[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 11, 2006
No. 05-14907 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-01198-CV-TWT-1
SAMUEL ADAM BUSH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, F.A., et al.,
Defendants,
W. HOMER DRAKE,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 11, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Samuel Adam Bush appeals the dismissal of his complaint of racketeering,
fraud, and civil rights violations against a federal bankruptcy judge, W. Homer
Drake. Bush argues that the district court erroneously concluded that the doctrine
of judicial immunity applies to allegations of bribery. Because the Supreme Court
has held that judicial immunity applies even in cases of alleged corruption, we
affirm.
In August 2004, Washington Mutual Bank scheduled a foreclosure sale on
property held by Bush. The day before the sale, Bush filed for bankruptcy in the
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia and his petition was
assigned to Judge Drake. The bank moved for relief from the automatic stay of
bankruptcy, and Judge Drake granted the motion. Bush appealed to the district
court, and the district court affirmed. Bush did not appeal to this Court.
Bush then filed suit in state court and alleged that the bank, its attorneys, and
Drake conspired to “tak[e] a bribe and throw[] the case” in violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, common
law fraud, and conspiracy to violate his civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bush
sought actual and punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
The defendants removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss the
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complaint. The district court granted the motion to dismiss as to Drake on the
ground that “[j]udicial immunity is an absolute bar to plaintiff’s action against
Judge Drake.” The district court later entered final judgment as to Drake. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b).
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, “accepting the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor.” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003). We
construe the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff more liberally than pleadings drafted by
attorneys. Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990).
“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the
immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their
judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1217
(1967). Judicial immunity applies when (1) “the judge deal[t] with the plaintiff in
his judicial capacity” and (2) the judge did not act “in the ‘clear absence of all
jurisdiction.’” Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 945 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1105 (1978)).
“This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and
corruptly.” Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S. Ct. at 1218. The doctrine of judicial
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immunity applies to both suits for damages and suits seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000).
Judge Drake is entitled to judicial immunity. The first requirement for
immunity is met because issuing an order is one of the “paradigmatic judicial acts
involved in resolving disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction
of a court.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S. Ct. 538, 544 (1988).
The second requirement is met because the U.S. Bankruptcy Court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the motion decided by Drake. See Dykes, 776 F.2d at 943
(holding that “a judge enjoys absolute immunity where he or she had subject
matter jurisdiction over the matter forming the basis for such liability”).
Bush contends that our decision “approve[s] judicial corruption,” but this
argument is without merit. Although judicial immunity prevents a civil suit against
a federal judge accused of taking bribes, other safeguards exist to protect litigants
against judicial corruption. See Bryan v. Murphy, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (listing “specific procedures . . . for the public to lodge complaints
about federal judges”). First, an aggrieved litigant can appeal the judgment.
Second, “[a]ny person alleging that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to
the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts . . . may
file with the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit a written complaint
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containing a brief statement of the facts constituting such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. §
351(a). Third, a bankruptcy judge may be removed from office, id. § 152(e), or
criminally prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. § 201, for taking bribes.
The dismissal of Bush’s complaint against Judge Drake is
AFFIRMED.
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