IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
______________________
No. 92-2018
____________________
CURTIS LEE JOHNSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JAMES A. COLLINS, DIRECTOR,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
On Application for Certificate of Probable Cause
From the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
(June 23, 1992)
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GARWOOD, and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
Johnson asks this court for a certificate of probable cause to
appeal from the district court's denial of his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. For the reasons set out below, his request is
DENIED.
I
On September 24, 1983, Curtis Lee Johnson--carrying a loaded
pistol--and a companion entered the open rear window of the second
story apartment of Murray Dale Sweat. While burglarizing it, they
heard people coming up the stairs to the apartment. Instead of
fleeing, the two remained, and when two people entered, Johnson
pointed the gun at them and told them not to move. One of the men
turned and ran out the door, but the other, Sweat, lunged at
Johnson and grabbed his legs. Johnson kicked Sweat, who fell over
backwards, and then--while Sweat was lying on his back--Johnson
shot and killed him.
II
Johnson was charged with capital murder and on December 15,
1983, was found guilty by a jury. At the punishment phase of the
trial, the jury answered affirmatively the special issues under the
former article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.1
The trial court, accordingly, sentenced Johnson to the death
penalty. On October 23, 1985, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
1
At the time of Johnson's offense, the Texas law provided:
(b)On conclusion of the presentation of the
evidence [at the sentencing proceeding], the
court shall submit the following issues to
the jury:
(1)whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result;
(2)whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society; and
(3)if raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the
provocation, if any, by the deceased.
. . . .
(e)If the jury returns an affirmative finding
on each issue submitted under this article,
the court shall sentence the defendant to
death.
Vernon's Ann. Texas C.C.P. art. 37.071 (1981). The
article was amended in 1985 and 1991.
2
affirmed the conviction and sentence. Johnson v. State, 698 S.W.2d
154 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985).
On January 2, 1986, the trial court scheduled Johnson's
execution for April 7, 1986. On April 3, 1986, Johnson filed in
the United States Supreme Court a Motion for Permission to File
Late Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals and Motion for Stay of Execution. On April 4, 1986,
Johnson also filed a Petition for Stay of Execution and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in federal district court. The district court
granted the stay of execution "pending further order of this Court"
and dismissed the petition on April 28, 1986. On April 7, 1986,
the Supreme Court granted a stay of execution pending the filing
and disposition of a writ for certiorari. On October 6, 1986, the
Supreme Court denied Johnson's petition for writ of certiorari,
thus vacating its stay of execution. Johnson v. Texas, 479 U.S.
871 (1986).
On July 29, 1987, the trial court scheduled Johnson's
execution for September 16, 1987. On August 4, 1987, Johnson filed
an application for writ of habeas corpus in state court, and, after
the trial court modified the execution date, a supplemental
application on October 14, 1987. Both applications were denied.
Ex Parte Johnson, Application No. 15,840-02 (Tex.Crim.App., October
19, 1987) & Application No. 15,840-03 (Tex.Crim.App., October 26,
1987).
On October 21, 1987, Johnson filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in United States District Court for the Southern
3
District of Texas, which granted a stay of execution on October 27,
1987. An evidentiary hearing before a magistrate judge followed
and on December 2, 1991, the district court entered its order
adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge in
its entirety (except conclusion of law 5 which was rejected and for
which the magistrate judge's alternative conclusion of law was
adopted). In accordance therewith, the district court vacated the
October 1987 stay of execution, denied Johnson's petition for writ
of habeas corpus, and denied Johnson a certificate of probable
cause to appeal. These proceedings followed.
III
Johnson applies to us for a certificate of probable cause
after denial of a certificate by the district court. The parties
have submitted briefs on the merits. We have jurisdiction in this
case in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253.
A certificate of probable cause to appeal will be granted
if the applicant can make "a substantial showing of the
denial of a federal right."
A "substantial showing" of a denial of a
federal right means that "the issues are
debatable among jurists of reason, that a
court could resolve the issues [in a different
manner]; or that the questions are `adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'"
The severity of the penalty in a death penalty
case "is a proper consideration in determining
whether to issue a certificate of probable
cause, but the severity of the penalty does
not in itself suffice to warrant the automatic
issuing of a certificate."
Clark v. Collins, 956 F.2d 68, 71 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Buxton v.
Collins, 925 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal quotes and
modifications as in original; citations omitted)). We turn now to
4
the issues raised by Johnson in his petition so that we may
determine if they meet this standard.
