concurring.
As reflected in the lead opinion, this Court has obviously had difficulty for quite some time in managing the appropriate contours of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Although I have some reservations, for the sake of certainty and consistency, I join the lead Justices in adopting the federal automobile exception.
I do wish to observe, however, that I find inconsistency in the courts’ rejection of bright-line rules restraining law enforcement as a means of protecting individual rights,1 while simultaneously embracing such rules when they facilitate law enforcement, see OAJC, at 124, 136-37. *139For my own part, I believe there would be benefit in maintaining some clear and appropriate boundaries operating in both directions. Accord Perez, 577 Pa. at 381-82, 845 A.2d at 792 (Saylor, J., concurring and dissenting) (concurring in the abandonment of one such bright-line rule protective of defendants’ rights only because it had been consistently undermined by exceptions).
. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Revere, 585 Pa. 262, 281, 888 A.2d 694, 707 (2005) (quoting the United States Supreme Court for the proposition that "we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules [in the Fourth Amendment context], instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry” (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Perez, 577 Pa. 360, 845 A.2d 779 (2004) (overruling previous decisions which had implemented a 6-hour rule governing the admissibility of pre-arraignment confessions, inter alia, as a means of protecting defendants’ rights to be free from unreasonable seizure of their persons).