[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 12, 2006
No. 05-15812 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-60910-CV-CMA
HERBERT LEE HATHCOCK, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.,
DAVIS, Nurse,
KEN JENNE,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 12, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Herbert Lee Hathcock, Jr., a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se,
appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint for failure to state
a claim. The district court properly dismissed the complaint because Hathcock
failed to state a constitutional violation; at most, his allegations amount to
negligence, which is not actionable under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.1
Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background
Hathcock filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Armor
Correctional Health Services, Inc., Dr. Douglas Smith, Nurse Bernice Rayson,
Nurse Practitioner Lynch, Sharon Johnson, and Deputy P. Ginkel, all at the JV
Conte Facility (“JVC”), and Broward County Sheriff Ken Jenne and Nurse Davis
at the Broward County Main Jail (“BCJ”), and various John Does, alleging
deliberate indifference to his medical needs and failure to properly train staff, in
violation of the United States Constitution. According to the complaint, (1) Davis
refused to re-bandage Hathcock’s hand after he suffered a large gash, instead
telling him to wash it with soap; (2) Rayson refused to give him medication, which
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Hathcock argues on appeal that the district court erred by analyzing his claims under
the Eighth Amendment because, as a pre-trial detainee, his claims are analyzed under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although the record is unclear as to whether Hathcock was a pre-trial
detainee during the events, the distinction is immaterial. The Eighth Amendment standard,
applicable to prisoners, and the Fourteenth Amendment standard, applicable to pre-trial
detainees, are the same. Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1024 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) (en
banc); Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997).
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prompted a seizure, refused to provide him with the care he requested after his
seizure, and continued to deny Hathcock seizure and asthma medication despite his
prescriptions; (3) Ginkel denied Hathcock medical care after Hathcock experienced
a seizure and fell backward down some stairs, ignored other inmates’ pleas for
Ginkel to help Hathcock after the fall, and refused to move Hathcock to the first
floor despite his history of seizures; (4) Johnson stated that Davis had a “reckless
disregard attitude;” and (5) Lynch changed Hathcock’s dosage of seizure medicine
and failed to examine him after his fall. Hathcock also alleged that Jenne provided
inadequate training and breached his contract to provide medical care. According
to Hathcock, his history of seizures and asthma was well-documented, and he had
filed several grievances about the withholding of his medication. He also filed
grievances complaining of the defendants’ failure to provide eyeglasses. Hathcock
was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
The magistrate judge performed the required screening under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and recommended that the
complaint be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.
Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, the magistrate judge
nevertheless determined that Hathcock had not alleged constitutional violations.
Specifically, the magistrate judge found: (1) the allegations against Davis were
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insufficient to state a claim because they amounted to a mere difference of opinion
on proper medical care; (2) the allegations against Ginkel did not state a claim for
deliberate indifference to medical needs because Ginkel was not a medical
professional and there was no evidence of injury from the failure to move
Hathcock to a first floor cell; (3) the allegations against Rayson amounted, at most,
to negligence or medical malpractice, which is insufficient to state a constitutional
claim; (4) there were no allegations against Johnson, and there could be no liability
under a theory of respondeat superior; (5) there were no allegations against Armor,
Smith, or the John Does; and (6) the allegations against Lynch did not involve
constitutional issues. As for the allegations against Jenne for inadequate training,
the magistrate judge found that the conclusory allegations were insufficient to
sustain the complaint, Hathcock had not identified a specific policy leading to a
constitutional violation, and Hathcock could not rely on the theory of vicarious
liability. The magistrate judge noted that Hathcock did not make any specific
claims against Jenne that established a causal connection between the alleged
failure to train and any injury he sustained.
Hathcock objected to the recommendation, asserting that he should be
allowed to conduct discovery and that the defendants were under contract to
provide medical care. He further argued that he stated a claim for constitutional
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violations because his need for medical treatment was obvious and the defendants
would have known of the risks involved had they been adequately trained. The
district court adopted the recommendation, over Hathcock’s objections, and
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.
II. Discussion
After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the magistrate judge
applied the proper legal standards, and we agree with the well-reasoned report and
recommendation, which the district court affirmed. Therefore, we AFFIRM the
district court ruling dismissing Hathcock’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
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