A
(1)
Johnson first complains that the district court "erred in
adopting the finding of the magistrate judge that there was
sufficient evidence to support the affirmative jury finding that
[Johnson] acted deliberately when he shot Murray Dale Sweat." We
are not persuaded.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a federal
habeas corpus case, we must decide whether, "after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 320 (1979) (emphasis in original). In "viewing the
evidence," we must consider "all of the evidence . . . in the light
most favorable to the prosecution." Id. (emphasis in original).
We also consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence. Id. Sufficiency of the evidence is determined based
upon the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by
state law. Alexander v. McCotter, 775 F.2d 595, 598 (5th Cir.
1985).
Under Texas law, "deliberately" is not a term of art and is
not defined in the trial judge's instructions to the jury.
Instead, it "is to be taken and understood in its normal use and
common language." Carter v. State, 717 S.W.2d 60, 67
5
(Tex.Crim.App. 1986). The state does not have to show that the
defendant "carefully weighed or considered or carefully studied the
situation immediately prior to killing the deceased in order for
the jury to" decide that the defendant acted "deliberately";
instead, the circumstances of the crime may be sufficient to
support a finding of deliberateness. Id. (emphasis in original).
"Deliberately" is defined as "with careful consideration or
deliberation; circumspectly; not hastily or rashly; slowly; as, a
resolution deliberately formed." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (William Collins Publisher; 2d
ed. 1980). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held:
[W]hile from the act of suddenly and impulsively firing
a gun can be found the intent to cause the death, such
action may not necessarily show that the act was
deliberate. To find the act of deliberateness, there
must be the moment of deliberation and the determination
on the part of the actor to kill. Such determination
must necessarily be found from the totality of the
circumstances of the individual case.
Cannon v. State, 691 S.W.2d 664, 677 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985).
In the instant case, the evidence before the jury showed the
following: Johnson consciously decided to take a loaded gun with
him when he went to commit a burglary of an apartment in which
people were living. When he heard people coming to the apartment,
Johnson made another conscious decision--to remain in the apartment
rather than flee. When Sweat entered the apartment, Johnson chose
to confront him rather than try to hide or leave. In confronting
Sweat, Johnson again made a conscious decision, i.e., to point the
loaded gun at Sweat. The evidence revealed that, after a struggle,
Johnson shot Sweat at a time when Sweat was lying on his back
6
several feet away from Johnson--a position in which he could pose
no threat to Johnson. From these facts, the jury rationally could
have concluded that there was the "moment of deliberation and the
determination . . . to kill" and, thus, that Johnson acted
"deliberately." Cannon, 691 S.W.2d at 677. We, therefore, find
no merit in Johnson's first claim of error.2
(2)
Our conclusion that there was sufficient evidence from which
the jury could rationally have found that Johnson acted
deliberately when he shot Sweat leads to a quick conclusion as to
Johnson's second assignment of error. He contends that his counsel
were ineffective because the issue of sufficiency of the evidence
to support a finding of deliberateness was not raised on direct
appeal.
Even if we assume that Johnson's counsel failed to "function[]
as the `counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment," by failing to
raise sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the fact remains that
the evidence was clearly sufficient to support a finding of
deliberateness. Therefore, there was no prejudice to Johnson from
2
In his "deliberateness" argument, Johnson states that the
evidence showed that on other occasions he carried a gun when
committing crimes and never shot at anyone, even though he
pointed the gun. If this is an argument that because Johnson, on
other occasions, had not shot other people, he did not
"deliberately" shoot Sweat, then it goes astray. The issue is
not whether Johnson acted in conformity with his behavior on
other occasions and, thus, did not shoot Sweat; the issue is
whether Johnson acted deliberately on the occasion when,
admittedly, he did shoot Sweat. The jury considered that
question based on all the evidence before it and reached a
conclusion which it rationally could have reached.
