[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 9, 2006
No. 05-16093 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00001-CR-WDO-5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSEPH JEROME PERKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(May 9, 2006)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Jerome Perkins appeals his consecutive sentences of 60 and 36
months’ imprisonment imposed after he pled guilty to 1 count of making false
claims, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, and 1 count of aiding and assisting in a
false tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). He was sentenced for his
involvement in preparing 32 fraudulent federal income tax returns in 1998, 1999,
2000, and 2001, in order to obtain false refunds from the Internal Revenue Service
for 15 clients. The Guideline range was 41 to 51 months’ imprisonment.
However, the court sentenced Perkins to the statutory maximum sentence as to
each count, finding that a sentence outside the advisory Guideline range was
warranted based primarily on Perkins’s 29 criminal history points.
On appeal, Perkins argues that the court imposed an unreasonable sentence
because (1) it only considered one of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors, and (2) it failed
to take into consideration that the majority of his criminal history points were for
traffic offenses. He contends that the court in sentencing him to the maximum
sentence available only looked at the number of his past crimes, not their nature.
He argues that the court in sentencing him should have examined the actual fraud
that occurred in the case as opposed to basing its sentence on the potential fraud
alleged by the government. Furthermore, Perkins asserts that the district court
should have determined the need for the sentence imposed, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2), as well as the kinds of sentences available pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3553(a)(3).
We review sentences imposed under the post-Booker advisory Guideline
scheme for reasonableness. United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1244
(11th Cir. 2005); Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-63, 125 S.Ct. at 765-66 (holding that
appellate court review sentences for unreasonableness in light of the § 3553(a)
factors). Following the Booker decision, we have held that the district court must
first correctly calculate the defendant’s advisory Guideline range, and then, using
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the district court can impose a more
severe or more lenient sentence as long as it is reasonable. United States v.
Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005).
Moreover, our review for reasonableness is deferential. United States v.
Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). We have stated that it “must evaluate
whether the sentence imposed by the district court fails to achieve the purposes of
sentencing as stated in section 3553(a),” and that in evaluating a sentence for
reasonableness, we recognize that “there is a range of reasonable sentences from
which the district court may choose . . . .” Id. The § 3553(a) factors include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of
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sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to
avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide
restitution to victims.
Id. at 786; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
In United States v. Scott, we held that a district court’s statement that it had
considered the § 3553(a) factors alone is sufficient in post-Booker sentences to
indicate that it considered the factors. 426 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2005).
We held “that nothing in Booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on
the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to
discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 1329. We concluded that the
defendant’s sentence was reasonable because the district court accurately
calculated the Guideline range and the defendant’s sentence at the low end of the
range reflected the court’s consideration of his evidence in mitigation. Id. at 1330.
In the instant case, we cannot say that Perkins’s consecutive sentences were
unreasonable. First, the district court correctly calculated Perkins’s Guideline
range. See Crawford, 407 F.3d at 1178. Second, the court, in sentencing Perkins
to a sentence in excess of the applicable Guideline range, explained in great detail
why the Guideline range was inadequate. Taking into consideration Perkins’s past
criminal record, the district court found that Perkins’s criminal history category of
VI was insufficient. Third, the district court expressly considered several
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§ 3553(a) factors before deciding that consecutive sentences were appropriate in
this case. Fourth, the court did not sentence Perkins in excess of the statutory
maximum sentence for each count. Upon review of the record and the parties’
briefs, we discern no reversible error.
AFFIRMED.
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