condition
Lastly, Jose Zamudio challenges the notification condition, which
requires him, “[a]s directed by the probation officer,” to “notify third parties
of risks” resulting from Zamudio’s “criminal record or personal history or
characteristics . . . .” Like the other defendants, Zamudio points to the
variance between the condition as imposed and the post-2016 Guidelines
version of the notification condition. In 2016, the Guidelines condition was
rephrased to provide an express threshold determination by the probation
officer “that the defendant poses a risk to another person”; if so, then “the
probation officer may require the defendant to notify the person about the
17
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 18 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
risk and the defendant shall comply with that instruction.” U.S.S.G.
§ 5D1.3(c)(12). Because of the different phrasing, Zamudio argues that there
is an impermissible conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement
of his sentence and the eventual written judgment.
Comparing the two versions of the condition, we fail to see any
substantive conflict between them. Both require the defendant to notify third
parties when the defendant poses a risk, at the discretion of the probation officer.
No other duties or rights are affected by the change in sentence structure of
the notify condition. Both versions ultimately vest discretion in the probation
officer to require the same thing: notification by a defendant to third parties
(or “another person” or organization) of risks posed by the defendant on
supervised release. Because the two conditions are reconcilable, at worst
there is merely an ambiguity between the district court’s oral pronouncement
and Zamudio’s written sentence. This ambiguity is easily reconciled given
that the two conditions are congruous. Therefore, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing this condition of supervised release. See
Vasquez-Puente, 922 F.3d at 704–05.
IV.
We AFFIRM the district court’s ruling with respect to the
conditions of supervised release challenged by defendants Goosby and
Zamudio. We MODIFY the conditions of supervised release imposed by the
district court in sentencing defendants Castillo, Russell, Hoyos, Lopez-
Campos, Wright-Nasalki, Tarin-Valerio, Cantrell, and Ramos-Quezada by
striking the condition that “[t]he defendant[s] shall not frequent places
where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or
administered” from their written judgments and AFFIRM AS
18
Case: 19-10649 Document: 00516016452 Page: 19 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
No. 19-10649
c/w Nos. 19-10712, 19-10821, 19-11220, 19-11224, 19-11241, 19-11265, 19-11290, 20-10026,
20-10037, 20-10237
MODIFIED. Finally, we DISMISS defendant Guevara-Bonilla’s appeal
(No. 19-10821) as moot.
AFFIRMED in part; MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED in part;
and DISMISSED in part.
19