7
counsel's failure. Because his claim of ineffectiveness of counsel
fails the "prejudice" prong of the Strickland test, we find no
merit to it. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
(3)
Johnson next claims that his trial counsel were ineffective
because those lawyers failed to call any witnesses on his behalf at
the punishment phase of his trial. The magistrate judge found
after an evidentiary hearing where trial counsel and witnesses for
Johnson testified, that: 1) "Counsel were not incompetent in
failing to obtain the seven witnesses now claimed to have been
readily accessible at the time;" and 2) "Johnson [has not] proved
that his defense was prejudiced by the failure to call his seven
relatives as witnesses." Johnson v. Collins, No. C.A. H-87-3284,
Memorandum and Recommendation at 7 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
Although Johnson contends that one of his trial counsel was
untruthful about filings made with the Texas court, was sanctioned
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for failure timely to
perform his duties and was not truthful in his answers, the
magistrate made his findings based, in part, upon a determination
of the credibility of the witnesses after their appearance before
him. These findings included, as a predicate to the magistrate
judge's finding that Johnson's counsel were not incompetent, a
factual finding that trial counsel had made efforts to find
witnesses and that both Johnson and his mother had been
uncooperative.
We can overturn findings of fact only if a review of all of
8
the evidence leaves us with "the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed." Bull's Corner Restaurant v.
Director, Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agcy., 759 F.2d 500, 502-03 (5th
Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). When findings of fact are based on
credibility determinations regarding witnesses, we must show even
more deference to the trial court's findings. Anderson v. City of
Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
In this case, our review of the record does not convince us
that "a mistake has been committed," much less the even greater
conviction required to overturn the magistrate judge's findings of
fact. We, therefore, conclude because Johnson's trial counsel made
a good faith effort to locate mitigation witnesses--which was
frustrated by noncooperation on the part of the defendant and his
mother--that trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective.
Additionally, even if we did not reach this conclusion, we
agree with the magistrate judge (and the district court) that the
lack of mitigation witnesses did not prejudice Johnson. None of
the proposed witnesses had even seen Johnson for several years.
They said they would have testified that Johnson was "slow" and
that, therefore, he did not deliberately shoot Sweat.
Additionally, they would have testified that, in their opinion,
Johnson did not pose a future danger. We agree with the magistrate
judge that "[i]n view of the calculated nature of the crime and
Johnson's prior and subsequent criminal history, including two
other aggravated robberies, there is little chance the jury would
have been impressed by the testimony of . . . highly partisan
9
relative witnesses." Memorandum and Recommendation at 7.
(4)
Johnson next complains that the district court erred in
concluding that Texas's procedure--at the punishment phase of the
trial limiting the jury to answering the three special issues--
allowed the jury to consider and give effect to "all mitigating
evidence." Although admitting that he introduced no mitigating
evidence, Johnson contends that "a juror . . . might reasonably
have believed that [he] should not be sentenced to death because of
the relatively non-aggravated circumstances of the murder . . .
despite having found that the State had proven affirmatively the
three special issues." He contends that the special issues
"provided no vehicle by which a juror could give effect to such a
reasoned moral response to the circumstances of the crime." He
cites Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2951 (1989), as supporting
the proposition that "the jury must be able to consider and give
effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's
background, character, or the circumstances of the crime in order
to ensure reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case."
Even if we assume that Johnson is correct in his reading of
Penry, we still conclude that there is no merit to this claim of
error. Each capital defendant is entitled to an "individualized
assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty" based on
the jury's "reasoned moral response to the defendant's background,
character, and crime." Penry, 109 S.Ct. at 2947 (emphasis in
10
original; citations and internal quotations omitted). To the
extent, however, that Johnson's argument is that the jury should be
allowed to avoid answering the special issues affirmatively because
they feel sympathy for Johnson, that argument has been discredited
by Saffle v. Parks, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1279 (1990), in which Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, pointed out that the Supreme
Court cases do not require such an instruction. California v.
Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987) held that an instruction to the
jury not to base its sentencing recommendation on, inter alia,
sympathy, did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
To the extent that Johnson's argument is simply that the jury
could not avoid answering a special issue affirmatively, even
though it had reached a reasoned moral conclusion that he was not
worthy of the death penalty, we disagree. Johnson asserts that his
crime was "non-aggravated" (by which we assume Johnson refers to
the absence of torture, mutilation, multiple wounds, etc.). We
reject his characterization of this murder. Even if Johnson's
crime could be said to be non-aggravated, Johnson's moral
culpability was relevant to and could have been considered in
answering the future dangerousness issue. Furthermore, moral
culpability under such circumstances could have been considered
under the first or third special issues. In Johnson's case, the
jury could have concluded that Johnson did not act deliberately,
but was provoked by Sweat's lunge at him into reflexively firing a
single shot after which he escaped as quickly as possible. This
conclusion would have allowed the jury to answer either the
11
deliberateness or provocation issues negatively. We find no merit
in this assignment of error.
