[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 19, 2006
No. 05-14652 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00093-CV-3-MCR-EMT
REINALDO JIMENEZ-PEREZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN DONALD BAUKNECHT,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 19, 2006)
Before DUBINA, CARNES AND HULL, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:
Reinaldo Jimenez-Perez (Jimenez), proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus. We
affirm.
We review a denial of habeas relief under § 2241 de novo. Skinner v.
Wiley, 355 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir. 2004). Jimenez contends that the Bureau of
Prisons has incorrectly interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), which sets forth
guidelines for awarding service of sentence credits for good behavior. It provides:
[A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1
year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the
prisoner’s life, may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner’s
sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each
year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of
the first year of the term, subject to determination by the Bureau of
Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary
compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (emphasis added).
According to the BOP’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), “term of
imprisonment” means time actually served. Therefore, an inmate may earn good
conduct time (GCT) credits based only on the time actually served and not on the
sentence imposed.
In Brown v. McFadden, 416 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2005), we considered
precisely the same argument that Jimenez makes here. Id. Brown involved a
prisoner’s challenge to the BOP’s interpretation of § 3624 based on the argument
that GCT should be calculated based on the length of the sentence imposed. Id.
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Although we noted that the district court was “arguably correct” in finding that the
plain language of § 3624 supported the BOP’s interpretation, we elected to follow
the decisions of other circuits. Id. at 1273. Those decisions held that the language
of § 3624 is ambiguous, but the BOP’s interpretation is reasonable. Id. These
were our holdings:
(1) 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) is ambiguous and does not unambiguously
support either argument; that a federal prisoner should get good time
credit of 54 days for each year he is sentenced to imprisonment, or
that a federal prisoner should get good time credit of 54 days for each
year he actually serves in prison;
(2) Even though the statute is ambiguous, the BOP’s interpretation of
the statute that a federal prisoner should get good time credit of 54
days for each year he actually serves in prison is reasonable and
therefore is due to be affirmed; and
(3) The rule of lenity is inapplicable because of the BOP’s reasonable
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1).
Id. (citations omitted).
Jimenez contends that we should reconsider Brown in light of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 125 S. Ct. 716,(2005), and
Leocal v. Ashcroft. 543 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 377, 160 (2004). “Under the prior panel
rule, we are bound by the holdings of earlier panels unless and until they are
clearly overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.” Swann v. S. Health Partners,
Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 837 (11th Cir. 2004). The prior panel rule applies here because
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Brown has not been overruled by an en banc panel or by the Supreme Court. See
id. Clark and Leocal were decided before Brown and cannot overrule it.
Also, Clark and Leocal do not specifically address the issues raised by this
appeal. See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12 n.8, 8–13, 125 S. Ct. at 384; Clark, 543 U.S. at
380, 125 S. Ct. at 724. Therefore, Brown controls, and we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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