[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-16745 JULY 12, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00184-CR-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SHARON D. HENDRICKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(July 12, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sharon D. Hendricks appeals her 30-month sentence, which is above the
advisory Guidelines imprisonment range of 10 to 16 months, imposed following
her conviction on 99 counts of possessing and uttering forged securities of an
organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a). According to the record,
Hendricks worked as a paralegal in a law firm with responsibilities related to real
estate closings, including writing checks from an escrow account which, in the
normal course of business, were then forwarded to the managing partner of the law
firm for his signature and disbursement. Between September 14, 2001, and
January 2, 2004, however, Hendricks prepared and forged the managing partner’s
signature on over 99 checks, which were made payable to various payees, for a
total amount of $79,417.83. The district court sentenced Hendricks to 30 months’
imprisonment, which sentence is above the advisory Guidelines range. On appeal,
Hendricks argues that this sentence is unreasonable.1
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d
621 (2005), a district court, in determining a reasonable sentence, must correctly
calculate the sentencing range under the Guidelines and then consider the factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786
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To the extent that Hendricks also argues that her sentence was based on an invalid
upward departure, we hold that this argument is without merit. It is clear from the record that
the district court did not depart upward from the Guidelines, but rather, treated the Guidelines as
advisory and, after considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, imposed a sentence that was
more severe than the high-end of the Guidelines range.
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(11th Cir. 2005). The factors in § 3553(a) include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of
sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to
avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide
restitution to victims.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). “[N]othing in Booker or elsewhere requires the
district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the
§ 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). Instead, indications in the record that
the district court considered facts and circumstances falling within § 3553(a)’s
factors will suffice. Id. at 1329-30; Talley, 431 F.3d at 786.
We review a defendant’s ultimate sentence for reasonableness in light of the
§ 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir.
2005). This “[r]eview for reasonableness is deferential,” and the district court
“may impose a sentence that is either more severe or lenient than the sentence we
would have imposed,” so long as that sentence is reasonable. Talley, 431 F.3d at
788. “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing
that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and the factors in
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section 3553(a).” Id.
Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that
Hendricks has failed to meet her burden of showing that her sentence was
unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. See Talley, 431 F.3d
at 788. In this case, the district court correctly calculated the advisory Guidelines
range and indicated that it had considered facts and circumstances falling within
§ 3553(a)’s factors, such as (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense,
including the number of forged checks, the total amount stolen, and the long period
of time that Hendricks’s conduct went undetected; (2) the history and
characteristics of Hendricks, including both the fiduciary relationship she occupied
within the law firm and her family needs; (3) the seriousness of the offense, which
the judge described as one which “strikes at the very heart of the whole practice of
law”; and (4) the fact that it is unlikely that Hendricks will be able to provide
restitution to the victims in this case. See id. at 786. Moreover, Hendricks’s
30-month sentence is only one-fourth of the statutory maximum sentence of
10 years’ imprisonment, and this is an additional indication of reasonableness. See
Winingear, 422 F.3d at 1246 (comparing the sentence imposed to the statutory
maximum in determining its reasonableness); 18 U.S.C. § 513(a). Finally, in her
brief, Hendricks does not discuss the applicability of the § 3553(a) factors, let
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alone demonstrate which factors weigh in favor of a lower sentence.
Because the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range and
considered the § 3553(a) factors, and because Hendricks failed to establish that her
sentence is unreasonable, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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