[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-16654 MAY 22, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-80050-CR-DMM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
REGINALD B. KNIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 22, 2006)
Before BLACK, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Reginald Knight appeals his criminal tax convictions for conspiring to
defraud the United States through a false claim for a tax refund and filing a
fraudulent claim for a tax refund, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 287. Knight
asserts the district court erred in instructing the jury that a good-faith belief his
actions were lawful does not have to be objectively reasonable, but the jury may
consider the reasonableness of his belief, along with all the other evidence, in
assessing the defense. The district court did not err, and we affirm.
“We apply a deferential standard of review to a trial court's jury
instructions.” United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1148 (11th Cir. 2003). We
review jury instructions de novo "to determine whether they misstate the law or
mislead the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party." Brochu v. City of Riviera
Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Under this standard, we will only reverse if we are left with a substantial and
eradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations."
Puche, 350 F.3d at 1148. “When the jury instructions, taken together, accurately
express the law applicable to the case without confusing or prejudicing the jury,
there is no reason for reversal even though isolated clauses may, in fact, be
confusing, technically imperfect, or otherwise subject to criticism.” United States
v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996).
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In Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991), the Supreme Court stated
the specific intent of willfulness in criminal tax cases “requires the Government to
prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this
duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty." Id. at 610. The
Government must also negate any claim by the defendant that he had a good-faith
belief he was not violating any duty imposed by the tax laws. Id. The Supreme
Court rejected the idea a defendant’s good-faith belief must be objectively
reasonable in order to constitute an affirmative defense to a willful violation of a
legal duty. Id. at 611-12. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court noted “the more
unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury
will consider them to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal
duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government has carried its
burden of proving knowledge.” Id.
In a case decided soon after Cheek, we stated “[i]t is thus highly probative
for the defense to show that the defendant's belief–whether or not mistaken–was
reasonable; evidence of a belief's reasonableness tends to negate a finding of
willfulness and to support a finding that the defendant's belief was held in good
faith.” United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1992). We
have found reversible error in jury instructions viewed as a whole for failing to
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convey a good-faith defense, including the court’s failure to instruct the jury that a
good-faith belief does not have to be objectively reasonable. United States v.
Morris, 20 F.3d 1111, 1118 (11th Cir. 1994). We clarified, however, that there is
no specific requirement a jury instruction specifically note that a good-faith
defense need not be objectively reasonable. Id.
The district court did not err in its instruction. First, the court’s instruction
was consistent with the applicable law. The court’s instruction correctly instructs
the jury on the principle from Cheek that a good-faith belief need not be
objectively reasonable. The disputed line instructing the jury that it may consider
the reasonableness of Knight’s belief along with the other evidence is consistent
with the statement in Cheek that “the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or
misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing
more than simple disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the tax laws
and will find that the Government has carried its burden of proving knowledge.”
Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 611-12; see also Lankford, 955 F.2d at 1550-51. The
applicable law supports the principle that while a good-faith belief need not be
reasonable, the reasonableness of the belief is probative evidence that may be
considered with the other evidence in the record. The district court included the
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proposed language from the Government because it expressed this principle to the
jury. Therefore, the court’s instruction is supported by the applicable law.1
In addition, there is no evidence suggesting these instructions misled the
jury. There is no indication in the record the jury returned any notes or questions
while in deliberation regarding the good-faith defense. Furthermore, the jury did
not return a special verdict revealing any confusion. The court’s instructions were
consistent with the applicable law and did not mislead the jury to the prejudice of
the defendant. We affirm Knight’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.
1
In addition, two circuits have approved similar language for pattern jury instructions.
See Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, Instruction No. 6.11 (1999) (cited
in 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 19.06 (5th ed.)); United States v. Pensyl, 387 F.3d 456, 459, n.1
(6th Cir. 2004) (cited in 2B Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 67.25 (5th ed.)).
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