(5)
Johnson next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective
because "[r]easonably effective trial counsel would have attempted
to question each prospective juror during voir dire regarding the
ability of the prospective juror to vote "no" on at least one
special issue, even though the State had proven the issue . . .
beyond a reasonable doubt, if the circumstances of the offense were
such that the death penalty should not be assessed." He further
contends that counsel should have asked the trial court, both at
voir dire and before the jury retired to consider its verdict, to
instruct the jury "that at least one special issue must be answered
negatively if the circumstances of the offense were such that the
death penalty should not be assessed."
The magistrate judge points out that the larger part of one of
Johnson's trial counsel's "final argument in the punishment phase
. . . urged the jury to engage in an act of nullification because
the death penalty was morally wrong and the jury should return a
life sentence." Furthermore, to the extent that Johnson argues
that the jury should have been instructed it could answer one or
more special issue negatively, regardless of mitigating evidence,
that is not the law in Texas. A prospective juror who states he or
she would answer negatively to a special issue, even though the
state had proven it beyond a reasonable doubt, is disqualified from
service. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 422-24 (1985). Neither
12
can such an argument withstand the Supreme Court's condemnation of
"uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries" in administration of
the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253 (1972).
In short, Johnson does not show that his trial counsel failed
either prong of the Strickland test in connection with this
assignment of error. First, trial counsel's performances were not
so deficient that they failed to meet the constitutional standard.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Second, Johnson has not demonstrated
prejudice as a result of counsel's alleged ineffectiveness in this
respect because had counsel sought such instructions, they
justifiably would have been refused in accordance with Witt and
Furman. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. We, therefore, find no merit
in Johnson's argument concerning this issue.
Although we have addressed Johnson's claims as they were
presented to us, we think it important to observe that we could
have dispensed with these arguments with greater dispatch: The
claims he makes in regard to the procedure under Texas's death
penalty statute (discussed above in sections III (A) (4) & (5)) fly
into the face of Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), and Franklin
v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988), which have upheld the Texas
statutes as constitutional except in limited circumstances
explicated in Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2947-51 (1989).
Because this record is devoid of any Penry type evidence, these
attacks on the Texas statute are meritless.
(6)
Finally, Johnson argues that "the district court erred . . .
13
in finding . . . that [he] was not prejudiced by the error of
counsel during voir dire in instructing two prospective jurors,
both of whom became members of the jury which convicted and
sentenced [him], that `deliberately' means much the same as
`intentionally.'"3 Johnson contends that "[b]y instructing two
3
We understand Johnson to refer to the examinations during
voir dire of Charles Allen White and Frank Alan Cain by Benjamin
Durant, one of his trial counsel.
In Durant's examination of Charles Allen White, the
following exchange occurred:
Q. . . . Now, let me give you a fact situation. Would
you agree with me that this word "deliberately" and the
word "intentionally," mean basically the same thing?
A. Well, no, not really.
Q. Okay. What do you see the difference in them?
A. I see deliberately is doing the act right then and
there, you know, just taking it and doing it; and
intentionally is walking in the door with the intent of
doing it.
Q. Okay. Let me say this. When you say deliberately
means doing it and knowing you're doing it?
A. Right.
Q. And wanting to do it?
A. That's right.
Q. That's deliberately?
A. That's what I said.
. . .
A. But it [whether or not something was committed
deliberately] would have to be proven to me.
Q. Let me ask you this: It has to be proven to you
beyond a reasonable doubt?
A. Absolutely.
14
. . .
Q. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not
something was committed deliberately, can you answer
that question [the first special issue] "no"?
A. If I have got a reasonable doubt, yes, sir, I
could.
State Trial Record Vol. 12, pp. 38-40. In Durant's examination
of Frank Alan Cain, we find the following:
Q. I'm going to state the word "intentional" or
"deliberate," I think they can possibly be two
interchangeable words taking a fact situation into
account.
. . .
Q. Let me give you an example of what I'm talking
about. Suppose two men--suppose two men are fighting.
Let's say if--let me give you a little background of
that. Let's say one man is burglarizing another man's
car, broken into this man's car; and then the man comes
out and sees the fellow inside his car, the man that
owns the car. So he attacks the burglar and they're
fighting, and during the course of the fight a gun
comes up from somewhere; and the two are struggling
over the gun. And the gun goes off and shoots and
kills the man who owns the car.
