NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 23 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID J. DEJEU, No. 21-35018
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05176-BHS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LEWIS COUNTY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 14, 2021**
Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
David J. Dejeu appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 action alleging various claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson, 640
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Dejeu’s action because Dejeu failed to
allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Castro v. County of Los
Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (discussing
requirements to establish municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, (1978)); Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561
(9th Cir. 1987) (to make out a claim under the second clause of § 1985(2) or the
first clause of § 1985(3), “a plaintiff must show invidiously discriminatory
motivation behind the conspirators action” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted and alteration adopted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dejeu’s motion for
reconsideration because Dejeu failed to establish grounds for relief. See Kona
Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth
standard of review and stating “a motion for reconsideration should not be granted,
absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with
newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening
change in the controlling law” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dejeu’s motion to
compel discovery because, subject to limited exceptions, a “party may not seek
discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule
2 21-35018
26(f).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1); Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 677 (9th
Cir. 2018) (standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by considering the allegedly
late-filed motion to dismiss. See Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080,
1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The district court is given broad discretion in supervising
the pretrial phase of litigation . . . .”).
Dejeu’s request that this court order discovery, set forth in the opening brief,
is denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 21-35018