[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 06-11050 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 29, 2006
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00018-CV-1-MP-WCS
VELMA PRESTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(June 29, 2006)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Velma Preston appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social
Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for supplemental security
income benefits, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). On appeal, Preston
argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred by discrediting her
testimony concerning her subjective pain symptoms. After careful review of the
record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.1
Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to an inquiry into
whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner,
and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004);
McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988). Preston’s challenge
to the ALJ’s credibility finding concerns a finding of fact, which we review to
determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d
1520, 1529–30 (11th Cir. 1990). We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute
our own judgment for that of the ALJ. Id. at 1529. A claimant applying for social
security income benefits bears the burden to prove that she is disabled, within the
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The role of the district court, as well as this Court, in a social security appeal is to review
the ALJ’s findings of fact to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence and to
determine whether the ALJ applied the correct relevant law. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520,
1529–30 (11th Cir. 1990). A magistrate judge’s findings on a “factual issue, adopted by the district
court without objection by either party, [are] not subject to attack on appeal except on grounds of
plain error or manifest injustice.” United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).
Here, neither the magistrate judge nor the district court made factual findings, but rather, reviewed
the evidence to determine if substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision. Thus, the
Commissioner’s argument concerning the requirement that a party object to a magistrate judge’s
factual findings in order to preserve it for our review is misplaced.
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meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th
Cir. 1999).
When a claimant attempts to establish disability through her own testimony
of pain or other subjective symptoms, she must show: (1) evidence of an
underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence that
confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition, or (b) that the
objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be
reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d
1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). Testimony that meets this standard can be sufficient
to show disability, and if the ALJ discredits such testimony, he must articulate
explicit and adequate reasons, and this articulation must be supported by
substantial evidence. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011-12 (11th Cir. 1987).
Here, the ALJ properly articulated the pain standard and the factors to
consider when evaluating Preston’s pain and other subjective symptoms. The ALJ
considered the medical findings of three treating doctors and one Social Security
Administration doctor, Preston’s own testimony, and the testimony of a vocational
expert who opined on jobs that were available to a person with Preston’s
restrictions. The ALJ made these findings: (1) that after Preston’s November 1,
2002 surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome and de Quervain’s disease (a condition
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similar to carpal tunnel syndrome, but affecting tendons around the thumb instead
of in the wrist), she failed to seek further treatment for her allegedly disabling
condition; (2) that she was able to control her symptoms using only over-the-
counter medication; and (3) that the medical evidence did not support Preston’s
testimony as to the severity and persistence of her symptoms, including one
examining physician’s finding that Preston made repeated and forceful use of the
limb she claimed was disabled. These reasons are explicit, adequate, and
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hale, 831 F.2d at 1011-12.
In short, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decisions with respect to
weighing the evidence and evaluating Preston’s impairments. Accordingly, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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