Do you follow what I'm saying?
A. Yeah. Right.
Q. Now, this would be a capital murder situation; but
there may be a question, because the two men are
struggling over a gun as to whether or not the burglar
intentionally or deliberately shot the man that owned
the car.
Do you follow what I'm saying?
A. He just--just intentionally kills someone. Right.
I understand what you are saying.
Q. But what I'm saying, there may be--there may be a
possibility that because of the fact--quite naturally
if he just walked up to him and shot him in cold-blood,
15
jurors that the words mean much the same, defense counsel lessened
the burden on the state," and that "had defense counsel not
instructed two members of the jury that `deliberately' means much
the same as `intentionally,' the outcome with respect to Special
Issue No. 1 would have been different."
One prospective juror, Charles Allen White stated that
"deliberate" and "intentional" had different meanings to him.
Although he initially appeared to confuse the meanings, as the
questioning progressed, he seemed to have corrected his initial
confusion. He responded to counsel's questions in such a way that
he could have been understood to see "deliberate" as requiring
conscious thought and choice to engage in an act, over and above
merely purposeful conduct.
Frank Alan Cain, contrary to Johnson's argument, clearly
obviously he did that intentionally and deliberately.
A. Right.
Q. Because the two of them are struggling, there is a
possibility that the burglar didn't intend to do it.
Do you follow what I'm saying?
A. Right.
Q. He killed the man because during the struggling the
gun goes off, whatever the case might be. Because of
that particular fact situation--don't misunderstand me.
I'm not trying to lock into any particular fact. I'm
giving you that as a hypothetical example on how a
person can be killed during the course of a felony
being committed. It might possibly not be a deliberate
act, you see.
A. Right.
State Trial Record Vol. 12, pp. 196-198.
16
demonstrated that he understood the difference between "deliberate"
and "intentional." First, he made no response to Durant's
assertion that the two were "interchangeable." He then responded
correctly to Durant's questions:
Q. Now, this would be a capital murder situation; but
there may be a question, because the two men are
struggling over a gun as to whether or not the burglar
intentionally or deliberately shot the man that owned the
car.
Do you follow what I'm saying?
A. He just--just intentionally kills someone. Right.
I understand what you are saying.
He then went on and responded correctly as Durant pursued the fact
situation he had outlined:
Q. . . . if he just walked up to him and shot him in
cold blood, obviously he did that intentionally and
deliberately.
A. Right.
He correctly responded as Durant distinguished "intentional" and
"deliberate."
Q. Because the two of them are struggling, there is a
possibility that the burglar didn't intend to do it.
. . .
A. Right.
Q. . . . It possibly might not be a deliberate act, you
see.
A. Right.
The magistrate judge, who reviewed the record and heard the
testimony of Durant, found as fact that "Mr. Durant did not mislead
members of the jury into the belief that `intentionally' and
`deliberately' meant the same thing and that an affirmative finding
17
must automatically be made on Special Issue No. 1 [after a finding
of guilt in the guilt/innocence phase]." Report and Recommendation
at 21. He concluded that Johnson was not prejudiced by Durant's
conduct of voir dire, id. at 13, and concluded as a matter of law
that Johnson had received effective assistance of counsel "under
the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)."
Id. at 21.
Strickland instructs us that in reviewing claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, "judicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential," must avoid distortion by
hindsight, and must "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
Our review of the record does not leave us with "the definite
and firm conviction" that the magistrate judge was mistaken
concerning the belief of the jurors, and, therefore, we cannot
overturn this finding of fact. Bull's Corner Restaurant, 759 F.2d
at 502-03. Thus, we cannot agree with Johnson that the jurors were
so confused about the difference between "deliberate" and
"intentional" that the verdict on special issue one was affected.
Furthermore, we agree with the court below that Johnson received
"effective assistance of counsel under the standards of Strickland
v. Washington."
This contention of error is without merit.
IV
Having reviewed Johnson's assignments of error and having
18
found them without merit, we conclude that he is not entitled to a
certificate of probable cause. Although we have resolved one
issue, that of the effectiveness of counsel at voir dire, in a
different theoretical manner than did the court below, we do not
consider that resolution to be "in a different manner," i.e.,
coming to a contrary conclusion such that "encouragement to proceed
further" is deserved. The application for a certificate of
probable cause is, therefore,
D E N I E D.
19
Johnson v. Collins
Combined Opinion