[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUG 31, 2006
No. 06-11337 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00541-CV-J-32MMH
BRENDA W. DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EDUCATION DEPT. SERVICES, INC.,
PIONEER CREDIT RECOVERY, INC.,
UNITED STUDENT AID FUNDS, INC.,
EQUIFAX CREDIT INFORMATION SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(August 31, 2006)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Brenda W. Davis, proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of her Motion to
Reopen the Case for Noncompliance [with] Settlement Agreement and Motion to
Bring Immediate Action Against Sallie Mae D/B/A General Revenue Corp.
(“GRC”),1 alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692 et seq., and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the district court.
I. Background
In 2003, Davis initiated this action against Education Services, Inc.; Pioneer
Credit Recovery, Inc.; United Student Aid Funds, Inc.; and Equifax Credit
Information Services. Davis alleged that the defendants had engaged in unlawful
collection practices relating to the collection of two Parent PLUS student loans she
had obtained for her son, Cartice Davis.
The parties settled the case in mediation in 2004. Pursuant to the settlement
agreement, the defendants agreed to pay Davis $5,000 and to cancel the Parent
PLUS loans, with a notation for credit reporting purposes that the loans had been
paid in full. Davis filed a Notice of Dismissal with Prejudice and then an
Amended Notice of Dismissal with Prejudice, stating in the latter that she would
dismiss her case with prejudice “provided the Settlement amount is paid [by] the
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Although plaintiff’s motion to bring immediate action named Sallie Mae and General
Revenue Corp., the district court instructed all defendants to respond to the motion.
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time established and the fulfillment of conditions are met in the Settlement
Agreement” and the Court would enforce “any violation of the Agreement.” The
court then entered an order stating that it would “delay entry of an order of
dismissal until plaintiff advises all provisions of the settlement have been
satisfied.” Thereafter, Davis received the $5,000 and filed a Notice of Dismissal
with Prejudice, and the court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice
on December 16, 2004.
In September 2005, however, Davis filed a motion to reopen her case,
alleging noncompliance with the settlement agreement. She then filed a motion to
bring an immediate action against Sallie Mae, which was doing business as GRC.
Specifically, Davis contended that, in violation of the terms of her
settlement, the appellees continued to harass Cartice for payment of the student
loans. The district court denied Davis’s motions, finding that the terms of the
Settlement Agreement had not been violated.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Davis argues that despite the Settlement Agreement, Cartice
continues to receive harassing phone calls from Sallie Mae/GRC, the appellees are
garnishing his pay checks, and the appellees intercepted his tax refund. Davis
asserts that the appellees failed to notify other credit reporting agencies,
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specifically TransUnion and Experian, of corrections to her credit report, and
Equifax allowed people to view her credit report without her permission. She
further argues that she is attempting to reopen the case because the appellees refuse
to eliminate all of the student loan debt reported to the credit reporting agencies
and refuse to stop harassing her and her family in an attempt to collect the debt.
Davis contends that she filed the notice of dismissal with prejudice and
signed the releases prematurely. She argues that she is not raising new claims and
suggests that the settlement agreement was supposed to include Cartice’s
obligations and not merely her own Parent PLUS loans. Although she realized that
Cartice’s name was not included in the settlement agreement, she assumed that he
was nevertheless a party to the agreement as a result of her discussions with the
mediator.
We review the denial of Davis’s motions for an abuse of discretion. See
Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1994)
(reviewing motion to vacate dismissal and reopen settlement agreement for abuse
of discretion); see also Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300,
1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (denial of Rule 60(b) motion reviewed for abuse of
discretion).
Upon review of the record and in consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
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discern no reversible error. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Davis’s motions because Davis’s complaints appear to involve matters and
parties that were not the subject of the original suit and resulting settlement
agreement. That is, the loan collection attempts about which Davis now complains
appear to involve loans other than the Parent PLUS loans obtained by Davis, and,
as such, the Settlement Agreement had no effect on the collection of those loans.
Furthermore, although Davis contends that her TransUnion and Experian
credit reports are incorrect, she did not allege that the inaccuracies related to the
Parent PLUS loans. In any event, neither TransUnion nor Experian was a party to
the Settlement Agreement, and the terms of the Agreement do not appear to require
the appellees to notify competing credit reporting agencies of the terms of the
Settlement. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
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