It is admitted that the issue of law in the present case is the same as that upon which State v. Douglass was decided in *163121 Maine, 137. It was there said: “An indictment for selling-intoxicating liquor, then, includes cider, only when it is sold for tippling purposes, or as a beverage. Therefore, a respondent indicted as a common seller for selling cider, can be so indicted, only upon the hypothesis that he is selling it for tippling purposes, or as a beverage. Hence, a respondent so indicted is furnished with knowledge that he is charged, under the statute, with the offense of sellng cider for tippling purposes, or as a beverage.
“We are unable, therefore, to discern why, when a respondent is charged with being a common seller of intoxicating liquor, he does not have the same knowledge of the offense, when proof is offered in support of the charge, that he has sold cider as a beverage, or for tippling purposes, that he would have if proof was offered that he had sold whiskey, beer, ale, porter, or some mixed liquor in proof of the same charge.”,
This court is of the opinion that the time has come when mere refinement of pleading should not be invoked as a subterfuge for the escape of manifest violators of the criminal law. When an indictment employs the use of language which makes clear and unambiguous the offense with which the respondent is charged, and enables him to fully comprehend the charges and make full defense to every allegation in the indictment, we are of the opinion that such indictment is sufficient and should not be quashed, because it does not happen to be couched in that technical language and form, required by the courts in pleadings, when the law required the infliction of the death penalty for stealing a sheep or imprisonment for life for committing what now may be called a misdemeanor. We, accordingly, see no reason for overruling State v. Douglass in 121st Maine.
The motion is not considered in this case as it is not properly before the Law Court.
Exceptions overruled.