[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 31, 2006
No. 05-15487 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
Agency Nos. A95-537-468
and A95-437-470
ARBEN GJEKAJ,
ALEKSANDRA GJEKAJ,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(May 31, 2006)
Before DUBINA, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM
Arben Gjekaj and his daughter, Aleksandra Gjekaj, natives and citizens of
Albania, petition for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”), which affirmed without opinion the immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of
asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”). On
appeal, Petitioners argue that substantial evidence did not support the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination or the IJ’s denial of their asylum application under the
INA, in which they claimed Gjekaj was persecuted in Albania because of his
membership in Albania’s Democratic Party (“DP”) and participation in the October
1, 2000 local elections there.1 After thorough review of the record and careful
consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
The IJ’s factual determination that an alien is not entitled to asylum must be
upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. See Mazariegos v. Att’y Gen.,
241 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001). Under this highly deferential standard of
review, a denial of asylum may be reversed only if the evidence would compel a
reasonable factfinder to find that the requisite fear of persecution exists. See INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815 n.1, 117 L. Ed. 2d 38
(1992); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“administrative findings of fact are
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
1
Because we find that Petitioners have not established a case for asylum under the INA,
we do not address their arguments that they also satisfied the higher standards for withholding of
removal or CAT relief. See Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 2001).
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the contrary”). A finding of fact will be reversed “only when the record compels
reversal; the mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion is not
enough to justify a reversal . . . .” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th
Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 125 S.Ct. 2245 (2005).
Petitioners argue that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not
supported by substantial evidence because any inconsistencies between Gjekkaj’s
testimony and his asylum application were not material. Like other factual
findings, credibility determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence
test, meaning that the IJ must offer specific, cogent reasons for an adverse
credibility finding. Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1286-1287 (11th
Cir. 2005). And “an adverse credibility determination alone may be sufficient to
support the denial of an asylum application” when there is no other evidence of
persecution. Id. at 1287 (emphasis added). “Once an adverse credibility finding is
made, the burden is on the applicant alien to show that the IJ’s credibility decision
was not supported by ‘specific, cogent reasons’ or was not based on substantial
evidence.” Id. (citations omitted). Although minor inconsistencies will not
support an adverse credibility finding, inconsistencies that go “to the heart of [the]
asylum claim” are sufficient to support such a finding. See Chebchoub v. I.N.S.,
257 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001). “Indications of reliable testimony include
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consistency on direct examination, consistency with the written application, and
the absence of embellishments.” Ruiz v. United States Att’y. Gen., 440 F.3d 1247,
1255 (11th Cir. 2006).
Petitioners have failed to meet their burden to show that the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination must be overturned. This is so because substantial
evidence supports the determination including inconsistencies (1) between
Gjekaj’s statements on his asylum application and his testimony; (2) between
Gjekaj’s testimony and his corroborating evidence; (3) on the face of his
corroborating evidence; and (4) within his testimony. Even if, as Gjekaj argues,
some of his testimony at the asylum hearing was roughly consistent with the
statements he made in his asylum application, during his testimony, he expanded
on his claims, and the underlying facts, thus diminishing the credibility of his
testimony. See Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1255 (indicating that “the absence of
embellishments” is one indicator of reliable testimony). Moreover, his testimony,
particularly when taken in combination with his corroborating evidence, caused the
IJ to question his credibility. The IJ also considered the 2001 Profile of Asylum
Claims and Country Conditions on Albania, which stated that claims by Albanian
nationals based on political grounds are likely to be incredible, and that the
October 2000 elections, upon which Gjekaj’s asylum application partially relied to
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establish persecution, were tainted by “only minor discrepancies,” with “very few
incidents of violence.” Indeed, the Profile cautions adjudicators to look closely at
claims such as Gjekaj’s, and explore other motivations that the claimant may have,
including family members already present in the United States.
On this record, based on the inconsistencies between Gjekaj’s asylum
application and testimony, as well as the other evidence before the IJ casting doubt
on the credibility of Gjekaj’s claim, we cannot say that the record compels reversal
of the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.
PETITION DENIED.
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