[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-13764
June 12, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-22252-CV-JEM
OFELIA CANALS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ARCHDIOCESE OF MIAMI, INC.,
CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF MIAMI, INC.,
MIRIAM ROMAN,
LUCIA VICENCIO,
TERESA REVUELTA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
CENTRO MATER, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(June 12, 2006)
Before CARNES, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ofelia Canals appeals the order denying her motion to recuse, which she
filed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(1), after the district court entered
judgments as a matter of law on her claims against six former co-workers, the
Archdiocese of Miami, Inc., Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc.,
and Centro Mater, Inc., for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act and the Florida Whistleblower Act, defamation, and conspiracy. On appeal,
Canals argues that Judge Jose Martinez of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida should have recused himself based on his position as a
Eucharistic Minister.1 We affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for recusal for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir.1999). Under the
abuse of discretion standard, we “will affirm a district judge’s refusal to recuse
himself unless we conclude that the impropriety is clear and one which would be
recognized by all objective, reasonable persons.” Id.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a federal judge must disqualify himself if his
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” To disqualify a judge under
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We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Canals’s request for an
evidentiary hearing to further develop her theory of recusal. See Loyd v. Alabama Dep’t of Corr.,
176 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999) (reviewing district court’s denial of a request for evidentiary
hearing for abuse of discretion).
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§ 455(a), the bias “must stem from extrajudicial sources, unless the judge’s acts
demonstrate such pervasive bias and prejudice that it unfairly prejudices one of the
parties.” Bailey, 175 F.3d at 968 (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding
whether a district judge should recuse himself under § 455(a), we consider
whether “an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts
underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant
doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321
(11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Section 455(b) requires disqualification under
specific circumstances, including situations where a judge has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party, has participated as counsel in the matter, or has a
financial interest in the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), (2), (4).
The Supreme Court has held that where a judge’s challenged actions
“consist[ed] of judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary
admonishments (whether or not legally supportable) to counsel and to witnesses,”
these actions were not sufficient to require a judge to recuse himself under § 455.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1158, 127 L.Ed.2d 474
(1994) (emphasis added). Moreover, in Liteky, all of the challenged actions
“occurred in the course of judicial proceedings, and neither (1) relied upon
knowledge acquired outside such proceedings nor (2) displayed deep-seated and
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unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
Here, we readily conclude that Judge Martinez did not abuse his discretion
by denying Canals’s motion. Canals failed to establish the existence of a personal
bias, instead asserting arguments that consisted solely of unsubstantiated
speculation. Moreover, Canals’s unsubstantiated speculation was insufficient to
establish that the district judge’s disputed rulings “(1) relied upon knowledge
acquired outside such proceedings nor (2) displayed deep-seated and unequivocal
antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.” Id.
Upon careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we discern no
abuse of discretion and affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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