United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT May 4, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-40195
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ELIAZAR RAMOS-FLORES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(1:05-CR-638)
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Convicted of being an “alien unlawfully found in the United
States after deportation, having previously been convicted of a
felony”, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1), Eliazar
Ramos-Flores challenges: the district court’s denying, in part,
his motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and the sufficiency of the evidence
showing he was “found in” the United States within the meaning of
8 U.S.C. § 1326. AFFIRMED.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I.
On 15 July 2005, an outbound fishing vessel departing Port
Isabel, Texas, was boarded by United States Coast Guard (USCG)
Officers to conduct routine questioning. Of the four people
aboard, the captain was a United States citizen; two crewmen
admitted being illegal aliens; and Ramos refused to answer
questions, stating only that he was from “the park” and
“Brownsville”. The Officers transported Ramos, along with the two
admittedly illegal aliens, to a USCG station and notified the
Border Patrol.
Before giving Ramos Miranda warnings, USCG and Border Patrol
personnel questioned him about his identity, place of birth,
parents’ names, immigration status, and how and when he entered the
United States. Ramos provided his parents’ names and stated: he
was from Mexico; he was not authorized to be in the United States;
and he entered on 11 July 2005 around the Los Tomates Bridge.
Ramos was then given Miranda warnings in Spanish and transported to
a Border Patrol station for fingerprinting, as discussed below, and
processing.
At a pretrial hearing on Ramos’ suppression motion, the
district court suppressed his parents’ names and the date and place
he entered the United States. On the other hand, because the rest
of Ramos’ biographical information was discoverable through his
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fingerprints, which are not testimonial evidence, the court denied
the remainder of the motion.
Ramos waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated in a
signed document to the following facts: his name is Eliazar Ramos-
Flores; he is an alien and citizen of Mexico; he was found by USCG
Officers on an outbound vessel in the Laguna Madre Channel between
Port Isabel and South Padre Island, Texas (the location where the
USCG boarded the vessel was marked on an attached exhibit); he
lacked authorization to enter the United States; and he had been
convicted for illegal re-entry in 1999.
Pursuant to a bench trial on those stipulated facts, Ramos was
convicted of being an “alien unlawfully found in the United States
after deportation, having previously been convicted of a felony”,
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). He was sentenced,
inter alia, to 36 months in prison.
II.
Ramos presents two contentions: the district court reversibly
erred in denying, in part, his motion to suppress his biographical
information obtained in violation of Miranda; and the stipulated
evidence was insufficient to prove he was “found in” the United
States within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Each contention
fails.
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A.
In claiming the district court erred by not suppressing the
biographical information he revealed before being given his Miranda
warnings, Ramos maintains this information was the only basis for
his stipulating to his alien status. We review de novo “[t]he
question of whether Miranda’s guarantees have been impermissibly
denied to [Ramos], assuming the facts as established by the trial
court are not clearly erroneous”. United States v. Harrell, 894
F.2d 120, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1990).
As noted, the district court suppressed Ramos’ parents’ names
and the date and place he entered the United States. It refused,
however, to suppress Ramos’ remaining biographical information,
such as his name, nationality, and immigration status, which he
also provided to USCG and Border Patrol personnel before being
given his Miranda warnings, because this information was
retrievable using his fingerprints.
Arguably, the district court did not err in that ruling; the
challenged biographical information was retrievable using his
fingerprints and would have been admissible in court. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
fingerprints are non-testimonial evidence, the admissibility of
which is not affected by Miranda); United States v. Guzman-Bruno,
27 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1994) (identity of the defendant is
admissible even if defendant’s statements are not). See also
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United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 435 (5th Cir. 2005)
(affirming denial of motion to suppress and holding admissible
documents in an alien’s “A-file”); United States v. Sanchez-Milam,
305 F.3d 310, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2002) (factfinder may infer from
absence in A-file that alien lacked permission to re-enter the
United States).
In any event, we need not decide that question because Ramos’
stipulations render this suppression issue moot. United States v.
Lares-Meraz, 452 F.3d 352, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2006) (“A controversy
is mooted when there are no longer adverse parties with sufficient
legal interests to maintain the litigation.”) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). Both Ramos and his attorney signed the
stipulation. And, at the bench trial on 19 October 2005, the
district court ensured Ramos and his attorney understood they were
agreeing with the Government on these facts. After those
stipulated facts were read aloud in court, the Government and Ramos
rested. Neither presented any other evidence; nor did they present
any objections or reservations.
Relying on United States v. Mendoza, 491 F.2d 534, 536 (5th
Cir. 1974), Ramos contends the suppression issue is not moot,
claiming a stipulated-fact bench trial is a proper means to
preserve for appeal a pretrial suppression issue. Mendoza,
however, conditioned such a preservation on the defendants’ “not
withdraw[ing] their pleas of not guilty, and [seeking] to expressly
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reserve their right to appeal from the order denying the motion to
suppress”. Id. (emphasis added).
Ramos’ reliance on a similar case, United States v. Robertson,
698 F.2d 703, 705-709 (5th Cir. 1983), is also misplaced. There,
our court refused to equate a stipulation of facts to a guilty
plea, which would permit non-jurisdictional defenses on appeal,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Id. at 709
(stating defendant “had ample opportunity during the trial to
protest the [stipulated-facts] procedure if he disagreed with it”).
Ramos did not reserve, or otherwise signal, his intent to
appeal the partial denial of his suppression motion. Accordingly,
he rendered this issue moot with his stipulated facts, such as his
“not [having] received permission to re-enter the United States ...
when found”.
B.
In claiming the stipulated evidence was not sufficient to
prove being “found in” the United States, within the meaning of 8
U.S.C. § 1326, Ramos contends the district court erred in making
that conclusion based on the following stipulation: he “was found
by the [USCG] on an outbound vessel in the water between Port
Isabel, Texas[,] and South Padre Island, Texas, as specifically
illustrated by exhibit ‘A’, attached hereto”. At trial, Ramos
emphasized that a circle on exhibit “A” showed the precise location
where he was found by the USCG in the Laguna Madre Channel. We
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examine the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether a
“rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”. United States v.
Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d 225, 234 (5th Cir. 2003).
Drawing on cases in the civil-immigration context, Ramos
maintains § 1326’s “found in” element requires the Government to
prove he voluntarily entered this country by stepping foot on its
dry land, free from official restraint. See, e.g., Yang v.
Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1548 (3d Cir. 1995) (entry into the United
States, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§
1101(a)(38) and 1361, “does not include waters or airspace subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States” (emphasis added)).
We need not reach this contention. Our court has specifically
stated that the Laguna Madre Channel, where Ramos stipulated he was
found, is within the United States, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
Sun Oil Co., 191 F.2d 705, 716 (5th Cir. 1951): “The Congress of
the Republic of Texas and the Legislature of the State of Texas,
from 1836 to the present time, have defined the boundaries of the
State so as to include Laguna Madre”. Therefore, pursuant to the
stipulated facts, a “rational trier of fact could have found that
the evidence established [Ramos was found in the United States and
was therefore] guilt[y] beyond a reasonable doubt”.
Serna-Villareal, 352 F.3d at 234.
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III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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