NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 20-3564
___________
IZZADEEN SHIABDEEN JAINUL ABDEEN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA-1: A088-379-465)
Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy
____________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 28, 2021
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 29, 2021)
OPINION*
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Izzadeen Shiabdeen Jainul Abdeen, a Sri Lankan national, has twice had his
motions to reopen removal proceedings denied by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) as untimely. The first time, the BIA found that the “changed country
conditions” exception to the timeliness requirement, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), did not apply. The second time, it found that, even assuming
conditions had changed, Abdeen had not established prima facie eligibility for relief, see
Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012), and we then affirmed. Following
the 2019 Easter Bombing and a rise in anti-Muslim violence in Sri Lanka, Abdeen filed a
third petition to reopen. But while the BIA agreed that circumstances had changed, it
denied Abdeen’s motion because he still had not established prima facie eligibility for
relief. Abdeen petitioned this court for review. Because the BIA’s decision was not an
abuse of discretion, we will deny the petition.
Discussion1
To establish a prima facie case for relief, an alien must demonstrate a “reasonable
likelihood that he can establish that he is entitled to relief.” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d
556, 563 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Abdeen claims that the BIA erred by applying
a higher standard, requiring him to actually establish his eligibility. The BIA, however,
clearly cited and applied our “reasonable likelihood” standard in addressing Abdeen’s
1
This Court has jurisdiction over Abdeen’s petition for review pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). See Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006). We
review the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Guo v.
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004).
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prima facie eligibility both for asylum and withholding of removal and for protection
under the Convention Against Torture. See A.R. 4, 6.
Abdeen argues that the BIA abused its discretion by not considering evidence that
he provided regarding the rise in anti-Muslim sentiment following the Easter Bombing.
But the BIA expressly cited this evidence as the basis for its determination that country
conditions had changed. See A.R. 5. It also explained that this evidence could not
establish prima facie eligibility because it did not show that Abdeen had “a reasonable
likelihood of establishing either an individualized risk of persecution or that there may be
a pattern or practice of persecution against Muslims in Sri Lanka.” Id. at 5-6. That is all
we require of the BIA. See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The
[BIA] is . . . required . . . only to show that it has reviewed the record and grasped the
movant’s claims.”) (citation omitted).
Abdeen also argues that the BIA abused its discretion by taking into consideration
that 9.7% of Sri Lanka’s population is Muslim and that his family had not suffered harm.
While he claims these factors are not relevant, he identifies no specific legal error, and
his mere disagreement is not enough for us to find that the BIA’s decision was “arbitrary,
irrational, or contrary to law.” Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition as to the BIA’s November 18,
2020 order.
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